Article How long could Britain really fight if war broke out tomorrow? (hawk style)

[C C]

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5yq5zdv907o

EXCERPTS: There are many ways of fighting a war, and not just the physically destructive wave of drones, bombs and missiles so tragically familiar to the citizens of Ukraine.

Our modern, tech-driven society is highly dependent on the network of undersea cables and pipelines that connect the UK to the rest of the world, carrying data, financial transactions and energy.

Covert activity by Russian spy vessels, such as the Yantar, is widely believed to have scoped out these cables for potential sabotage in a time of war, which is why the Royal Navy has recently invested in a fleet of underwater drones equipped with integrated sensors.

In a war, these hidden, unseen actions, combined with an almost inevitable attempt to "blind" Western satellites in space, would seriously hamper the UK's ability to fight, as well as potentially wreaking havoc on civil society.

[...] "There remains little evidence that the UK has a plan to fight a war lasting more than a few weeks," argues Rusi's Hamish Mundell. "Medical capacity is limited. Reserve regeneration pipelines are slow… The British plan for mass casualty outcomes appears to be based on not taking casualties." With classic British understatement, he says: "This could be considered an optimistic planning assumption."

He adds that to fight a long war you need proper back-up. "It demands a second and even third echelon; personnel, platforms and logistics chains that can absorb losses and continue the fight. Yet this depth is notably absent from current British force design."

[...] Even conservative estimates put the number of Russians killed at 150,000. Ukraine has also suffered catastrophic casualties but numbers are hard to ascertain. But Russia has been able to draw on such a massive pool of manpower that it has so far been able to replace its estimated 30,000 monthly battlefield casualties with fresh blood.

Russia's economy has also been on a war footing for more than three years now: an economist has been placed in charge of the Defence Ministry, while its factories churn out ever more supplies of drones, missiles and artillery shells. According to a recent report by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Russia has been producing each month around 150 tanks, 550 infantry fighting vehicles, 120 Lancet drones and more than 50 artillery pieces.

The UK, and most of its Western allies, are simply not anywhere near this point. [...] Today, with multiple pressures on the economy, the government is striving to meet a target of 2.5% of GDP by 2027 [spent on defence] , while Russia spends close to 7%.

On paper, the British Army numbers around 74,000, but Rusi's Ed Arnold points out that once you subtract medically non-deployable soldiers, defence attaches around the world and others not part of formed units, then its actual deployable strength is only 54,000. That is less than the average number of casualties Russia takes in two months in Ukraine.

In the event of a war, says Justin Crump of Sibylline, on land the (British) Army would most likely be degraded – incapable of fighting effectively - within weeks, once committed, though he adds "much depends on the form of the conflict"... (MORE - missing details)

[stryder]

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5yq5zdv907o

EXCERPTS: There are many ways of fighting a war, and not just the physically destructive wave of drones, bombs and missiles so tragically familiar to the citizens of Ukraine.

Our modern, tech-driven society is highly dependent on the network of undersea cables and pipelines that connect the UK to the rest of the world, carrying data, financial transactions and energy.

Covert activity by Russian spy vessels, such as the Yantar, is widely believed to have scoped out these cables for potential sabotage in a time of war, which is why the Royal Navy has recently invested in a fleet of underwater drones equipped with integrated sensors.

In a war, these hidden, unseen actions, combined with an almost inevitable attempt to "blind" Western satellites in space, would seriously hamper the UK's ability to fight, as well as potentially wreaking havoc on civil society.

[...] "There remains little evidence that the UK has a plan to fight a war lasting more than a few weeks," argues Rusi's Hamish Mundell. "Medical capacity is limited. Reserve regeneration pipelines are slow… The British plan for mass casualty outcomes appears to be based on not taking casualties." With classic British understatement, he says: "This could be considered an optimistic planning assumption."

He adds that to fight a long war you need proper back-up. "It demands a second and even third echelon; personnel, platforms and logistics chains that can absorb losses and continue the fight. Yet this depth is notably absent from current British force design."

[...] Even conservative estimates put the number of Russians killed at 150,000. Ukraine has also suffered catastrophic casualties but numbers are hard to ascertain. But Russia has been able to draw on such a massive pool of manpower that it has so far been able to replace its estimated 30,000 monthly battlefield casualties with fresh blood.

Russia's economy has also been on a war footing for more than three years now: an economist has been placed in charge of the Defence Ministry, while its factories churn out ever more supplies of drones, missiles and artillery shells. According to a recent report by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Russia has been producing each month around 150 tanks, 550 infantry fighting vehicles, 120 Lancet drones and more than 50 artillery pieces.

The UK, and most of its Western allies, are simply not anywhere near this point. [...] Today, with multiple pressures on the economy, the government is striving to meet a target of 2.5% of GDP by 2027 [spent on defence] , while Russia spends close to 7%.

On paper, the British Army numbers around 74,000, but Rusi's Ed Arnold points out that once you subtract medically non-deployable soldiers, defence attaches around the world and others not part of formed units, then its actual deployable strength is only 54,000. That is less than the average number of casualties Russia takes in two months in Ukraine.

In the event of a war, says Justin Crump of Sibylline, on land the (British) Army would most likely be degraded – incapable of fighting effectively - within weeks, once committed, though he adds "much depends on the form of the conflict"... (MORE - missing details)

To be effectively capable of dealing with an enemy, it would likely require a surplus of money that could cover fighting a war for 10 years. That fund could be traded outside of warfare but should always been maintained to cover it should the need arise.

In previous wars, the method to reach finances was a mixture of selling out to third-party countries and selling stamps/war bonds to those in the country willing to support the venture.

Money isn't of course the only thing that needs to be considered. Logistics and production is a major point, and it's some of what the Prime Minister has actually likely been doing while jetting about (much to the chagrin of the opposition) There likely needs to be greater investment in automation in regards to the production chains however which brings its' own concerns in regards to security.

The other problem is of course manpower. The Great British public are use to a post war society, however the world has been shifting towards the pre-war of the next "Great one". If the country is unwilling to get people organised and trained in greater number, then it will be left to conscription in the future. (Which might be seen as fairer or unfair depending on how it's cast).

There would likely be need of a number of different shifts in regards to the welfare and healthcare systems as sacrifices would be necessary to get a potential war machine purring. All in all it would probably take a decade or so to be ready to fight a major war, rather than just being skirmishers.