Yesterday 03:17 AM
(This post was last modified: Yesterday 03:19 AM by C C.)
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5yq5zdv907o
EXCERPTS: There are many ways of fighting a war, and not just the physically destructive wave of drones, bombs and missiles so tragically familiar to the citizens of Ukraine.
Our modern, tech-driven society is highly dependent on the network of undersea cables and pipelines that connect the UK to the rest of the world, carrying data, financial transactions and energy.
Covert activity by Russian spy vessels, such as the Yantar, is widely believed to have scoped out these cables for potential sabotage in a time of war, which is why the Royal Navy has recently invested in a fleet of underwater drones equipped with integrated sensors.
In a war, these hidden, unseen actions, combined with an almost inevitable attempt to "blind" Western satellites in space, would seriously hamper the UK's ability to fight, as well as potentially wreaking havoc on civil society.
[...] "There remains little evidence that the UK has a plan to fight a war lasting more than a few weeks," argues Rusi's Hamish Mundell. "Medical capacity is limited. Reserve regeneration pipelines are slow… The British plan for mass casualty outcomes appears to be based on not taking casualties." With classic British understatement, he says: "This could be considered an optimistic planning assumption."
He adds that to fight a long war you need proper back-up. "It demands a second and even third echelon; personnel, platforms and logistics chains that can absorb losses and continue the fight. Yet this depth is notably absent from current British force design."
[...] Even conservative estimates put the number of Russians killed at 150,000. Ukraine has also suffered catastrophic casualties but numbers are hard to ascertain. But Russia has been able to draw on such a massive pool of manpower that it has so far been able to replace its estimated 30,000 monthly battlefield casualties with fresh blood.
Russia's economy has also been on a war footing for more than three years now: an economist has been placed in charge of the Defence Ministry, while its factories churn out ever more supplies of drones, missiles and artillery shells. According to a recent report by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Russia has been producing each month around 150 tanks, 550 infantry fighting vehicles, 120 Lancet drones and more than 50 artillery pieces.
The UK, and most of its Western allies, are simply not anywhere near this point. [...] Today, with multiple pressures on the economy, the government is striving to meet a target of 2.5% of GDP by 2027 [spent on defence] , while Russia spends close to 7%.
On paper, the British Army numbers around 74,000, but Rusi's Ed Arnold points out that once you subtract medically non-deployable soldiers, defence attaches around the world and others not part of formed units, then its actual deployable strength is only 54,000. That is less than the average number of casualties Russia takes in two months in Ukraine.
In the event of a war, says Justin Crump of Sibylline, on land the (British) Army would most likely be degraded – incapable of fighting effectively - within weeks, once committed, though he adds "much depends on the form of the conflict"... (MORE - missing details)
EXCERPTS: There are many ways of fighting a war, and not just the physically destructive wave of drones, bombs and missiles so tragically familiar to the citizens of Ukraine.
Our modern, tech-driven society is highly dependent on the network of undersea cables and pipelines that connect the UK to the rest of the world, carrying data, financial transactions and energy.
Covert activity by Russian spy vessels, such as the Yantar, is widely believed to have scoped out these cables for potential sabotage in a time of war, which is why the Royal Navy has recently invested in a fleet of underwater drones equipped with integrated sensors.
In a war, these hidden, unseen actions, combined with an almost inevitable attempt to "blind" Western satellites in space, would seriously hamper the UK's ability to fight, as well as potentially wreaking havoc on civil society.
[...] "There remains little evidence that the UK has a plan to fight a war lasting more than a few weeks," argues Rusi's Hamish Mundell. "Medical capacity is limited. Reserve regeneration pipelines are slow… The British plan for mass casualty outcomes appears to be based on not taking casualties." With classic British understatement, he says: "This could be considered an optimistic planning assumption."
He adds that to fight a long war you need proper back-up. "It demands a second and even third echelon; personnel, platforms and logistics chains that can absorb losses and continue the fight. Yet this depth is notably absent from current British force design."
[...] Even conservative estimates put the number of Russians killed at 150,000. Ukraine has also suffered catastrophic casualties but numbers are hard to ascertain. But Russia has been able to draw on such a massive pool of manpower that it has so far been able to replace its estimated 30,000 monthly battlefield casualties with fresh blood.
Russia's economy has also been on a war footing for more than three years now: an economist has been placed in charge of the Defence Ministry, while its factories churn out ever more supplies of drones, missiles and artillery shells. According to a recent report by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Russia has been producing each month around 150 tanks, 550 infantry fighting vehicles, 120 Lancet drones and more than 50 artillery pieces.
The UK, and most of its Western allies, are simply not anywhere near this point. [...] Today, with multiple pressures on the economy, the government is striving to meet a target of 2.5% of GDP by 2027 [spent on defence] , while Russia spends close to 7%.
On paper, the British Army numbers around 74,000, but Rusi's Ed Arnold points out that once you subtract medically non-deployable soldiers, defence attaches around the world and others not part of formed units, then its actual deployable strength is only 54,000. That is less than the average number of casualties Russia takes in two months in Ukraine.
In the event of a war, says Justin Crump of Sibylline, on land the (British) Army would most likely be degraded – incapable of fighting effectively - within weeks, once committed, though he adds "much depends on the form of the conflict"... (MORE - missing details)
