Damasio's Error & Descartes' Truth - An Inquiry into Consciousness, Metaphysics, & Epistemology
http://metapsychology.mentalhelp.net/poc...458&cn=394
EXCERPT (book review by Sandra Egege): According to [Andrew L. ] Gluck, drawing metaphysical conclusions from empirical findings commits a logical fallacy in that it 'presupposes what it sets out to prove.' Not only does it assume the reality of the physical world but it confuses a narrow, limited scientific reality with 'ultimate reality' (pp. xvii-xix). In contrast to this, Gluck suggests that there may be more than one truth and puts forward a case for a pluralistic metaphysics. This does not mean he is arguing for the mutual existence of the non-physical / spiritual with the physical as within the traditional dualist metaphysical model. Rather, he is putting forward the idea that different disciplines should use different metaphysical frameworks, as dictated by the limitations of their subject matter. He suggests physical monism as the most suitable for the sciences, neutral monism for aesthetics and mind/body dualism for the social sciences. He takes this position because of the limitations of the scientific paradigm to deal with subjectivity and phenomena like consciousness.
Positing a multiple metaphysics is a controversial position, but one that could be of great import to discussions about the reality of the self and consciousness. Within science, selves have no concrete reality or, at best, have a kind of abstract existence. Could a multiple metaphysical approach help categorise anomalous phenomena like selves and qualia and offer a clearer picture of where our experienced reality fits with the scientific worldview, and vice versa? Could God still have a place?
Given this expectation, I began to read Gluck's text under the supposition that it would expound some kind of detailed metaphysics that, in the process, would reveal where Damasio (and those of his persuasion) had gone wrong in their contentions about the self and that this analysis would vindicate Descartes. Not so. While Gluck does begin by expounding a pluralistic metaphysical position, he does not directly offer a critique of Damasio's and others' ideas, nor does he offer a defence of Descartes. What he does claim is that Damasio was wrong in claiming that science has shown 'once and for all' that Descartes was wrong and that mind and body are not metaphysically separate entities. Nor can Damasio claim that Spinoza was right about ultimate reality being a neutral substance. For Gluck, this is committing the logical fallacy of assuming what it is one wants to prove. Science can't justify metaphysics because metaphysical assumptions are inherent in the scientific enterprise....
http://metapsychology.mentalhelp.net/poc...458&cn=394
EXCERPT (book review by Sandra Egege): According to [Andrew L. ] Gluck, drawing metaphysical conclusions from empirical findings commits a logical fallacy in that it 'presupposes what it sets out to prove.' Not only does it assume the reality of the physical world but it confuses a narrow, limited scientific reality with 'ultimate reality' (pp. xvii-xix). In contrast to this, Gluck suggests that there may be more than one truth and puts forward a case for a pluralistic metaphysics. This does not mean he is arguing for the mutual existence of the non-physical / spiritual with the physical as within the traditional dualist metaphysical model. Rather, he is putting forward the idea that different disciplines should use different metaphysical frameworks, as dictated by the limitations of their subject matter. He suggests physical monism as the most suitable for the sciences, neutral monism for aesthetics and mind/body dualism for the social sciences. He takes this position because of the limitations of the scientific paradigm to deal with subjectivity and phenomena like consciousness.
Positing a multiple metaphysics is a controversial position, but one that could be of great import to discussions about the reality of the self and consciousness. Within science, selves have no concrete reality or, at best, have a kind of abstract existence. Could a multiple metaphysical approach help categorise anomalous phenomena like selves and qualia and offer a clearer picture of where our experienced reality fits with the scientific worldview, and vice versa? Could God still have a place?
Given this expectation, I began to read Gluck's text under the supposition that it would expound some kind of detailed metaphysics that, in the process, would reveal where Damasio (and those of his persuasion) had gone wrong in their contentions about the self and that this analysis would vindicate Descartes. Not so. While Gluck does begin by expounding a pluralistic metaphysical position, he does not directly offer a critique of Damasio's and others' ideas, nor does he offer a defence of Descartes. What he does claim is that Damasio was wrong in claiming that science has shown 'once and for all' that Descartes was wrong and that mind and body are not metaphysically separate entities. Nor can Damasio claim that Spinoza was right about ultimate reality being a neutral substance. For Gluck, this is committing the logical fallacy of assuming what it is one wants to prove. Science can't justify metaphysics because metaphysical assumptions are inherent in the scientific enterprise....