“More important than logic is truth & in particular the truth of some contradictions"

[C C]

https://www.3-16am.co.uk/articles/yes-and-no

INTRO (excerpt from Zach Weber interview): 'I am a dialetheist, or glut theorist, and on that basis I also think some paraconsistent logic is correct. An example of a true contradiction is that for any set, there is always a bigger set than that (Cantor’s theorem), but also there is a set of all sets (the universe of sets) which is as big as it can be—so the universe is bigger than itself, and not. Obviously. ... Or for a more mundane example, if you quit smoking six weeks ago, then you might be both a smoker and not a smoker. Do you want a cigarette? Yes and no.'

'“Ultralogic” was Richard Routley/Sylvan’s name circa 1977 for his envisioned logic that would “open all locks”. Sylvan was a visionary and his work has been tremendously influential, on many people, and on me, especially at some formative moments. It’s the logic I was been hinting at above – the content/context neutral consequence relation that works no matter what.'

'I tried to make the case for paraconsistent vagueness in a paper over 10 years ago, after working with Mark Colyvan on the problem. Priest put something in the same vicinity forward. To be candid, so far the ‘glutty vagueness’ proposal has not gained many adherents—even fellow glut theorists like Jc Beall think you can have tolerance without gluts, as you say. Maybe he’s right. But maybe the ‘glutty vagueness’ view hasn’t been around long enough yet. Give it another four minutes.'

'A theory of truth ... will need to be paraconsistent, but that doesn’t make it ‘paraconsistent truth’—it’s just ‘truth’. I’d do it using a paraconsistent logic, but that’s just because I’d do it using logic . And also for the reasons above, it can’t be a ‘meta’ theory, because there’s no outside the universe. So that right there would be the difference with classical theories.'

'There is something to connecting paraconsistency and dialetheism to some kind of religious impulse. Set theory with a universal set, a universal logic, semantic closure—these are all totalizing worldviews, with some theistic overtones.'

Zach Weber is an expert in philosophical logic, with a focus on paradoxes and non-classical logic. Here he discusses why he's interested in non-classical logics, paraconsistency, strong and weak versions, his dialetheistic position, paraconsistency and ethics, paraconsistency and the temptation to mitigate against resolving inconsistencies, ultralogic, vagueness, another problem with boundaries, closure and revenge, metatheories and paraconsistencies, the challenge of trivial worlds, and paraconsistency and the religious impulse... (MORE - the interview)

[Ostronomos]

The departure from a classical universe is the first step towards a correct approach to a Quantum mechanical modelling of the universe.

[Leigha]

As an aside, I hadn't really considered that there may be a ''variety'' of logical systems. Mind is blown.

When it comes to ''truth'' is it fair to say that it's ''always been there,'' and logic is a method of understanding it? Since logic is a system of determining what is true and false.

[C C]

As an aside, I hadn't really considered that there may be a ''variety'' of logical systems. Mind is blown.

As a general discipline, logic is the study of reasoning, which in the course of that activity has thereby also set standards for distinguishing good reasoning from bad. A particular "logic" is a toolkit of rules and techniques for addressing special concerns; or it can be broad modification taking a different course from classic conceptions of the enterprise.

Previously, my understanding of paraconsistent logic is that by spurning explosiveness it could tolerate inconsistent information, when the latter was interesting or intriguing, rather than automatically abandoning it. That is, paraconsistent logic didn't so much accept the conflict as continue to investigate it with the hope that what looked like contradiction could be resolved or open up new insights. Here, however, it sounds like a much deeper commitment.

When it comes to ''truth'' is it fair to say that it's ''always been there,'' and logic is a method of understanding it? Since logic is a system of determining what is true and false.

It's contended that truth is a property of propositions, when the latter are conceived as "nonlinguistic, abstract and timeless entities" bearing the "meanings" of declarative sentences (potentially prior to humans inventing language). In that context the truth is Platonically "out there", but not with a location in empirical space.

But by definition no one can sensibly exhibit such non-sensible or purely intelligible objects. So I prefer (perhaps over-simplistically) for "true/false" to be values that apply to the relationship that a declarative sentence has with affairs of actual, non-described existence (like the asteroid Ceres as perceived or scientifically mapped) or to an artificial fact of an invented idea or system (like "there are nine innings in baseball"). If there's nothing at the other end of the relationship, or if what's there is not what it is supposed to be, then the sentence is false.

Obviously cultural traditions and the feral preferences and biases of personal or group interpretation can affect conclusions about sensory experiences. But that's what the systemic conventions of professional practices and skillsets are for, to output a consensus for themselves and/or an official one for larger communities slash government. The standardized assessments and measurements work for whatever these disciplines themselves are trying to accomplish, regardless of the hermeneutical quibbling from critics abroad about how _X_ is being conceived.

Going back to the interview, a mundane "true contradiction" like being both a smoker and a non-smoker sounds more in the territory of descriptions that are too vague, unrefined -- or there is no single, non-contested criterion setting precise boundaries for parts of its subject matter. A problem of linguistic or symbolic representation, rather than a person literally perceiving a contradictory thing or circumstance. (Though some optical and auditory illusions might qualify, but that's actually the brain cognitively shifting back and forth between unsettled identifications rather than the thing, pattern, or circumstance itself being existentially confused.)