Just as life itself can't be reduced to some proto-life property inherent in matter, I doubt that consciousness can be reduced to some proto-experiential property of matter. There is an emergent quality to it that defies explanation in terms of composition. That's not to say there may be more explanatory power in terms of consciousness's relations to the outer world, as an interactive and information-gathering process.
But I don't place much stock in a panpsychic reductionism to some material property. Too much of consciousness, as with life also, arises out of the structured matrix of itself and its world. It actually is emergent, and so may never satisfactorily have a clear and formulaic explanation in terms of its physical elements.
But I don't place much stock in a panpsychic reductionism to some material property. Too much of consciousness, as with life also, arises out of the structured matrix of itself and its world. It actually is emergent, and so may never satisfactorily have a clear and formulaic explanation in terms of its physical elements.