https://iai.tv/articles/can-there-be-bel...-auid-1199
EXCERPT: . . . The ideas we have about young children's, animals' or aliens’ feelings and intentions suggest that it is possible to be a thinker without being a speaker. But some philosophers have denied it, arguing that only language users can believe anything. [...] Beliefs are often described as mental representations that have propositional structure, which means they can be characterised in terms of sentences. They permit rational inference such that we can use sets of beliefs about the world to infer new things about the world, and have truth value such that our beliefs are either true or not.
Given the parallel structure between belief and language, perhaps it shouldn’t be surprising that some people think that it is impossible to have belief without language. Language and belief both appear to have sentential structure that allows us to think things like: All dogs are mammals, Fido is a dog, and from those two thoughts conclude that Fido is a mammal. From these sorts of observations, we develop hypotheses. Maybe we think in language! Maybe language is required to have a thought at all. Maybe it is linguistic structure that allows us to solve problems and construct generalisations. After all, language is like magic, permitting the creation of an infinite number of new thoughts with its finite set of tools.
It’s not a bad hypothesis, but it doesn’t hold up to scrutiny. Language is powerful, but not so powerful that it creates thoughts out of nothing. Language can be used to create new concepts which allow us to think new thoughts, so with language we can create beliefs that we never had before. An alternative hypothesis is that without something to think about in the first place, there would be nothing to talk about. Thoughts drive language.
According to the alternative hypothesis, language is a tool for communicating thoughts. If the function of language is to communicate what we think, we have another explanation for the parallel structure between belief and language: belief is required for language, but language is not required for belief.
[...] The two hypotheses make different predictions about the conceptual connection between belief and language. If language is required for belief, then they should be conceptually intertwined, and there should be no evidence of belief that doesn’t also serve as evidence for language. However, when we understand belief as having the function of thinking and language as having the function of communicating, we can make sense of evidence for belief that does not provide evidence for language. Because prelinguistic child behaviour, animal behaviour, or hypothetical alien behaviour provokes questions about what these individuals are thinking. It is sometimes natural for us to ask what a non-language-user thinks. In contrast, we are never inclined to wonder whether a language user is a thinker.
Scientists accept animal belief as the best explanation for animals’ facilities with communication and cultural technologies. [...] Those who think that language is necessary for thought have to reject the scientists’ appeal to animal belief to explain their ability to communicate and use technology. But they can’t deny the conceptual priority of belief over language. (MORE - details)
EXCERPT: . . . The ideas we have about young children's, animals' or aliens’ feelings and intentions suggest that it is possible to be a thinker without being a speaker. But some philosophers have denied it, arguing that only language users can believe anything. [...] Beliefs are often described as mental representations that have propositional structure, which means they can be characterised in terms of sentences. They permit rational inference such that we can use sets of beliefs about the world to infer new things about the world, and have truth value such that our beliefs are either true or not.
Given the parallel structure between belief and language, perhaps it shouldn’t be surprising that some people think that it is impossible to have belief without language. Language and belief both appear to have sentential structure that allows us to think things like: All dogs are mammals, Fido is a dog, and from those two thoughts conclude that Fido is a mammal. From these sorts of observations, we develop hypotheses. Maybe we think in language! Maybe language is required to have a thought at all. Maybe it is linguistic structure that allows us to solve problems and construct generalisations. After all, language is like magic, permitting the creation of an infinite number of new thoughts with its finite set of tools.
It’s not a bad hypothesis, but it doesn’t hold up to scrutiny. Language is powerful, but not so powerful that it creates thoughts out of nothing. Language can be used to create new concepts which allow us to think new thoughts, so with language we can create beliefs that we never had before. An alternative hypothesis is that without something to think about in the first place, there would be nothing to talk about. Thoughts drive language.
According to the alternative hypothesis, language is a tool for communicating thoughts. If the function of language is to communicate what we think, we have another explanation for the parallel structure between belief and language: belief is required for language, but language is not required for belief.
[...] The two hypotheses make different predictions about the conceptual connection between belief and language. If language is required for belief, then they should be conceptually intertwined, and there should be no evidence of belief that doesn’t also serve as evidence for language. However, when we understand belief as having the function of thinking and language as having the function of communicating, we can make sense of evidence for belief that does not provide evidence for language. Because prelinguistic child behaviour, animal behaviour, or hypothetical alien behaviour provokes questions about what these individuals are thinking. It is sometimes natural for us to ask what a non-language-user thinks. In contrast, we are never inclined to wonder whether a language user is a thinker.
Scientists accept animal belief as the best explanation for animals’ facilities with communication and cultural technologies. [...] Those who think that language is necessary for thought have to reject the scientists’ appeal to animal belief to explain their ability to communicate and use technology. But they can’t deny the conceptual priority of belief over language. (MORE - details)