Dec 27, 2018 08:05 AM
https://aeon.co/essays/why-it-is-better-...ly-perfect
EXCERPT: ‘I am glad,’ wrote the acclaimed American philosopher Susan Wolf, ‘that neither I nor those about whom I care most’ are ‘moral saints’. ... Wolf’s essay ‘Moral Saints’ (1982) imagines two different models of the moral saint, which she labels the Loving Saint and the Rational Saint.
The Loving Saint, as described by Wolf, does whatever is morally best in a joyful spirit: such a life is not fun-free, but it is unerringly and unwaveringly focused on morality. We are to think of the Loving Saint as the kind of person who cheerfully sells all of her or his possessions in order to donate the proceeds to famine relief.
The Rational Saint is equally devoted to moral causes, but is motivated not by a constantly loving spirit, rather by a sense of duty.
The Loving Saint might be more fun to be around than the Rational Saint, or more maddening, depending on your own personal temperament. ... Both types of moral saint are likely to present difficulties if you are not a saint yourself. Would they be constantly bothering you and urging you to give more? ... Do you want to be friends with someone whose 100 per cent moral focus always seems, in effect, to be encouraging you to feel guilty? The aspiration to be a moral saint, Wolf suggests, might turn someone into a nightmare to live with and be around.
... But perhaps a true saint, being as decent a person as possible, wouldn’t want you to feel bad all the time: what would be good about that? In fact, wouldn’t true moral saints be as sensitive about their effect on your life as they are about their effect on the world at large? Wolf suggests that the problem then would be that the moral saint would have to hide her true thoughts ... Moreover, can a moral saint laugh sincerely at your cynical jokes[?]...
And, in any case, when would they have the time to hang out with you? If they are morally perfect, then they have far more morally important things to be doing. ... The problem with extreme altruism, as Oscar Wilde is reported to have said about socialism, is that it takes up too many evenings. Moral saints might be able to find time for some of these activities when they happen to coincide with their ethical projects ... But these experiences have to be seen as lucky extras if the only aim in life is to do as much moral good as possible.
If you don’t have enough time for friendship or fun, or works of art or wildlife, then you are missing out on what Wolf calls the non-moral part of life. Wolf does not mean to suggest that non-moral equals immoral: just because something doesn’t have anything to do with morality ... it does not follow that it is therefore morally bad.
... Perhaps, Wolf suggests, the Loving Saint is almost missing a piece of perceptual equipment: an ability to see that there is more to life than morality. Perhaps this explains why the Loving Saint can stay happy. By contrast, Wolf does not suppose that the Rational Saint fails to see that there is a huge area of life that she is missing out on. Wolf imagines the Rational Saint persisting in her barren life through a sense of duty alone.
... Wolf’s two versions of moral sainthood are modelled on the two most influential moral philosophies of modern Western philosophy: utilitarianism (which inspires Wolf’s Loving Saint) and Kantianism (which inspires the Rational Saint).
... It is a significant feature of both utilitarianism and Kantianism that neither value personal happiness very highly, if at all. Utilitarianism is a philosophy of ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number’ and so, if the needs of the many require you to make enormous personal sacrifices, including sacrificing your happiness, then so be it. ...
Kantian morality is even less concerned with personal happiness. Kantianism, derived from and named after the 18th-century philosopher Immanuel Kant, is a philosophy that emphasises our rational responsibility to other rational beings (hence Wolf’s ‘Rational Saint’ label). The reason to do the right thing is because it is your duty to others, not because it will make you happy. ...
[...] The morally good life has become identified with a life of selfless altruism and the most desirable life with a life of self-focused pleasure-seeking. The good life has therefore become split in two opposing directions, and the resulting huge schism seems a cause for concern.
These reflections, among others, might send one in the direction of Ancient Greek virtue ethics in search of views that predate the schism. ... Aristotle most notably, held views of ethics that encouraged neither selfishness nor selflessness: the best kind of life would be concerned with others, and involve pleasurable engagement with others’ lives, but it would not require impartial dedication to the needs of strangers. Ethics is more concerned with the question of how to be a good friend than it is the question of how to save the world. And, as with good friendships, ethics is both good for you and good for other people. At the heart of Aristotle’s ethics is the ultimate win-win. The best ethical life simply is the most desirable life, and the fulfilment of our social nature consists in living in mutual happiness with others. Ancient views such as Aristotle’s therefore render the schism between morality and personal happiness inconceivable.
Wolf, in depicting moral sainthood in unappealing terms, could easily be misinterpreted as encouraging a return to views such as Aristotle’s. But a careful reading of ‘Moral Saints’ makes clear that Wolf has no such intention. ... She is quite content to leave the concept of modern morality as it is: strongly altruistic, impartial and global in its reach.
... But ... Morality doesn’t oblige you to become a moral saint. Morality doesn’t require you to have no other interests besides morality. You have a life. Having a life doesn’t mean that you don’t take morality seriously or that you have given up on trying to be a decent person.
... One ongoing theme in Wolf’s philosophy is that [...] Moral concepts mark out very important areas of life but don’t tell us everything about life or how to live it. It’s therefore not a criticism of a moral theory that life wouldn’t be very appealing if we transformed the theory in question into our sole answer to life’s questions. That would be to misunderstand the role of a moral theory. Wolf, in putting moral theory in its place, wants to liberate ... We can be inspired in how to live by all sorts of sources...
MORE: https://aeon.co/essays/why-it-is-better-...ly-perfect
EXCERPT: ‘I am glad,’ wrote the acclaimed American philosopher Susan Wolf, ‘that neither I nor those about whom I care most’ are ‘moral saints’. ... Wolf’s essay ‘Moral Saints’ (1982) imagines two different models of the moral saint, which she labels the Loving Saint and the Rational Saint.
The Loving Saint, as described by Wolf, does whatever is morally best in a joyful spirit: such a life is not fun-free, but it is unerringly and unwaveringly focused on morality. We are to think of the Loving Saint as the kind of person who cheerfully sells all of her or his possessions in order to donate the proceeds to famine relief.
The Rational Saint is equally devoted to moral causes, but is motivated not by a constantly loving spirit, rather by a sense of duty.
The Loving Saint might be more fun to be around than the Rational Saint, or more maddening, depending on your own personal temperament. ... Both types of moral saint are likely to present difficulties if you are not a saint yourself. Would they be constantly bothering you and urging you to give more? ... Do you want to be friends with someone whose 100 per cent moral focus always seems, in effect, to be encouraging you to feel guilty? The aspiration to be a moral saint, Wolf suggests, might turn someone into a nightmare to live with and be around.
... But perhaps a true saint, being as decent a person as possible, wouldn’t want you to feel bad all the time: what would be good about that? In fact, wouldn’t true moral saints be as sensitive about their effect on your life as they are about their effect on the world at large? Wolf suggests that the problem then would be that the moral saint would have to hide her true thoughts ... Moreover, can a moral saint laugh sincerely at your cynical jokes[?]...
And, in any case, when would they have the time to hang out with you? If they are morally perfect, then they have far more morally important things to be doing. ... The problem with extreme altruism, as Oscar Wilde is reported to have said about socialism, is that it takes up too many evenings. Moral saints might be able to find time for some of these activities when they happen to coincide with their ethical projects ... But these experiences have to be seen as lucky extras if the only aim in life is to do as much moral good as possible.
If you don’t have enough time for friendship or fun, or works of art or wildlife, then you are missing out on what Wolf calls the non-moral part of life. Wolf does not mean to suggest that non-moral equals immoral: just because something doesn’t have anything to do with morality ... it does not follow that it is therefore morally bad.
... Perhaps, Wolf suggests, the Loving Saint is almost missing a piece of perceptual equipment: an ability to see that there is more to life than morality. Perhaps this explains why the Loving Saint can stay happy. By contrast, Wolf does not suppose that the Rational Saint fails to see that there is a huge area of life that she is missing out on. Wolf imagines the Rational Saint persisting in her barren life through a sense of duty alone.
... Wolf’s two versions of moral sainthood are modelled on the two most influential moral philosophies of modern Western philosophy: utilitarianism (which inspires Wolf’s Loving Saint) and Kantianism (which inspires the Rational Saint).
... It is a significant feature of both utilitarianism and Kantianism that neither value personal happiness very highly, if at all. Utilitarianism is a philosophy of ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number’ and so, if the needs of the many require you to make enormous personal sacrifices, including sacrificing your happiness, then so be it. ...
Kantian morality is even less concerned with personal happiness. Kantianism, derived from and named after the 18th-century philosopher Immanuel Kant, is a philosophy that emphasises our rational responsibility to other rational beings (hence Wolf’s ‘Rational Saint’ label). The reason to do the right thing is because it is your duty to others, not because it will make you happy. ...
[...] The morally good life has become identified with a life of selfless altruism and the most desirable life with a life of self-focused pleasure-seeking. The good life has therefore become split in two opposing directions, and the resulting huge schism seems a cause for concern.
These reflections, among others, might send one in the direction of Ancient Greek virtue ethics in search of views that predate the schism. ... Aristotle most notably, held views of ethics that encouraged neither selfishness nor selflessness: the best kind of life would be concerned with others, and involve pleasurable engagement with others’ lives, but it would not require impartial dedication to the needs of strangers. Ethics is more concerned with the question of how to be a good friend than it is the question of how to save the world. And, as with good friendships, ethics is both good for you and good for other people. At the heart of Aristotle’s ethics is the ultimate win-win. The best ethical life simply is the most desirable life, and the fulfilment of our social nature consists in living in mutual happiness with others. Ancient views such as Aristotle’s therefore render the schism between morality and personal happiness inconceivable.
Wolf, in depicting moral sainthood in unappealing terms, could easily be misinterpreted as encouraging a return to views such as Aristotle’s. But a careful reading of ‘Moral Saints’ makes clear that Wolf has no such intention. ... She is quite content to leave the concept of modern morality as it is: strongly altruistic, impartial and global in its reach.
... But ... Morality doesn’t oblige you to become a moral saint. Morality doesn’t require you to have no other interests besides morality. You have a life. Having a life doesn’t mean that you don’t take morality seriously or that you have given up on trying to be a decent person.
... One ongoing theme in Wolf’s philosophy is that [...] Moral concepts mark out very important areas of life but don’t tell us everything about life or how to live it. It’s therefore not a criticism of a moral theory that life wouldn’t be very appealing if we transformed the theory in question into our sole answer to life’s questions. That would be to misunderstand the role of a moral theory. Wolf, in putting moral theory in its place, wants to liberate ... We can be inspired in how to live by all sorts of sources...
MORE: https://aeon.co/essays/why-it-is-better-...ly-perfect
