Apr 24, 2021 05:07 AM
https://theconversation.com/there-are-pl...uty-158687
EXCERPTS: . . . The discussion of whether or not one should take the COVID-19 vaccine is often framed in terms of individual self-interest: The benefits outweigh the risk, so you should do it. That’s not a moral argument.
Most people likely believe that others have wide latitude in determining how they care for their own health, so it can be permissible to engage in risky activities [...] Whether one should get vaccinated, however, is a moral issue because it affects others, and in a couple of ways.
First, effective vaccines are expected to decrease not only rates of infection but also rates of virus transmission. This means that getting the vaccine can protect others from you and contribute to the population reaching herd immunity.
Second, high disease prevalence allows for more genetic mutation of a virus, which is how new variants arise. If enough people aren’t vaccinated quickly, new variants may develop that are more infectious, are more dangerous or evade current vaccines.
The straightforward ethical argument, then, says: Getting vaccinated isn’t just about [...] the right to take risks with your own safety. But as the British philosopher John Stuart Mill argued in 1859, your freedom is limited by the harm it could do to others. In other words, you do not have the right to risk other people’s health, and so you are obligated to do your part to reduce infection and transmission rates.
It’s a plausible argument. But the case is rather more complicated...
[...] Refusing to be vaccinated does not violate Mill’s harm principle, as it does not directly threaten some particular other with significant harm. Rather, it contributes a very small amount to a large, collective harm.
Since no individual vaccination achieves herd immunity or eliminates genetic mutation, it is natural to wonder: Could we really have a duty to make such a very small contribution to the collective good?
[...] Is getting vaccinated intimate? While it may not appear so at first blush, it involves having a substance injected into your body, which is a form of bodily intimacy. It requires allowing another to puncture the barrier between your body and the world. In fact, most medical procedures are the sort of thing that it seems inappropriate to demand of someone, as individuals have unilateral moral authority over what happens to their bodies.
The argument presented here objects to intimate duties because they seem too invasive. However, even if members of the moral community don’t have the standing to demand that others vaccinate, they are not required to stay silent; they may ask, request or entreat, based on very good reasons. And of course, no one is required to interact with those who decline... (MORE - details)
EXCERPTS: . . . The discussion of whether or not one should take the COVID-19 vaccine is often framed in terms of individual self-interest: The benefits outweigh the risk, so you should do it. That’s not a moral argument.
Most people likely believe that others have wide latitude in determining how they care for their own health, so it can be permissible to engage in risky activities [...] Whether one should get vaccinated, however, is a moral issue because it affects others, and in a couple of ways.
First, effective vaccines are expected to decrease not only rates of infection but also rates of virus transmission. This means that getting the vaccine can protect others from you and contribute to the population reaching herd immunity.
Second, high disease prevalence allows for more genetic mutation of a virus, which is how new variants arise. If enough people aren’t vaccinated quickly, new variants may develop that are more infectious, are more dangerous or evade current vaccines.
The straightforward ethical argument, then, says: Getting vaccinated isn’t just about [...] the right to take risks with your own safety. But as the British philosopher John Stuart Mill argued in 1859, your freedom is limited by the harm it could do to others. In other words, you do not have the right to risk other people’s health, and so you are obligated to do your part to reduce infection and transmission rates.
It’s a plausible argument. But the case is rather more complicated...
[...] Refusing to be vaccinated does not violate Mill’s harm principle, as it does not directly threaten some particular other with significant harm. Rather, it contributes a very small amount to a large, collective harm.
Since no individual vaccination achieves herd immunity or eliminates genetic mutation, it is natural to wonder: Could we really have a duty to make such a very small contribution to the collective good?
[...] Is getting vaccinated intimate? While it may not appear so at first blush, it involves having a substance injected into your body, which is a form of bodily intimacy. It requires allowing another to puncture the barrier between your body and the world. In fact, most medical procedures are the sort of thing that it seems inappropriate to demand of someone, as individuals have unilateral moral authority over what happens to their bodies.
The argument presented here objects to intimate duties because they seem too invasive. However, even if members of the moral community don’t have the standing to demand that others vaccinate, they are not required to stay silent; they may ask, request or entreat, based on very good reasons. And of course, no one is required to interact with those who decline... (MORE - details)
