Mar 20, 2017 01:05 AM
Sommerfeld’s Miracle: The Ultimate Challenge to Scientific Realism
http://thebjps.typepad.com/my-blog/
EXCERPT: A ‘no miracles’ argument is still prevalent in the scientific realism debate, even if a lot has changed since Hilary Putnam’s formulation of it, and even if the word ‘miracle’ is generally avoided. For example, realists think that if the most central ‘working’ parts of a scientific theory were not even approximately true (for any serious theory of ‘approximate truth’), then it would be incredibly unlikely (‘miraculous’) for that theory to deliver successful novel predictions with ‘perfect’ quantitative accuracy (e.g. to several significant figures). It would be like perfectly predicting the time and position of the next solar eclipse based on a completely false (not even approximately true) model of how the sun, moon, and earth interact. Here it is appropriate to talk in terms of ‘counterexamples’ to scientific realism: any historical case where a scientific theory delivered ‘perfect’ predictions but where the central working parts of the theory are now thought to be radically false would be a very serious thorn in the side of nearly every contemporary scientific realist position....
Causation in Scientific Methods
http://thebjps.typepad.com/my-blog/2016/...thods.html
EXCERPT: Need scientists worry about philosophy? Or should philosophers get off their backs and let them do their work in peace? Unsurprisingly, many scientists want to stay clear of philosophical discussions. What is more disturbing is when I hear philosophers themselves announce that our discipline has nothing useful to offer science. In my view, they could not be more wrong.
I study causation. Scientists search for causation. It is clear that we have some interests in common, but our approach is different. I want to know what causation is and what it means for something to cause something else. Scientists use methods to discover causes, choosing the ones they think are best suited for the task. But how can one judge which method is better or worse for picking out causation unless one already has some idea of what causation is?
There are many philosophical theories of causation available and no general agreement about which one is correct. Is causation the same as regularity, difference-making, probability-raising, manipulability, energy transference, tendencies, or perhaps all of these? And what difference does it make to the scientist, one way or the other?
As it happens, scientific methods are not philosophically neutral. They bring with them all sorts of philosophical commitments, especially but not exclusively about causation. These days I am writing a book with Stephen Mumford on causation in science. During this work I’ve come to realise just how much positivism and Humean philosophy has influenced the normative and methodological foundation of science in general. In the book we encourage the scientist to critically reflect upon this philosophical foundation, while also offering an alternative. In our research project, Causation, Complexity and Evidence in Health Sciences (CauseHealth),1 we offer an alternative to positivism for medicine.
So how do scientific methods involve philosophical assumptions about the nature of causation? A quick glance at some basic methodological approaches might help illustrate this point....
Recent updates to SEP entries:
Friedrich Nietzsche
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche/
Nietzsche's Life and Works
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietz...ife-works/
Contractarianism
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contractarianism/
Maimonides
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/maimonides/
Juan Luis Vives [Joannes Ludovicus Vives]
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/vives/
http://thebjps.typepad.com/my-blog/
EXCERPT: A ‘no miracles’ argument is still prevalent in the scientific realism debate, even if a lot has changed since Hilary Putnam’s formulation of it, and even if the word ‘miracle’ is generally avoided. For example, realists think that if the most central ‘working’ parts of a scientific theory were not even approximately true (for any serious theory of ‘approximate truth’), then it would be incredibly unlikely (‘miraculous’) for that theory to deliver successful novel predictions with ‘perfect’ quantitative accuracy (e.g. to several significant figures). It would be like perfectly predicting the time and position of the next solar eclipse based on a completely false (not even approximately true) model of how the sun, moon, and earth interact. Here it is appropriate to talk in terms of ‘counterexamples’ to scientific realism: any historical case where a scientific theory delivered ‘perfect’ predictions but where the central working parts of the theory are now thought to be radically false would be a very serious thorn in the side of nearly every contemporary scientific realist position....
Causation in Scientific Methods
http://thebjps.typepad.com/my-blog/2016/...thods.html
EXCERPT: Need scientists worry about philosophy? Or should philosophers get off their backs and let them do their work in peace? Unsurprisingly, many scientists want to stay clear of philosophical discussions. What is more disturbing is when I hear philosophers themselves announce that our discipline has nothing useful to offer science. In my view, they could not be more wrong.
I study causation. Scientists search for causation. It is clear that we have some interests in common, but our approach is different. I want to know what causation is and what it means for something to cause something else. Scientists use methods to discover causes, choosing the ones they think are best suited for the task. But how can one judge which method is better or worse for picking out causation unless one already has some idea of what causation is?
There are many philosophical theories of causation available and no general agreement about which one is correct. Is causation the same as regularity, difference-making, probability-raising, manipulability, energy transference, tendencies, or perhaps all of these? And what difference does it make to the scientist, one way or the other?
As it happens, scientific methods are not philosophically neutral. They bring with them all sorts of philosophical commitments, especially but not exclusively about causation. These days I am writing a book with Stephen Mumford on causation in science. During this work I’ve come to realise just how much positivism and Humean philosophy has influenced the normative and methodological foundation of science in general. In the book we encourage the scientist to critically reflect upon this philosophical foundation, while also offering an alternative. In our research project, Causation, Complexity and Evidence in Health Sciences (CauseHealth),1 we offer an alternative to positivism for medicine.
So how do scientific methods involve philosophical assumptions about the nature of causation? A quick glance at some basic methodological approaches might help illustrate this point....
Recent updates to SEP entries:
Friedrich Nietzsche
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche/
Nietzsche's Life and Works
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietz...ife-works/
Contractarianism
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contractarianism/
Maimonides
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/maimonides/
Juan Luis Vives [Joannes Ludovicus Vives]
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/vives/
