http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reasons-just-vs-expl/
First published Sun Apr 24, 2016; [Editor's Note: The following new entry by Maria Alvarez replaces the former entry on this topic by the previous author.]
INTRO: Why are you always lying? Why did the Ancient Egyptians mummify their dead? Should Huck Finn have turned Jim in? Why is she selling her car? Questions that ask for reasons, and in particular, reasons for action, are among the commonest questions humans have. Philosophers have sought to understand the nature of such reasons. Most contemporary philosophers start by distinguishing two types of reason for action: “normative” reasons—that is, reasons which, very roughly, favour or justify an action, as judged by a well-informed, impartial observer; and “motivating” reasons—which, again roughly, are reasons the “agent” (that is, the person acting) takes to favour and justify her action and that guides her in acting. But there are, in addition, “explanatory” reasons, reasons that explain an action without necessarily justifying it and without being the reasons that motivated the agent.
A clear understanding of reasons for action in their justifying, motivating and explanatory functions is of relevance to the philosophy of action, to ethics, political philosophy and the philosophy of law. The essential issues about reasons—what they are, and how they relate to human actions—are of wider concern.
This entry examines the various accounts that philosophers have given of these different kinds of reasons and their interconnections, as well as the disagreements among them about these matters. The focus will be on reasons for acting—what are commonly called “practical reasons”, leaving aside questions that are specific to other reasons, for instance, reasons for believing, wanting, feeling emotions, and having attitudes, such as hope or resentment....
First published Sun Apr 24, 2016; [Editor's Note: The following new entry by Maria Alvarez replaces the former entry on this topic by the previous author.]
INTRO: Why are you always lying? Why did the Ancient Egyptians mummify their dead? Should Huck Finn have turned Jim in? Why is she selling her car? Questions that ask for reasons, and in particular, reasons for action, are among the commonest questions humans have. Philosophers have sought to understand the nature of such reasons. Most contemporary philosophers start by distinguishing two types of reason for action: “normative” reasons—that is, reasons which, very roughly, favour or justify an action, as judged by a well-informed, impartial observer; and “motivating” reasons—which, again roughly, are reasons the “agent” (that is, the person acting) takes to favour and justify her action and that guides her in acting. But there are, in addition, “explanatory” reasons, reasons that explain an action without necessarily justifying it and without being the reasons that motivated the agent.
A clear understanding of reasons for action in their justifying, motivating and explanatory functions is of relevance to the philosophy of action, to ethics, political philosophy and the philosophy of law. The essential issues about reasons—what they are, and how they relate to human actions—are of wider concern.
This entry examines the various accounts that philosophers have given of these different kinds of reasons and their interconnections, as well as the disagreements among them about these matters. The focus will be on reasons for acting—what are commonly called “practical reasons”, leaving aside questions that are specific to other reasons, for instance, reasons for believing, wanting, feeling emotions, and having attitudes, such as hope or resentment....