http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontolo...ommitment/
EXCERPT: Ontology, as etymology suggests, is the study of being, of what there is. The ontologist asks: What entities or kinds of entity exist? Are there abstract entities, such as sets or numbers, in addition to concrete entities, such as people and puddles and protons? Are there properties or universals in addition to (or instead of) the particular entities that, as we say, instantiate them? Questions such as these have divided philosophers down the ages, and divide them no less to this day.
Meta-ontology concerns itself with the nature and methodology of ontology, with the interpretation and significance of ontological questions such as those exhibited above. The problem of ontological commitment is a problem in meta-ontology rather than ontology proper. The meta-ontologist asks (among other things): What entities or kinds of entity exist according to a given theory or discourse, and thus are among its ontological commitments? Having a criterion of ontological commitment for theories is needed, arguably, if one is to systematically and rigorously attack the problem of ontology: typically, we accept entities into our ontology via accepting theories that are ontologically committed to those entities. A criterion of ontological commitment, then, is a pre-requisite for ontological inquiry.
On its face, the notion of ontological commitment for theories is a simple matter. Theories have truth conditions. These truth conditions tell us how the world must be in order for the theory to be true; they make demands on the world. Sometimes, perhaps always, they demand of the world that certain entities or kinds of entity exist. The ontological commitments of a theory, then, are just the entities or kinds of entity that must exist in order for the theory to be true. End of story (compare Rayo 2007: 428).
But complications arise as soon as one tries to specify a theory's truth conditions: different accounts of truth conditions lead to different accounts of ontological commitment. Moreover, theories couched in ordinary language do not wear their truth conditions—or their ontological commitments—on their sleeves. Thus, the need arises to find a criterion of ontological commitment: a test or method that can be applied to theories in a neutral way to determine the theory's ontological commitments....
EXCERPT: Ontology, as etymology suggests, is the study of being, of what there is. The ontologist asks: What entities or kinds of entity exist? Are there abstract entities, such as sets or numbers, in addition to concrete entities, such as people and puddles and protons? Are there properties or universals in addition to (or instead of) the particular entities that, as we say, instantiate them? Questions such as these have divided philosophers down the ages, and divide them no less to this day.
Meta-ontology concerns itself with the nature and methodology of ontology, with the interpretation and significance of ontological questions such as those exhibited above. The problem of ontological commitment is a problem in meta-ontology rather than ontology proper. The meta-ontologist asks (among other things): What entities or kinds of entity exist according to a given theory or discourse, and thus are among its ontological commitments? Having a criterion of ontological commitment for theories is needed, arguably, if one is to systematically and rigorously attack the problem of ontology: typically, we accept entities into our ontology via accepting theories that are ontologically committed to those entities. A criterion of ontological commitment, then, is a pre-requisite for ontological inquiry.
On its face, the notion of ontological commitment for theories is a simple matter. Theories have truth conditions. These truth conditions tell us how the world must be in order for the theory to be true; they make demands on the world. Sometimes, perhaps always, they demand of the world that certain entities or kinds of entity exist. The ontological commitments of a theory, then, are just the entities or kinds of entity that must exist in order for the theory to be true. End of story (compare Rayo 2007: 428).
But complications arise as soon as one tries to specify a theory's truth conditions: different accounts of truth conditions lead to different accounts of ontological commitment. Moreover, theories couched in ordinary language do not wear their truth conditions—or their ontological commitments—on their sleeves. Thus, the need arises to find a criterion of ontological commitment: a test or method that can be applied to theories in a neutral way to determine the theory's ontological commitments....