May 14, 2026 04:05 PM
Just recently I have been studying Lacan's notion of the Real as "that which resists symbolization absolutely." It is in this sense impossible in terms of the symbolic dimension that frames our experience (the structure of so-called "reality" we conceive of and relate to as our world). And yet it exerts an influence and has bearing on the nature of our experience in terms of negativities such as contradictions and trauma and absolute otherness. It is an example of what I call a "boundary concept"--of an entity or property not manifesting positively either empirically or rationally but asserting itself negatively as the limit of what is possible and what can be experienced or understood.
A similar case can be made for Kant's concept of the noumena, which is defined as that object that lies beyond experience and thought and yet negatively informs them as the absolute limit of their possibility. Here's one author's elaboration of this idea: https://ucupr.wordpress.com/2018/09/13/a...tive-idea/ Here the noumena is conceived as a regulatory concept that restrains thinking from overabstraction while preserving its it openness to the transcendent as precisely that which is NOT thinkable.
Another example of a boundary concept is Derrida's notion differance, which he describes in negative terms as the trace or horizon of what cannot be said:
"Crucial to an understanding of Derrida’s philosophy is the term différance. Created by Derrida, all signs constitute différance in that signs are not the thing to which they refer. What then is différance? Derrida proffers the following “definition” (my quotes) of the term: “Différance as temporization, différance as spacing.” [8] In order to understand this definition, one must refer to the origin (Derrida would shudder at my word choice) of différance, which comes from the French verb différer, which means both to defer and to differ. All signs defer (meaning they have temporality) and all signs differ (creating a gap, or space, between the sign and what it means). For example, you might tell a friend “I like your new sweater.” At the point of saying “new” your friend does not know what you are referring to – because meaning is deferred. The meaning conferred by “new” comes from “old” and that of “sweater” comes from an understanding of other possible tops (blouses, jackets, sweatshirts…) – because all signs differ. Even within a term, meaning is inherently unstable. In this example, “new” could mean “newly acquired,” “newly made,” or “of a new style.” Like all of Derrida’s terms, différance has multiple layers of meaning. In spoken French/English, difference and différance are homophones, marking the distinction between speech and writing. According to Derrida, différance is “no longer simply a concept, but rather the possibility of conceptuality, of a conceptual process and system in general.”
Différance rejects the oppositions we have unquestioningly accepted as the basis for language. As such, Derrida realizes this “makes the thinking of it [différance] uneasy and uncomfortable.” [10] Derrida contends that signs do not convey meaning in the way intended by the original author. What is missing from a text becomes as important as what is there. As Derrida clarifies in “Différance:”
Thus one could reconsider all of the pairs of opposites on which philosophy is constructed and on which our discourse lives, not in order to see opposition erase itself but to see what indicates that each of the terms must appear as the différance of the other, as the other different and deferred in the economy of the same (the intelligent as differing-deferring the sensible, as the sensible different and deferred; the concept as different and deferred, differing-deferring intuition; culture as nature different and deferred, differing-deferring;…"--
A similar case can be made for Kant's concept of the noumena, which is defined as that object that lies beyond experience and thought and yet negatively informs them as the absolute limit of their possibility. Here's one author's elaboration of this idea: https://ucupr.wordpress.com/2018/09/13/a...tive-idea/ Here the noumena is conceived as a regulatory concept that restrains thinking from overabstraction while preserving its it openness to the transcendent as precisely that which is NOT thinkable.
Another example of a boundary concept is Derrida's notion differance, which he describes in negative terms as the trace or horizon of what cannot be said:
"Crucial to an understanding of Derrida’s philosophy is the term différance. Created by Derrida, all signs constitute différance in that signs are not the thing to which they refer. What then is différance? Derrida proffers the following “definition” (my quotes) of the term: “Différance as temporization, différance as spacing.” [8] In order to understand this definition, one must refer to the origin (Derrida would shudder at my word choice) of différance, which comes from the French verb différer, which means both to defer and to differ. All signs defer (meaning they have temporality) and all signs differ (creating a gap, or space, between the sign and what it means). For example, you might tell a friend “I like your new sweater.” At the point of saying “new” your friend does not know what you are referring to – because meaning is deferred. The meaning conferred by “new” comes from “old” and that of “sweater” comes from an understanding of other possible tops (blouses, jackets, sweatshirts…) – because all signs differ. Even within a term, meaning is inherently unstable. In this example, “new” could mean “newly acquired,” “newly made,” or “of a new style.” Like all of Derrida’s terms, différance has multiple layers of meaning. In spoken French/English, difference and différance are homophones, marking the distinction between speech and writing. According to Derrida, différance is “no longer simply a concept, but rather the possibility of conceptuality, of a conceptual process and system in general.”
Différance rejects the oppositions we have unquestioningly accepted as the basis for language. As such, Derrida realizes this “makes the thinking of it [différance] uneasy and uncomfortable.” [10] Derrida contends that signs do not convey meaning in the way intended by the original author. What is missing from a text becomes as important as what is there. As Derrida clarifies in “Différance:”
Thus one could reconsider all of the pairs of opposites on which philosophy is constructed and on which our discourse lives, not in order to see opposition erase itself but to see what indicates that each of the terms must appear as the différance of the other, as the other different and deferred in the economy of the same (the intelligent as differing-deferring the sensible, as the sensible different and deferred; the concept as different and deferred, differing-deferring intuition; culture as nature different and deferred, differing-deferring;…"--