Feb 21, 2026 01:55 AM
https://www.templeton.org/news/can-digit...sciousness
EXCERPTS: Is functionalism correct? An increasing number of philosophers think it is not, and in a recent peer-reviewed article, my co-author Corey Maley (University of Kansas) and I argue that if it isn’t, there are reasons to think that digital people would experience nothing. This, we argue, is because consciousness is analog, not digital.
[...] Functions deal with quantities of things—that is, they can be quantified. So, for example, if we think about color wavelengths—that is, the wavelengths of light that we identify with different colors—they are all quantifiable. The wavelength of ‘violet’ light is 400 nanometers (nm), the wavelength of blue 470 nm, red 665 nm, and so on.
Brain functions can also be quantified. When your brain ‘sees’ red, the neurons in your visual cortex will fire in a certain configuration and at a particular firing rate. Like other functions, we could express this function in terms of a complex equation that we might write out in a book.
Here, though, is the problem. How can one get the experience of red out of a function? The experience of red is not simply a quantity, such as the number 1 or 665 nanometers. ‘Red’ wavelengths of light are 665nm. But your experience of red does not itself look at all like 665 nm. No, red is a quality.
Indeed, the curious thing about color experiences is that they appear to be utterly simple. One cannot describe what red looks like to anyone (even yourself!). Sure, you can describe red as a ‘hot’ color, and blue as a ‘cool’ color. But you cannot actually do better than this, writing out in a book exactly what red looks like, as opposed to blue. Seriously, give it a try. The best you or anyone else can ever do is point to it. “That,” you might say, “is red. And that is blue.”
These simple facts about color experience are illustrated by color-blind people who put on glasses that enable them to see particular colors for the very first time. They are completely shocked by what they see—because no one, and no scientific theory, could ever convey to them what purple looks like before they see it.
Consciousness appears to be utterly unique in this regard. [...] All science is ultimately based upon experience. ... The data we have built these sciences on are our experiences of the world.
Yet, if science is based on data, our experiences are the data of science, and as we have just seen the qualitative features of experiences (such as the experience of what red looks like) cannot be expressed in terms of functions, then as a matter of science we should conclude that functionalism is false: our experiential data shows that conscious experience is not merely a function. It is something more.
[...] Arguments like these have led an increasing number of philosophers to support non-functionalist theories of consciousness...
[...] as we have seen, consciousness appears to be analog too. What red, green, orange, and purple look like are not merely ‘on’ or ‘off’, like a ‘1’ or a ‘zero.’ Red and orange are qualities that come in all kinds of continuous degrees, like Mercury expanding in a thermometer. Sadness, joy, fear, love. None of these features of consciousness are merely ‘on’ or ‘off’ like a one or a zero. They too are unique qualities that come in degrees, like the turning of the gears of a watch.
Here, then, is the lesson. If panpsychism or panqualityism are true, then colors such as red and green are fundamentally in nature. Our brains somehow put together (or ‘combine’) these qualities in a coherent way through analog processing, much as a painter has to put colors together on a canvas.
[...] So, it’s probably false that digital beings can have minds. To use a once-common but now somewhat outdated phrase, digital ‘minds’ can fake it, but they can never actually make it. Conscious experience is fundamentally analog—digital beings are not.
What is it like to be a ‘digital person’? Probably nothing—or static on a TV screen.
Indeed, as I and another co-author argue in a second peer-reviewed paper, the same point extends to ‘the simulation hypothesis.’ In his widely publicized recent book, Reality+, the philosopher David Chalmers argues that virtual realities are no less real than our Universe.
If we are correct, then Chalmers is simply wrong about all of this: ‘virtual worlds’ do not actually contain conscious beings, let alone green grass, red roses, love, joy, sorrow, and so on. All they are is digital code, and digital code cannot realize these analog features of our world or our experiences of them... (MORE - details)
EXCERPTS: Is functionalism correct? An increasing number of philosophers think it is not, and in a recent peer-reviewed article, my co-author Corey Maley (University of Kansas) and I argue that if it isn’t, there are reasons to think that digital people would experience nothing. This, we argue, is because consciousness is analog, not digital.
[...] Functions deal with quantities of things—that is, they can be quantified. So, for example, if we think about color wavelengths—that is, the wavelengths of light that we identify with different colors—they are all quantifiable. The wavelength of ‘violet’ light is 400 nanometers (nm), the wavelength of blue 470 nm, red 665 nm, and so on.
Brain functions can also be quantified. When your brain ‘sees’ red, the neurons in your visual cortex will fire in a certain configuration and at a particular firing rate. Like other functions, we could express this function in terms of a complex equation that we might write out in a book.
Here, though, is the problem. How can one get the experience of red out of a function? The experience of red is not simply a quantity, such as the number 1 or 665 nanometers. ‘Red’ wavelengths of light are 665nm. But your experience of red does not itself look at all like 665 nm. No, red is a quality.
Indeed, the curious thing about color experiences is that they appear to be utterly simple. One cannot describe what red looks like to anyone (even yourself!). Sure, you can describe red as a ‘hot’ color, and blue as a ‘cool’ color. But you cannot actually do better than this, writing out in a book exactly what red looks like, as opposed to blue. Seriously, give it a try. The best you or anyone else can ever do is point to it. “That,” you might say, “is red. And that is blue.”
These simple facts about color experience are illustrated by color-blind people who put on glasses that enable them to see particular colors for the very first time. They are completely shocked by what they see—because no one, and no scientific theory, could ever convey to them what purple looks like before they see it.
Consciousness appears to be utterly unique in this regard. [...] All science is ultimately based upon experience. ... The data we have built these sciences on are our experiences of the world.
Yet, if science is based on data, our experiences are the data of science, and as we have just seen the qualitative features of experiences (such as the experience of what red looks like) cannot be expressed in terms of functions, then as a matter of science we should conclude that functionalism is false: our experiential data shows that conscious experience is not merely a function. It is something more.
[...] Arguments like these have led an increasing number of philosophers to support non-functionalist theories of consciousness...
[...] as we have seen, consciousness appears to be analog too. What red, green, orange, and purple look like are not merely ‘on’ or ‘off’, like a ‘1’ or a ‘zero.’ Red and orange are qualities that come in all kinds of continuous degrees, like Mercury expanding in a thermometer. Sadness, joy, fear, love. None of these features of consciousness are merely ‘on’ or ‘off’ like a one or a zero. They too are unique qualities that come in degrees, like the turning of the gears of a watch.
Here, then, is the lesson. If panpsychism or panqualityism are true, then colors such as red and green are fundamentally in nature. Our brains somehow put together (or ‘combine’) these qualities in a coherent way through analog processing, much as a painter has to put colors together on a canvas.
[...] So, it’s probably false that digital beings can have minds. To use a once-common but now somewhat outdated phrase, digital ‘minds’ can fake it, but they can never actually make it. Conscious experience is fundamentally analog—digital beings are not.
What is it like to be a ‘digital person’? Probably nothing—or static on a TV screen.
Indeed, as I and another co-author argue in a second peer-reviewed paper, the same point extends to ‘the simulation hypothesis.’ In his widely publicized recent book, Reality+, the philosopher David Chalmers argues that virtual realities are no less real than our Universe.
If we are correct, then Chalmers is simply wrong about all of this: ‘virtual worlds’ do not actually contain conscious beings, let alone green grass, red roses, love, joy, sorrow, and so on. All they are is digital code, and digital code cannot realize these analog features of our world or our experiences of them... (MORE - details)
