Mar 5, 2025 07:11 PM
(This post was last modified: Mar 5, 2025 07:57 PM by C C.)
Pain destroys the mind-body problem
https://iai.tv/articles/pain-destroys-th..._auid=2020
INTRO: Pain defies the mind-body divide. We usually see physical and psychological pain as separate, but research shows that pain doesn’t work that way. Sabrina Coninx and Peter Stilwell argue that pain is not simply in the body or the mind but emerges from the complex interaction of our biology, mindset and environment. Rethinking pain in this way has profound implications for how medicine should understand and treat it... (MORE - details)
Zombie is to Human as Human is to XXX?
https://eschwitz.substack.com/p/zombie-i...uman-is-to
INTRO: Let's grant for the sake of argument that philosophical zombies are possible: beings that are molecule-for-molecule physically and behaviorally identical to human beings yet lack conscious experience. They will say "I'm conscious!" (or emit sounds naturally interpreted as sentences with that meaning), but that's exactly the type of sound a molecule-for-molecule identical replica of a human would make given the physical-causal channels from ears to brain to vocal cords. Zombies share every single physical property with us but lack something crucial -- the property of being conscious. My thought for today: Is there any reason to think there would be only one such nonphysical property? (MORE - details )
The true, hidden origin of the so-called 'Hard Problem of Consciousness'
https://www.bernardokastrup.com/2024/10/...alled.html
EXCERPT: To see why Physicalism fails to explain experience, notice that there is nothing about physical parameters—i.e., quantities and their abstract relationships, as given by, e.g., mathematical equations—in terms of which we could deduce, in principle, the qualities of experience. Even if neuroscientists knew, in all minute detail, the topology, network structure, electrical firing charges and timings, etc., of my visual cortex, they would still be unable to deduce, in principle, the experiential qualities of what I am seeing. This is the so-called ‘hard problem of consciousness’ that is much talked about in philosophy... (MORE - details)
Mackie on Pascal’s Wager
http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2025/02/...wager.html
I’ve never been a fan of Pascal’s Wager. But there’s a bit more that one might say for it than is often supposed. For example, the objections J. L. Mackie raises against it in his classic defense of atheism The Miracle of Theism, though important, are not fatal. Let’s take a look at the argument, at Mackie’s objections, and at how a defender of Pascal might reply to them... (MORE - details)
https://iai.tv/articles/pain-destroys-th..._auid=2020
INTRO: Pain defies the mind-body divide. We usually see physical and psychological pain as separate, but research shows that pain doesn’t work that way. Sabrina Coninx and Peter Stilwell argue that pain is not simply in the body or the mind but emerges from the complex interaction of our biology, mindset and environment. Rethinking pain in this way has profound implications for how medicine should understand and treat it... (MORE - details)
Zombie is to Human as Human is to XXX?
https://eschwitz.substack.com/p/zombie-i...uman-is-to
INTRO: Let's grant for the sake of argument that philosophical zombies are possible: beings that are molecule-for-molecule physically and behaviorally identical to human beings yet lack conscious experience. They will say "I'm conscious!" (or emit sounds naturally interpreted as sentences with that meaning), but that's exactly the type of sound a molecule-for-molecule identical replica of a human would make given the physical-causal channels from ears to brain to vocal cords. Zombies share every single physical property with us but lack something crucial -- the property of being conscious. My thought for today: Is there any reason to think there would be only one such nonphysical property? (MORE - details )
The true, hidden origin of the so-called 'Hard Problem of Consciousness'
https://www.bernardokastrup.com/2024/10/...alled.html
EXCERPT: To see why Physicalism fails to explain experience, notice that there is nothing about physical parameters—i.e., quantities and their abstract relationships, as given by, e.g., mathematical equations—in terms of which we could deduce, in principle, the qualities of experience. Even if neuroscientists knew, in all minute detail, the topology, network structure, electrical firing charges and timings, etc., of my visual cortex, they would still be unable to deduce, in principle, the experiential qualities of what I am seeing. This is the so-called ‘hard problem of consciousness’ that is much talked about in philosophy... (MORE - details)
Mackie on Pascal’s Wager
http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2025/02/...wager.html
I’ve never been a fan of Pascal’s Wager. But there’s a bit more that one might say for it than is often supposed. For example, the objections J. L. Mackie raises against it in his classic defense of atheism The Miracle of Theism, though important, are not fatal. Let’s take a look at the argument, at Mackie’s objections, and at how a defender of Pascal might reply to them... (MORE - details)