
https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/02/18/tru...ssia-nato/
INTRO: China hawks in the United States have made what amounted to a Faustian pact with President Donald Trump. Anxious that Beijing’s power was surpassing Washington’s and critical of Democrats such as former President Joe Biden for failing to turn it back, Trump seemed to be the best option for a more robust approach to China. But after the whirlwind start of the new administration, that bargain already looks shaky, raising questions about whether Trump’s much-anticipated pivot to a tougher China policy will instead turn out to be a geopolitical win for Beijing.
Trump’s approach presents a conundrum. On the one hand, he has appointed serious China hawks to important positions, including at the National Security Council, the State Department, and the Defense Department. This team has been crafting the elements of a more competitive approach—albeit with some degree of continuity with Biden’s team.
On the other hand, it should by now be obvious not just that Trump’s strategic agenda is more radical and far-reaching than in his first term, but also that his ferocious transactional instincts risk pulling his approach to China in directions that would be entirely welcomed by Chinese President Xi Jinping.
Indeed, as it’s viewed from Beijing, Trump’s second start in the White House already presents myriad unexpected opportunities for China to exploit.
Those who support a more competitive approach can still point to early wins. Trump has lambasted European allies but been much gentler in Asia. Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba enjoyed a successful trip to Washington in early February, and a visit by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi last week demonstrated an Indo-U.S. relationship in seemingly rude health. Trump’s team reaffirmed its support for the Australia-United Kingdom-United States pact (known as AUKUS) while U.S. warplanes conducted joint patrols above the South China Sea to support the Philippines. And by browbeating Panama, the United States persuaded it to abandon China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
More starkly, Trump’s approach to Ukraine—his demand that European nations provide security guarantees for any peace deal as well as Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s declaration that Washington is no longer “primarily focused” on Europe’s security—bears the hallmarks of an administration that is serious about prioritizing the Indo-Pacific over other parts of the world. “America, as the leader of the free world defending American interests, is going to need to make sure we’re focused properly on the Communist Chinese,” Hegseth said on Feb. 12 during a trip to Germany.
Yet this apparent drive to prioritize competition with China stands in sharp contrast to Trump’s wider geopolitical approach—much of which will likely be a cause for quiet contentment in Beijing. Some of this links to Trump’s rough-and-tumble treatment of allies as well as China’s long-term hope that the United States’ globe-spanning alliance system might crumble. Just as important is Trump’s new embrace of a raw form of great-power politics.
His inaugural address featured little criticism of China, barring two references citing Beijing as the justification for Trump’s plan to retake the Panama Canal. Its other themes, including his neo-imperial aspirations for Greenland, will be welcomed by China—given that they align with its ambitions to control Taiwan and signal the demise of U.S. support for a rules-based order that China has long sought to end.
Much the same is true of the way that Trump is pursuing a great-power deal in Ukraine by reportedly handing concessions to Russian President Vladimir Putin while sidelining Europe. All of this plays to Beijing’s geopolitical advantage, given its quasi-alliance with Moscow as well as its long-term aims of driving a split between Europe and the United States and undermining NATO so that it cannot get involved in Asia.
Elsewhere, Trump’s policies are creating openings for possible Chinese influence... (MORE - details)
INTRO: China hawks in the United States have made what amounted to a Faustian pact with President Donald Trump. Anxious that Beijing’s power was surpassing Washington’s and critical of Democrats such as former President Joe Biden for failing to turn it back, Trump seemed to be the best option for a more robust approach to China. But after the whirlwind start of the new administration, that bargain already looks shaky, raising questions about whether Trump’s much-anticipated pivot to a tougher China policy will instead turn out to be a geopolitical win for Beijing.
Trump’s approach presents a conundrum. On the one hand, he has appointed serious China hawks to important positions, including at the National Security Council, the State Department, and the Defense Department. This team has been crafting the elements of a more competitive approach—albeit with some degree of continuity with Biden’s team.
On the other hand, it should by now be obvious not just that Trump’s strategic agenda is more radical and far-reaching than in his first term, but also that his ferocious transactional instincts risk pulling his approach to China in directions that would be entirely welcomed by Chinese President Xi Jinping.
Indeed, as it’s viewed from Beijing, Trump’s second start in the White House already presents myriad unexpected opportunities for China to exploit.
Those who support a more competitive approach can still point to early wins. Trump has lambasted European allies but been much gentler in Asia. Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba enjoyed a successful trip to Washington in early February, and a visit by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi last week demonstrated an Indo-U.S. relationship in seemingly rude health. Trump’s team reaffirmed its support for the Australia-United Kingdom-United States pact (known as AUKUS) while U.S. warplanes conducted joint patrols above the South China Sea to support the Philippines. And by browbeating Panama, the United States persuaded it to abandon China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
More starkly, Trump’s approach to Ukraine—his demand that European nations provide security guarantees for any peace deal as well as Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s declaration that Washington is no longer “primarily focused” on Europe’s security—bears the hallmarks of an administration that is serious about prioritizing the Indo-Pacific over other parts of the world. “America, as the leader of the free world defending American interests, is going to need to make sure we’re focused properly on the Communist Chinese,” Hegseth said on Feb. 12 during a trip to Germany.
Yet this apparent drive to prioritize competition with China stands in sharp contrast to Trump’s wider geopolitical approach—much of which will likely be a cause for quiet contentment in Beijing. Some of this links to Trump’s rough-and-tumble treatment of allies as well as China’s long-term hope that the United States’ globe-spanning alliance system might crumble. Just as important is Trump’s new embrace of a raw form of great-power politics.
His inaugural address featured little criticism of China, barring two references citing Beijing as the justification for Trump’s plan to retake the Panama Canal. Its other themes, including his neo-imperial aspirations for Greenland, will be welcomed by China—given that they align with its ambitions to control Taiwan and signal the demise of U.S. support for a rules-based order that China has long sought to end.
Much the same is true of the way that Trump is pursuing a great-power deal in Ukraine by reportedly handing concessions to Russian President Vladimir Putin while sidelining Europe. All of this plays to Beijing’s geopolitical advantage, given its quasi-alliance with Moscow as well as its long-term aims of driving a split between Europe and the United States and undermining NATO so that it cannot get involved in Asia.
Elsewhere, Trump’s policies are creating openings for possible Chinese influence... (MORE - details)