Article  Strong comic immoralism (Connor Kianpour)

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EXCERPTS: In my recent article, “Strong Comic Immoralism,” I defend a view that has long been shunned by the philosophy of humor. The philosophy of humor? Yes, it’s a thing...

[...] Strong comic immoralism might strike you as something you simply could never get behind because so many people find a good number of immoral jokes to be less funny precisely because the jokes are immoral. But I think the strong comic immoralist has a way to compellingly respond to this concern.

The people who find immoral jokes to be less funny because they are immoral are not in good positions to judge how funny immoral jokes are! You wouldn’t let someone averse to sweets judge a cake competition, would you? So why would you let someone averse to the immorality in jokes judge how funny immoral jokes are?

We have very good reason to believe that offense and amusement are incompatible emotions; you cannot be at once both offended and amused by the same thing. So those who take offense to the immorality in a joke and judge it to be less funny on that basis have their capacity for amusement impaired, and shouldn’t be taken as authorities on how funny the joke in question is. We want those who judge how funny jokes are to be capable of being amused by them! (MORE - missing details)

PAPER: https://academic.oup.com/jaac/advance-ar...m=fulltext
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