Mar 23, 2022 06:12 AM
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-com...ooms-large
EXCERPTS: . . . Ukraine was second only to the U.S. in the number of cyberattacks it had experienced over the past year. Given this history, it stood to reason that future Russian incursions in Ukraine would likely involve cyber weapons. [...] the fact that devastating attacks haven’t occurred so far has raised doubts in some quarters about the viability and efficacy of using malicious software as a weapon of war.
There are many theories floating around as to why the Russians didn’t go all-out and take down Ukraine’s cellular networks, electric grid, municipal water supplies, and other crucial utilities, either in the run-up to war or in its first days. It may be that the Kremlin, high on its own propaganda, believed that the Russian army would conquer Ukraine in record time and install a puppet government that would need to have those services intact.
When that didn’t happen and the Russians began bombing cities, it made cyber weapons that could turn off the lights, say, largely beside the point [...] “If you’re already at a stage in a conflict where you’re willing to drop bombs, you’re going to drop bombs,” Jacquelyn Schneider ... told me. In other words, bombs are blunter, more peremptory instruments.
But it also may be that Russia never had the capabilities that its adversaries ascribed to it in the first place: unlike conventional weapons, which can be counted, cyber weapons are invisible until they are deployed, making it impossible for outsiders to assess the size and power of a nation’s cyber arsenal. Or it may be that the Russian generals prosecuting the war were skeptical of relying on weapons composed of zeros and ones.
Or that the Russians tried to replicate their earlier attacks but that Ukraine’s digital defenses, which are much stronger now, successfully fended them off. [...] After the 2017 cyberattack, Ukraine, with help from its allies, fortified its computer networks.
[...] something that has largely been lost in the musings about Russia’s failure ... to use cyber weapons to crippling effect in the war: Ukraine has actually been under a constant barrage of cyberattacks that began before the invasion. [...] Perhaps most crucial, on the morning of the invasion, hackers jammed the satellite signal that delivered broadband satellite Internet services to much of Ukraine and other parts of Europe ... The service has not been fully restored...
[...] In retrospect, it seems possible that the attack on Viasat was actually Russia’s opening gambit—a cyberattack intended to compromise Ukraine’s command-and-control systems—but was only marginally successful. Then, while the world was waiting for Russia to turn off the lights in Ukraine, the Kremlin was, instead, engaging in more targeted and strategic attacks.
Still, Russia might do something more comprehensive and destructive going forward. A cyber weapon can only be launched once; it is possible that the Kremlin is holding its most powerful malware in reserve. As Burt told me, although Russia’s cyber activity has not caused mass destruction, “it does not in any way reduce the risk that more aggressive and destructive attacks could be deployed in the future inside or outside Ukraine.” (MORE - missing details)
EXCERPTS: . . . Ukraine was second only to the U.S. in the number of cyberattacks it had experienced over the past year. Given this history, it stood to reason that future Russian incursions in Ukraine would likely involve cyber weapons. [...] the fact that devastating attacks haven’t occurred so far has raised doubts in some quarters about the viability and efficacy of using malicious software as a weapon of war.
There are many theories floating around as to why the Russians didn’t go all-out and take down Ukraine’s cellular networks, electric grid, municipal water supplies, and other crucial utilities, either in the run-up to war or in its first days. It may be that the Kremlin, high on its own propaganda, believed that the Russian army would conquer Ukraine in record time and install a puppet government that would need to have those services intact.
When that didn’t happen and the Russians began bombing cities, it made cyber weapons that could turn off the lights, say, largely beside the point [...] “If you’re already at a stage in a conflict where you’re willing to drop bombs, you’re going to drop bombs,” Jacquelyn Schneider ... told me. In other words, bombs are blunter, more peremptory instruments.
But it also may be that Russia never had the capabilities that its adversaries ascribed to it in the first place: unlike conventional weapons, which can be counted, cyber weapons are invisible until they are deployed, making it impossible for outsiders to assess the size and power of a nation’s cyber arsenal. Or it may be that the Russian generals prosecuting the war were skeptical of relying on weapons composed of zeros and ones.
Or that the Russians tried to replicate their earlier attacks but that Ukraine’s digital defenses, which are much stronger now, successfully fended them off. [...] After the 2017 cyberattack, Ukraine, with help from its allies, fortified its computer networks.
[...] something that has largely been lost in the musings about Russia’s failure ... to use cyber weapons to crippling effect in the war: Ukraine has actually been under a constant barrage of cyberattacks that began before the invasion. [...] Perhaps most crucial, on the morning of the invasion, hackers jammed the satellite signal that delivered broadband satellite Internet services to much of Ukraine and other parts of Europe ... The service has not been fully restored...
[...] In retrospect, it seems possible that the attack on Viasat was actually Russia’s opening gambit—a cyberattack intended to compromise Ukraine’s command-and-control systems—but was only marginally successful. Then, while the world was waiting for Russia to turn off the lights in Ukraine, the Kremlin was, instead, engaging in more targeted and strategic attacks.
Still, Russia might do something more comprehensive and destructive going forward. A cyber weapon can only be launched once; it is possible that the Kremlin is holding its most powerful malware in reserve. As Burt told me, although Russia’s cyber activity has not caused mass destruction, “it does not in any way reduce the risk that more aggressive and destructive attacks could be deployed in the future inside or outside Ukraine.” (MORE - missing details)
