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Russian Ukraine Invasion

Secular Sanity Offline
(Mar 8, 2022 02:34 AM)Kornee Wrote: Truth is, by and large the joint position of NATO really means what US policy makers want. They have the big guns, and as Teddy Roosevelt famously quipped 'Speak softly - and carry a big stick'. Big sticks are always where it's really at.

The French have a saying, "Qui trop embrasse, mal étreint."

[Who embraces too much, embraces too little.]

If you want to expand your knowledge base on our current plight, here’s a very informative lecture given by Professor Jamie Shea, a retired member of NATO. He was Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium until his retirement in late September 2018.


https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/lx-Au3VIbDk
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Kornee Offline
(Mar 8, 2022 06:58 AM)Secular Sanity Wrote:
(Mar 8, 2022 02:34 AM)Kornee Wrote: Truth is, by and large the joint position of NATO really means what US policy makers want. They have the big guns, and as Teddy Roosevelt famously quipped 'Speak softly - and carry a big stick'. Big sticks are always where it's really at.

The French have a saying, "Qui trop embrasse, mal étreint."

[Who embraces too much, embraces too little.]

If you want to expand your knowledge base on our current plight, here’s a very informative lecture given by Professor Jamie Shea, a retired member of NATO. He was Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium until his retirement in late September 2018....
Thanks for that link. I did manage to view nearly all of it. The overall viewpoint, and strategies for handling the situation short and long term presented there, certainly come across as perfectly rational and reasonable and very comprehensive. The underlying theme being Putin is an irrational war criminal whose regime must be crippled not just contained, and preferably Putin personally ousted from power.
The key takeaway is that the invasion has backfired on Russia and served to initiate reinvigoration of NATO politically and militarily. But such unfolding of events was anything but inevitable and only a question of how soon?

Shea's address didn't ever attempt to try and seriously see it from Putin's (and Russian top brass etc.) historical perspective a la the articles you linked to in #148, #156 and later.
The initial part of Q & A session after the main talk sort of posed the obvious matter re Putin's perspective, but as typical of the talk itself, a rather one sided, one dimensional projection:
Putin is pure and simple an out and out nostalgic, backwards-only looking megalomaniac. With a 'now or never' unreasonable, irrational desperation. And 'we' didn't invite that situation in any way by 'our' perfectly reasonable policies.
Hmm.... There will likely be a host of behind-the-scenes factors left out of that public response from Shea.

I earlier linked to Zbigniew Brzezinski's highly influential blueprint for US -> globalist world hegemony - The Grand Chessboard. Nothing touching on that angle at all came up. No surprise.
Shea goes on to reinforce the view that NATO posed no threat to Russia. Having effectively unilaterally disarmed, with large reductions of US military assets formerly stationed in NATO member states. Valid point. Unless there were good reasons for Russian side to suspect that would be quietly reversed once expanded 'benign' NATO membership completely bordered Western part of Russia, and a convenient pretext then led to a rapid re-militarization. All surmising - but recall Brzezinski's The Grand Chessboard strategy was obviously a likely big factor in the Kremlin's thinking.

As mentioned elsewhere here, a cornered animal instinctively becomes desperate and aggressive. Whether the cornering is real or merely perceived in immaterial. Survival instinct will kick in.
The current mess, for all the deaths and destruction so far and reasonably projected, is still far preferable to an all out nuclear war. That Putin has for sure the will to fight, should a strongly re-militarized NATO extend to all along the border with Russia.

A coup against Putin is certainly now on the cards if crippling logistical logjams and heavy personnel and equipment losses keep mounting. Russians were caught off guard with effectiveness of hand-held anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. High kill ratios and at a fraction of the cost of the Russian side's losses. Add reportedly low troop morale, and so far two generals dead.
Anyway we can do no more than observe how the war progresses and hope the ultimate outcome is less than catastrophic escalation.
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Secular Sanity Offline
I thought the same, but I'm not tracking, which article?

(Mar 8, 2022 01:52 PM)Kornee Wrote: Shea's address didn't ever attempt to try and seriously see it from Putin's (and Russian top brass etc.) historical perspective a la the articles you linked to in #148, #156 and later.
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Kornee Offline
(Mar 8, 2022 02:25 PM)Secular Sanity Wrote: I thought the same, but I'm not tracking, which article?

(Mar 8, 2022 01:52 PM)Kornee Wrote: Shea's address didn't ever attempt to try and seriously see it from Putin's (and Russian top brass etc.) historical perspective a la the articles you linked to in #148, #156 and later.

In #148, that would be the link: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/...ders-early
In #156, ...... https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08MOSCOW265_a.html
Well they seemed relevant to me, and presented the situation in a decidedly different light to that of Shea. Though I add he does come across as sincere himself.
Then again, isn't projecting sincerity part of the job of diplomats (to add a counterpoint to his own early remarks in his main talk). Dodgy
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Secular Sanity Offline
(Mar 8, 2022 02:42 PM)Kornee Wrote: In #148, that would be the link: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/...ders-early
In #156, ...... https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08MOSCOW265_a.html
Well they seemed relevant to me, and presented the situation in a decidedly different light to that of Shea. Though I add he does come across as sincere himself.
Then again, isn't projecting sincerity part of the job of diplomats (to add a counterpoint to his own early remarks in his main talk). Dodgy

Oh, gotcha, duh. I hadn’t realized that the post count had gotten so high. I thought that you were referring to the numbers within the debate regarding the expansion. It’s an intense and daunting read and both sides put forth good arguments. Obviously, Shea was for the expansion.

In hindsight, the Warsaw pact of 1955 collapsed along with the USSR in 1991. We have Yeltsin from 1991-1999. We know that NATO’s expansion eastward was always met with Russian opposition. In 1996, we have Clinton making NATO enlargement a crucial part of his foreign policy. Shea made some valid points regarding our reasoning when it came to Russia stomping its feet, but given the timeline of events, our current situation is hardly surprising.

Some of the points in the debate that caught my attention are as follows.

With its abrupt embrace of NATO enlargement, the Clinton administration upped the ante of NATO's role in post-Cold War Europe, and it did so without benefit of any serious consultation with Congress or attempt to explain the implications of its policy to the American people. Following the Republican Party's control of both Houses of Congress as a result of the November 1994 mid-term Congressional elections, the administration adopted an even more activist stance in Europe to demonstrate its “toughness” in the face of Russia's opposition to the new U.S. policy.

The catalyst was not (Europe is concern about its security), but U.S. domestic politics. In August 1995, Strobe Talbott, who had initially reacted coolly to enlargement because of its adverse consequences for U.S. relations with Russia, but then Talbott was assigned the task of giving an official response to the public criticisms made by a blue-ribbon group of retired diplomats and military leaders. He argued that NATO enlargement should be undertaken for three basic reasons.

First, collective defense. Though acknowledging that ``the end of Soviet communism, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the breakup of the USSR have eliminated the threat that NATO was created to counter during the cold war,'' he nonetheless maintained that "new threats may arise that would require NATO to protect the members and to deter attack." The possible threat he saw, though nowhere on the horizon, was Russia.

Second, promotion of democracy. Admission to NATO would provide the countries of Central Europe and the former Soviet Union ``with additional incentives to strengthen their democratic and legal institutions, ensure civilian command of their armed forces, liberalize their economies, and respect human rights, including the rights of minorities.''

Third, regional peace and stability. In return for admission to NATO, new members would be expected ``to resolve disputes peacefully and contribute to peacekeeping operations.'' BUT Talbott never explained why these incentives were to be applicable to countries in Central and Eastern Europe but not to Russia as well.

With its abrupt embrace of NATO enlargement, the Clinton administration upped the ante of NATO's role in post-Cold War Europe, and it did so without benefit of any serious consultation with Congress or attempt to explain the implications of its policy to the American people. Following the Republican Party's control of both Houses of Congress as a result of the November 1994 mid-term Congressional elections, the administration adopted an even more activist stance in Europe to demonstrate its “toughness” in the face of Russia's opposition to the new U.S. policy.

Further Arguments:
I am here to express my very real concern on the issue of NATO expansion. That concern has to do with the need to maintain our bilateral relations with Russia, which are more important to the long-term security and economic interests of the United States and the American people, and which far outweigh the fuzzy goals of NATO expansion.
   
We could well be driving Russian foreign policy in a direction decidedly not to our liking. There are many issues out there on which Russian cooperation is essential. I have in mind nuclear weapons stockpile reductions, nuclear nonproliferation, environmental pollution, conventional arms control and sales, access to new oil resources, strategic relationships in the Middle East and the Far East and the success or failure of a series of treaties either signed or on the table.
   
Thus, I oppose NATO expansion on the grounds that we are sacrificing our long-term relations with Russia on the altar of an ill-conceived plan to haphazardly expand an outmoded military alliance, ill-conceived for domestic political purposes, ill-conceived as a legacy for one man, and ill-conceived since we are not clear on why, how, when, and where to expand.
   
It is haphazard because we don't know how many countries will eventually join. There is no clear definition of NATO's new mission and there is no clear idea of the real costs.
   
I hope, therefore, that the Senate, in its infinite wisdom, will delay the process of allowing time for an informed debate on both sides of the Atlantic. As George Kennan observed, expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold war era.
   
If this be true—and I believe it is—sir, we need to be cautious and proceed with deliberate speed.

If neither democracy, stability, morality nor security is a good reason to expand NATO, then why proceed with it? The proponents have an answer: credibility. The process of expansion, they say, has gone too far to stop because stopping would have devastating consequences for America's standing and leadership in the world.

Since there can be no going back to abandon long-standing promises because a Russian tantrum would bust the alliance . . . ”NATO goes a-wooing”, The Economist, January 25, 1997, p. 15. In fact, going forward with expansion is more likely to ``bust the alliance'' than stopping it. (See below, Section IV). For that reason, a decision to stop would be greeted by current NATO members with a collective sigh of relief.
   
The Clinton administration's political strategy for securing the two-thirds vote in the Senate necessary to expand NATO is apparently to issue invitations to the prospective new members in July, then assert that, no matter how high the costs involved, the failure to approve expansion would have dreadful, earth-shattering results. While the other arguments in favor of expansion are hollow, this one is merely outdated. It made sense during the Cold War, when the United States and its allies confronted a hostile, militant, heavily armed adversary around the world. Communism was a global movement, whose branches were connected through its world headquarters in Moscow. From this feature of Cold War international politics arose the fear that a Western defeat, retreat, or show of irresolution in one place would invite pressure, even aggression, elsewhere. Such was the logic behind the American decision in June 1950 to fight in Korea, a place of no intrinsic importance to the United States but where a defeat could, American policymakers feared, have adverse effects in places that were important. It was the reason for standing firm in West Berlin, which, because it was located inside East Germany, could not be successfully defended against a determined Communist assault. It was also the reason for fighting in Vietnam and for the decision of the Nixon administration, upon inheriting responsibility for the war in 1969, to continue rather than abandon it even though the American public had turned against it and the chances of prevailing was slight. According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, ``We should not be shy in saying that NATO expansion will help a democratic Russia and hurt an imperialistic Russia.'' Quoted in George Melloan, ``Russia's Neighbors Worry About `Yalta II,' '' The Wall Street Journal, February 24, 1997,
p. A23.

It is not only Russians with impeccable democratic credentials who say this. According to General Alexander Lebed, briefly President Yeltsin's national security advisor and considered a leading candidate for the Russian presidency in the future, writing in the newspaper Izvestia in March 1997, ``If the sense of loss and humiliation that comes with defeat is allowed to fester in the Russian mentality, it may lead to an inferiority complex that can only be overcome by gaining new victories, preferably over old rivals. That is also a big mistake. Unfortunately, the political and military expansion of NATO to the East makes it probable that both of these mistakes will be committed''. Translation distributed by the LA Times Syndicate, March 17, 1997.
   
Nor is such an analysis confined to Russians. Professor Richard Pipes of Harvard, perhaps the most distinguished historian of the Russian revolution and, on the basis both of his scholarship and service in the Reagan administration, hardly someone who is unaware of or insensitive to historical Russian patterns of imperialism, has written: ``First and foremost among Western initiatives likely to provoke a violent reaction and to intensify chauvinism is the proposed expansion of NATO to Eastern Europe. This action, intended to enhance the sense of security of the Poles, Hungarians, and Czechs, will produce the contrary effect among the Russians''. Pipes, ``Russian Foreign Policy in Historical Perspective'', Harvard International Review, XIX:1, Winter, 1996-7, p. 57.

Even assuming, however, that the pro-containment arguments were valid, the particular expansion that is being planned is ill-conceived, for it does not extend membership far enough to the east. Even if it is inevitable that Russia will pose a threat to its neighbors, it will not threaten the countries slated for NATO membership. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are no longer Russia's neighbors. None has a real border with Russia. The countries that do share borders with Russia and thus would be threatened--Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Ukraine--are not being invited to join the Alliance. In this sense the Clinton administration's policy on NATO expansion is perfectly nonsensical: those who--under the only set of
assumptions under which expansion makes sense--need ATO won't get it; and those who get it don't need it.

They further outlined the need for reductions in armaments leading to the creation of a system of general security.
   
It is becoming commonplace today to deride disarmament and arms control as ineffective and unverifiable. This is the worst form of defeatism for, if it is impossible to create effective
disarmament measures, then in the long run nuclear war will be inevitable.
   
Fortunately, there is a great tradition of disarmament to be pursued. Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev's INF and START treaties name but two.
   
Today, for the first time in history, there are no significant cross border conflicts in Europe. According to NATO's own assessments, the Russian Army barely exists and will take a generation to rebuild We need to build upon that opportunity with nonmilitary measures.
 
I would like now to come to a central issue in the nature of the alliance itself, Mr. Chairman. There is, unfortunately, a dangerous illusion at the heart of the pro-enlargement argument. NATO is said to offer a security guarantee. But if one looks at what President Clinton said in a letter to members of the Senate, he explained the Article 5 commitment in this way. Article 5 states that members will consider an attack against one to be an attack against all. It does not define what actions would constitute an ``attack'' or prejudge what alliance decisions might be made in such circumstances.
 
Member States, acting in accordance with established constitutional processes, are required to exercise individual and collective judgment over this question. That is a case-by-case interpretation of Article 5.
   
Contrast that with the remarks of Secretary Albright in Prague, where she said above all, NATO membership means you will always be able to rely on us.
   
This weakness and contradiction have long been understood by officials in Europe. During the cold war, no one raised the matter in public except the French. In any case, it was assumed that any war would rapidly become nuclear, in which case the small print of documents would not become relevant. Extending these commitments today is a very different matter. It is reckless of the administration to talk of guarantees in Eastern Europe but of loopholes when talking to the Congress.
   
The Hungarian people are soon to be asked to vote on whether they want a security guarantee from NATO. No one has shown them the small print. Bosnia is a critical case. The U.S. was and is reluctant to commit troops. We are led to believe that this reluctance would not exist were Bosnia or any other country to be in NATO. Yet, the answer given by President Clinton to Senator Hutchison and other members indicates in the clearest possible way that the NATO treaty does, indeed, contain an escape clause, permitting another Munich or
Sarajevo.
   
We should recognize that there is not much difficulty between the commitments already given in the Partnership for Peace and the NATO treaty itself.

A careful look at the security environment in Europe that NATO enlargers seek to remake reveals a Europe at peace and no power threatening a major war. For the first time in this century--indeed, in Europe's history--a European peace can be assured by the long-term security commitment of a non-European power, the United States. Such a commitment is far more likely to be sustained for a minimalist NATO that does not require unnecessary increases in expenditures by an American electorate that has already been shouldering heavy defense burdens for Western Europe's defense for almost six decades. From a geostrategic perspective, the dominant force on the European continent is the U.S.-led NATO alliance. It securely anchors a democratic Germany to the rest of Western Europe and no other power or coalition of powers poses any threat to its present hegemonic security community or security outreach.
   
Eastward, stretching from Estonia to Bulgaria, a vast borderland has emerged from the collapse of the Soviet imperial system. It contains nine newly independent former Soviet satellites and three former Soviet imperial possessions. Together, they constitute an extensive buffer zone between Germany and Russia, the prime disrupters of Europe's peace since 1870. Far to the east lies Russia itself, a severely weakened empire shorn of its protective perimeters from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, and from Transcaucasia across Central Asia to China; bordered by eight of the fourteen weak and vulnerable Soviet republics that acquired instant independence when the Soviet Union was dissolved on 25 December 1991; marginalized as a great power; and uneasy over the potential of Political Islam. What is more, the Russian government presides over a society in disarray, a demoralized people, and a deteriorating, quasi-anarchical economy and political system. Whether the failure to stand firm in these past episodes would have triggered the adverse consequences American officials feared cannot, of course, be known. But their fears were not groundless; the dangerous consequences were at least conceivable. In the wake of the Cold War, however, such consequences are not conceivable. The circumstances that made Cold War fears plausible have disappeared. Communism in Europe is gone; the Soviet Union has disintegrated; the armed forces that made them both dangerous are in a state of collapse. If NATO does not expand to Central Europe, this will not bring the Soviet army into West Berlin: Berlin is no longer divided, and the Soviet army no longer exists. The end of the Cold War means that the world is safe for the United States to reconsider ill-advised foreign policies and correct them.
   
There is a final purpose that expanding NATO to Central Europe is supposed to serve: containing a resurgent Russia that, someday, will again threaten its neighbors to the West. This pro-expansion argument differs from the others in two important ways: it is both coherent and logical, and it is at least plausible.
   
The source of its plausibility is Russian history. Russia has recurrently threatened, and often occupied, its neighbors to the west. In truth, it is the fear that this pattern will one day be repeated, amid doubts about the sturdiness of Russia's own commitments to democracy, that lies behind the Central Europeans' desire to join the Atlantic Alliance.

The third proposition is that NATO expansion will decrease the likelihood of a revival of Russian imperial behavior toward its western neighbors and strengthen democracy at home. This view is vehemently and virtually unanimously contested, however, by those who have the greatest stake in Russian democracy and in peaceful Russian relations with the rest of the world: Russian democrats themselves. They oppose NATO expansion precisely because they believe it will give aid and comfort to the worst elements in Russian public life, the forces of nationalism, chauvinism, and imperialism.

Of course, none of this justifies an invasion but it clearly points to the public’s lack of understanding. One thing for sure, they’re not stupid, crazy or even going through a midlife crisis. When it comes to chess, fuhgettaboutit. What do you think—Slav Defense? Someone said that Putin has been playing chess while Biden is playing checkers.

We have Clinton wooing an expansion with an attempt to procure Yeltsin. We have NATO wanting to stay alive with the push for democracy and security. Not that this was the cause of Putin jumping out of a frog soup because his moves were premeditated. Like Shea said, we just didn’t see it—rose colored glasses and all.

Not everyone’s cup of tea, of course. Most people simply prefer to actually drink the tea.  Wink

'Kornee Wrote:Anyway we can do no more than observe how the war progresses and hope the ultimate outcome is less than catastrophic escalation.

Of course, but research is my go-to tool for self-soothing.  Blush
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Secular Sanity Offline
(Feb 28, 2022 01:13 AM)Secular Sanity Wrote: We should be enforcing a full-blown energy embargo on Russia, but I highly doubt that Biden has the balls for it. We could easily help Europe wean off of Russian gas and oil by waiving or revising the Jones Act.

Well, what do you know? Ukraine’s president asked everyone to ban Russian oil yesterday, and today Biden says he’s doing, but it’s not going to excuse the climbing prices that were already in play before the invasion.

We should also revive the keystone pipeline.

Addendum: Biden also spoke about our humanitarian efforts, but today, Zelensky said it’s just not working. They’re bombing the humanitarian convoys. He said there’s a lot of talk about the corridors being opened but it’s still not working. He needs anti-missile defense and now!

This documentary from 2021 shows the path Russian foreign policy has followed under Putin. It gives you an idea of the political views of all the people in these regions.
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Yazata Online
A belated day 12 summary. Word is that just about all of the forces that Russia had built up around Ukraine's borders have been committed to the fight. Unclear how many reinforcements they have in reserve. And notably notes and orders obtained off dead/captured Russian officers suggest that those officers were told to expect a 2 week campaign and that Russia was expected to have won in 14 days. That looks increasingly unlikely.

https://militaryland.net/ukraine/invasio...2-summary/

There aren't any big changes on the map. Biggest things to note are a growing buildup of Russian forces around Kyiv and a generally worsening situation in the east where Ukrainian defenders are outnumbered, hard pressed and in some places in danger of encirclement. Mariupol continues to hold out but several ceasefires to evacuate civilians have broken down. Another thing to note are roving columns of Russian vehicles driving across the Ukrainian countryside, cutting roads and railways. These columns look too small to take heavily defended cities, but are taking many small towns. But lots of abandoned Russian vehicles are being encountered everywhere that apparently ran out of gas, suggesting that the Russians are having serious problems supplying fuel, ammunition and other supply logistics to their far flung units. Russian soldiers have been seen raiding Ukranian grocery stores in search of food.

And Poland has apparently agreed to donate their Mig-29 fighters to Ukraine, free of charge. They will be flown to the US Air Force base at Ramstein in Germany, and then flown from there to Ukraine. I guess that this preserves the fiction that Poland isn't getting involved in the conflict, but is giving the jets to the US which is giving them to Ukraine. I assume that the US has agreed to make it up to Poland by supplying Poland with more US made F16's, an aircraft type that Poland already flies. (The reason why the US doesn't give the F-16's direct to Ukraine is that it would take too long to train Ukrainian pilots and mechanics to fly and service them. But Ukraine already flies Mig 29's, and it's pilots and mechanics are already familiar with the planes.)


[Image: 1024px-105_Polish_Air_Force_MiG-29A_Fulc...40x480.jpg]
[Image: 1024px-105_Polish_Air_Force_MiG-29A_Fulc...40x480.jpg]

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Secular Sanity Offline
Here’s something that I don’t know anything about. Maybe one of you guys could explain it. I am curious about the whole just war theory and Putin’s genocide claim. Am I missing something? Is his claim valid or not?

According to Wikipedia, there were allegations of torture and war crimes, as well as neo-Nazi sympathies and usage of associated symbols by the regiment, as seen in their logo featuring the Wolfsangel, one of the original symbols used by the 2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich.  

In 2018, we passed a bill we blocking military aid to Azov on the grounds of its white supremacist ideology.

Quote:Azov initially formed as a volunteer militia in May 2014 and has since been fighting Russian separatist forces in the Donbas War. It saw its first combat experience recapturing Mariupol from pro-Russian separatists in June 2014. On 12 November 2014, Azov was incorporated into the National Guard of Ukraine, and since then all members are official soldiers serving in the National Guard.

An uninitiated Western reader, reading this, is sure that Azov is just some insignificant public organization of the ultra-right, of which there are enough in the West. It's just that the authors decided to hide one essential fact from the reader: the neo-Nazi "Azov" has long been an official unit of the National Guard of Ukraine, which in turn is part of the structure of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. And the stylized swastika, known in the world under the name "wolf hook" and banned in a number of European countries as a neo-Nazi symbol, also officially flaunts on the standards of this structure, with which Zelensky has repeatedly participated in joint events.

And for some reason, during meetings with the Azov fighters, Zelensky never mentioned the feat of the Ukrainian people in the fight against the Nazis and the ideological forerunners of these fighters - Bandera, or even the feat of his grandfather. In the West, no one was embarrassed by the presentation of the highest Ukrainian award personally by the President in the hall of the Verkhovna Rada to Dmitry Kotsyubaylo, a militant of another neo-Nazi structure - the " Right Sector " *.

Yes, we in Russia at that moment were asking the same question that Zelensky is now asking in his addresses: can the Ukrainian people support the misanthropic ideas of Nazism? The very ideas that are promoted by the supporters of the theory of "purity of the white race" from "Azov" and "Right Sector" *! But the Western media, which are now shouting about the groundlessness of the accusations against the Ukrainian state, preferred not to mention this inconvenient moment for them. And even more so, they don’t mention it now. Otherwise, it will be difficult to explain to your readers how the glorification of Nazism is possible in a democratic state at the official level.

***Note that the Ukrainian Nazis never hid their goals and objectives. Moreover, they talked about this long before the events of 2014, so this cannot be attributed to the "events in Crimea", with which some experts are trying to clumsily explain the ATO and the Russian genocide in Donbass . Back in the early 90s, in the chorus of the anthem of another militaristic structure of Ukrainian nationalists , UNA-UNSO * , the words "And from Donbass to Perekop - two crossings in an armored personnel carrier" sounded - a more than transparent hint at the alleged war zone.

And the same Mikhalchishin in 2011 said that two "centers of power - Moscow and Donetsk" were fighting against Ukraine, promising that "Bandera's army would cross the Dnieper and Donets", occupying the capital of Donbass. Which, in fact, since 2014, already being in the ranks of the SBU or Azov, he tried to realize by destroying his ideological enemies , which he directly called the Russians. Note that he called them that, already being in the public service. And someone else proves to us that the term "genocide" in relation to the events in the Donbass has no basis and is even "ridiculous"!

Now we hear only the first testimonies of the frightened and exhausted residents of those Donbass settlements that were under the occupation of the Ukrainian "warriors of light" for eight years. Residents of the settlements that were under the control of "Azov" speak directly about the attitude of the Nazis towards them: "We were not considered people. Because we are Donbass." But for some reason, these shots are not shown on any Western TV channel. Otherwise, after all, the terms "genocide" and "denazification" will acquire a completely different sound, which they are trying to achieve in the West. Suddenly, for that audience, it turns out that this is no longer as "funny" as it seems to German Chancellor Olaf Scholz .

https://ria.ru/20220303/denatsifikatsiya....html?in=t

https://theconversation.com/a-brief-hist...ile-178574

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Azov_Battalion
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Magical Realist Offline
https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukrain...dc4410664e

WARSAW, Poland (AP) — "The Pentagon on Tuesday rejected Poland’s surprise announcement that it would give the United States its MiG-29 fighter jets for use by Ukraine, a rare display of disharmony by NATO allies seeking to boost Ukrainian fighters while avoiding getting caught up in a wider war with Russia.

Pentagon spokesman John Kirby said Poland’s declaration that it intended to deliver the 28 jets to the U.S. Ramstein Air Base in Germany raised the concerning prospect of warplanes departing from a U.S. and NATO base to fly into airspace contested with Russia in the Ukraine conflict.

“We will continue to consult with Poland and our other NATO allies about this issue and the difficult logistical challenges it presents, but we do not believe Poland’s proposal is a tenable one,” Kirby said in a statement.

The proposed gift of more warplanes would be a morale booster for Ukrainians under pounding Russian assault for nearly two weeks. But it also raises the risk of the war expanding beyond Ukraine."
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Yazata Online
(Mar 9, 2022 03:50 AM)Magical Realist Wrote: https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukrain...dc4410664e

WARSAW, Poland (AP) — "The Pentagon on Tuesday rejected Poland’s surprise announcement that it would give the United States its MiG-29 fighter jets for use by Ukraine, a rare display of disharmony by NATO allies seeking to boost Ukrainian fighters while avoiding getting caught up in a wider war with Russia.

Pentagon spokesman John Kirby said Poland’s declaration that it intended to deliver the 28 jets to the U.S. Ramstein Air Base in Germany raised the concerning prospect of warplanes departing from a U.S. and NATO base to fly into airspace contested with Russia in the Ukraine conflict.

“We will continue to consult with Poland and our other NATO allies about this issue and the difficult logistical challenges it presents, but we do not believe Poland’s proposal is a tenable one,” Kirby said in a statement.

The proposed gift of more warplanes would be a morale booster for Ukrainians under pounding Russian assault for nearly two weeks. But it also raises the risk of the war expanding beyond Ukraine."

Damn it, this kind of BS makes me mad. Regardless of how the planes are routed to Ukraine, Putin is going to be pissed. There's no way to avoid angering Russia if we intend to help Ukraine. If the jets find their way to Ukraine, Russia will know they are there. And Moscow will know perfectly well where they came from.

Poland must not be pleased either. They were hesitating to give the planes to Ukraine for fear of getting involved in the war. And the United States was pressuring them to do it. So they proposed to give the planes to the US to pass on to Ukraine, and suddenly the US backs away. If that's how the US feels, why was Washington pressuring Warsaw to do something they are afraid to do themselves?

Putin must be loving all the NATO confusion and how scared both Poland and the US seem to be about angering Russia. That's just what he wants. This whole war is about returning Russia to its old superpower status.

Just give the Ukrainians the damn jets!!
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