https://iai.tv/articles/what-physicists-..._auid=2020
EXCERPTS: Panpsychism is the view that consciousness is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the physical world. It is the view that the basic building blocks of the physical universe – perhaps fundamental particles – have incredibly simple forms of experience, and that the very sophisticated experience of the human or animal brain is rooted in, derived from, more rudimentary forms of experience at the level of basic physics.
Panpsychism has received a lot of attention of late. The world of academic philosophy has been rocked by the conversion of one of the most influential materialists of the last thirty years, Michael Tye, to a form of panpsychism (panprotopsychism) in his latest book. And the main annual UK philosophy conference held a plenary panel on panpsychism this year for the first time in its history.
Much of the attention has been critical, which is as it should be when it comes to matters on which there is little consensus. Among the recent critics are two leading theoretical physicists: Sabine Hossenfelder and Sean Carroll 19 Essays on ‘Galileo’s Error’, who argue that panpsychism is incompatible with what fundamental physics tells us about the building blocks of the universe. However, these objections rely on a misunderstanding of what panpsychism is. Panpsychism is not a scientific theory in competition with physics, and therefore not incompatible with it. It’s rather a philosophical interpretation of the claims of physics.
[...] How should the panpsychist respond to these challenges? Hossenfelder simply misunderstands panpsychism. She interprets panpsychism as a form of dualism: there are the physical properties of the particles (mass, spin, charge) and then, in addition, certain non-physical consciousness properties. But panpsychists are not dualists. According to panpsychism, an electron doesn’t have two kinds of property: physical and non-physical. Rather, it’s physical properties (mass, spin, charge) are forms of consciousness. Consciousness is the ultimate nature of the physical.
[...] what physics gives us is a purely mathematical description of reality. ... Now, there are a couple of ways one might respond to the fact that physics is purely mathematical. One option is to follow the physicist Max Tegmark in concluding that reality itself, at its base, is purely mathematical. Another option, the one taken by the panpsychist, is to hold that there is something that underlies this mathematical structure...
In what sense does consciousness underlie the mathematical structures of physics? According to panpsychism, all that exists at the fundamental level of reality are networks of conscious entities. However, those conscious entities behave in certain predictable ways, in virtue of the kinds of experiences they have, and that behaviour can be modelled mathematically. The result is physics. Physics describes the behaviour of fundamental conscious entities, but does so in way that abstracts from their experiential nature, focusing only on the abstract patterns they realise through their interactions.
[...] That sounds a bit weird. If you’re doing physics, it doesn’t feel like you’re studying networks of conscious entities. But that’s because when you’re doing physics you’re just interested in mathematical structure, not in what, if anything, underlies that mathematical structure. The latter question is one for philosophers.
Properly understood, then, there is no clash between the standard model and panpsychism. Panpsychism is not a rival scientific hypothesis to the standard model, it is rather a philosophical interpretation of the standard model, according to which the standard model records the mathematical structures realised by fundamental conscious entities.
[...] To repeat: all that exists at the fundamental level, according to panpsychism, are conscious entities. And those entities are doing what they do because of the kinds of conscious experiences they have. When, ignorant of the experiential nature of the properties of particles, we refer to them in terms of the mathematical structures they realise through their behaviour, we call them ‘mass’, ‘spin’ and ‘charge.’ But it’s not as though there are on the one hand the physical properties of particles, and their consciousness properties on the other (again, this would be dualism rather than panpsychism). There are just fundamental conscious entities, and physics reports the mathematical patterns they form through their interactions.
Panpsychism is not a competitor to physics. As a philosophical interpretation of physics, it is rather in competition with other philosophical interpretations of physics. But why on earth would we take the panpsychism interpretation of physics seriously, when Tegmark’s interpretation of there being only mathematical structure seems more parsimonious?
Essentially, when it comes to understanding the relationship between our mathematical models of the world and our experiences of consciousness, I believe we have to decide between three options:
EXCERPTS: Panpsychism is the view that consciousness is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the physical world. It is the view that the basic building blocks of the physical universe – perhaps fundamental particles – have incredibly simple forms of experience, and that the very sophisticated experience of the human or animal brain is rooted in, derived from, more rudimentary forms of experience at the level of basic physics.
Panpsychism has received a lot of attention of late. The world of academic philosophy has been rocked by the conversion of one of the most influential materialists of the last thirty years, Michael Tye, to a form of panpsychism (panprotopsychism) in his latest book. And the main annual UK philosophy conference held a plenary panel on panpsychism this year for the first time in its history.
Much of the attention has been critical, which is as it should be when it comes to matters on which there is little consensus. Among the recent critics are two leading theoretical physicists: Sabine Hossenfelder and Sean Carroll 19 Essays on ‘Galileo’s Error’, who argue that panpsychism is incompatible with what fundamental physics tells us about the building blocks of the universe. However, these objections rely on a misunderstanding of what panpsychism is. Panpsychism is not a scientific theory in competition with physics, and therefore not incompatible with it. It’s rather a philosophical interpretation of the claims of physics.
[...] How should the panpsychist respond to these challenges? Hossenfelder simply misunderstands panpsychism. She interprets panpsychism as a form of dualism: there are the physical properties of the particles (mass, spin, charge) and then, in addition, certain non-physical consciousness properties. But panpsychists are not dualists. According to panpsychism, an electron doesn’t have two kinds of property: physical and non-physical. Rather, it’s physical properties (mass, spin, charge) are forms of consciousness. Consciousness is the ultimate nature of the physical.
[...] what physics gives us is a purely mathematical description of reality. ... Now, there are a couple of ways one might respond to the fact that physics is purely mathematical. One option is to follow the physicist Max Tegmark in concluding that reality itself, at its base, is purely mathematical. Another option, the one taken by the panpsychist, is to hold that there is something that underlies this mathematical structure...
In what sense does consciousness underlie the mathematical structures of physics? According to panpsychism, all that exists at the fundamental level of reality are networks of conscious entities. However, those conscious entities behave in certain predictable ways, in virtue of the kinds of experiences they have, and that behaviour can be modelled mathematically. The result is physics. Physics describes the behaviour of fundamental conscious entities, but does so in way that abstracts from their experiential nature, focusing only on the abstract patterns they realise through their interactions.
[...] That sounds a bit weird. If you’re doing physics, it doesn’t feel like you’re studying networks of conscious entities. But that’s because when you’re doing physics you’re just interested in mathematical structure, not in what, if anything, underlies that mathematical structure. The latter question is one for philosophers.
Properly understood, then, there is no clash between the standard model and panpsychism. Panpsychism is not a rival scientific hypothesis to the standard model, it is rather a philosophical interpretation of the standard model, according to which the standard model records the mathematical structures realised by fundamental conscious entities.
[...] To repeat: all that exists at the fundamental level, according to panpsychism, are conscious entities. And those entities are doing what they do because of the kinds of conscious experiences they have. When, ignorant of the experiential nature of the properties of particles, we refer to them in terms of the mathematical structures they realise through their behaviour, we call them ‘mass’, ‘spin’ and ‘charge.’ But it’s not as though there are on the one hand the physical properties of particles, and their consciousness properties on the other (again, this would be dualism rather than panpsychism). There are just fundamental conscious entities, and physics reports the mathematical patterns they form through their interactions.
Panpsychism is not a competitor to physics. As a philosophical interpretation of physics, it is rather in competition with other philosophical interpretations of physics. But why on earth would we take the panpsychism interpretation of physics seriously, when Tegmark’s interpretation of there being only mathematical structure seems more parsimonious?
Essentially, when it comes to understanding the relationship between our mathematical models of the world and our experiences of consciousness, I believe we have to decide between three options:
- Pythagoreanism: Reality is in itself a purely mathematical structure
- Dualism: Physical reality is pure mathematical structure, but there is also non-physical consciousness.
- Panpsychism: There are only conscious entities, and some of them realise the mathematical structures identified by physical science.