A theory on the evolution of phenomenal consciousness

Much of his thesis here echoes my own past observations, like the necessary feedback loop of motor and sensation as well as the possibility of perception without sentience. Really intriguing thoughts!

https://royalsocietypublishing.org/rstb/...-scope-and

"In the history of life, consciousness of sensory states with ‘phenomenal properties’—the basis of ‘sentience’—is, arguably, a late evolutionary development, which occurred long after conscious access to a ‘global mental workspace’ had become widely established as a strategy for cognitive information processing. In this article, I focus on phenomenal consciousness. I propose a step-by-step sequence by which the mental representation of sensory stimulation could have acquired phenomenal content through small changes in the brain. Also—addressing the question of evolutionary function—I point to the crucial psychological benefits to an animal of having a ‘phenomenally conscious self’. A thread running through the article is the phenomenon of ‘blindsight’, which I take to be a model for the non-phenomenal cognition that characterizes the majority of insentient animal species.

This article is part of the theme issue ‘Evolutionary functions of consciousness’."

Upon further thought, I can't quite agree that phenomenality evolved in humans only recently from a previous blindsite state thru them internalizing their reactions to certain stimuli. For one thing there's the quale of pain, which must go way back in our history and in fact even thru most all other animal species. I can't imagine a non-quale experience of pain. The whole point of it is to generate such a powerful quale that you immediately react to stop, remedy, and avoid its cause in the future. VERY crucial for survival. Likewise there's the powerful qualia of sex, of eating, of smelling, of being tired, of social bonding, and so attendant to so many actions crucial for survival. Thus we don't remember our bear encounter because we were so in danger. We remember it because we were terrified. For this reason I believe sentience was long connected with phenomenal perception. And I don't accept that animals and babies are without it.

(Oct 30, 2026 10:28 PM)Magical Realist Wrote: Much of his thesis here echoes my own past observations, like the necessary feedback loop of motor and sensation as well as the possibility of perception without sentience. Really intriguing thoughts!

https://royalsocietypublishing.org/rstb/...-scope-and

"In the history of life, consciousness of sensory states with ‘phenomenal properties’—the basis of ‘sentience’—is, arguably, a late evolutionary development, which occurred long after conscious access to a ‘global mental workspace’ had become widely established as a strategy for cognitive information processing. In this article, I focus on phenomenal consciousness. I propose a step-by-step sequence by which the mental representation of sensory stimulation could have acquired phenomenal content through small changes in the brain. Also—addressing the question of evolutionary function—I point to the crucial psychological benefits to an animal of having a ‘phenomenally conscious self’. A thread running through the article is the phenomenon of ‘blindsight’, which I take to be a model for the non-phenomenal cognition that characterizes the majority of insentient animal species.

This article is part of the theme issue ‘Evolutionary functions of consciousness’."

Yeah, I figured that must have been written by Humphrey, of the "illusionism" camp.

Nicholas Humphrey: This means – now you can be shocked – that Descartes was essentially right: sensations have no material substance; they are indeed just thought stuff. [...] We don’t have to explain the existence of brain-states that possess strange non-physical properties such as phenomenal redness, but only the existence of brain-states that give rise to the idea of these properties.

[...] To say that sensations are representations is not to deny that they exist: they exist precisely as imaginings. [...] Illusionism as a theory is liberating. It means we can escape the quagmire of a generation of modern philosophers and neuroscientists who have started from the wrong place.

If, like the scientist Francis Crick, you go looking for ‘the neural correlate of consciousness’, you are all too likely to get fixated on the possible existence of an impossible kind of mind-brain identity. But the truth is that sensations – as thoughts – don’t belong down there in the substance of the brain.

[...] Whoever suggested that physics and chemistry account for everything? Physics doesn’t account for ideas in general. --The Invention of the Soul