(Nov 1, 2020 07:12 AM)Leigha Wrote: [ -> ]The idea behind determinism sort of puts off free will as an impossibility.
It's
incompatibilism that really does that. What its flavors have in common is that they choose conceptions of free-will (FW) which make the latter just that: incompatible with determinism.
The so-called "hard determinism" flavor thus circularly concludes that FW is not the case (if determinism is the case).
Alternatively, incompatibilism's libertarianism flavor (which is pro-FW) rejects determinism because of that.
Its "hard incompatibilism" flavor goes a step further and conceives FW as incommensurable with both determinism and indeterminism.
A fourth flavor might be "
adequate determinism", that takes a mitigated view about both its namesake and FW (as opposed to absolutes).
The situation is vaguely similar to Pluto having once been defined as as planet, but then the definitions/rules were changed so that now it gets slotted as a dwarf planet. The prescriptive "experts" of an enterprise simply modify their "word-game" to get the result their motivated reasoning desires beforehand (in the case of Pluto, though, it was also prompted by adjustment to "new" empirical knowledge).
Quote:But, practically speaking, we believe (even if say, it's not objectively true) that we have free will, that the quality of our lives is partially chosen for us, and chosen by us...no? Free will could be an illusion, but does it matter if we believe that our choices...matter?
The Earth would not be like it is today (i.e., technological civilization and its various effects) if our choices did not matter or if our bodies were like rocks that lacked the internal apparatus to make decisions. We actually made the future we occupy -- we collectively chose it. The capacity to deliberate and select is "will", and "free" is not having external agencies (entities that have agendas) obstructing one in that regard (always).
Quote:If we have absolutely no free will, why are we held morally culpable for crimes and such in society?
Elimination of FW also nullifies or undermines the objectivity of science (and naturalism-oriented philosophy), what with the experimental approaches, interpretations of data and conclusions of its practicioners being compromised by supposed agencies and influences beyond the inner workings/operation of human bodies. Elimination of FW thereby becomes suspect itself, as its product veers back around to inflict the bite of doubt upon the impartiality and "independence from puppet-mastery" of its adherents.
But we can have FW -- it's simply a matter of switching from one metaphysical word-game to another one (either to a different sub-member of incompatiblism or a leap to
compatibilism). Or just leave the whole mess behind. We know when we're being forced to do something we don't want to, without the need of philosophical proclamations. The distinction could not be made unless we were also familiar with the opposite.
Many people feel that "randomness" has something to do with free will. While I don't see it that way, it can still be preserved for finicky folk.
A specific _X_ event that is genuinely random (not
chaotic) is one that does not conform to any pattern, principle, calculation or "precognition of the gods" that could predict it. (Though it might still be corralled in a general way by statistical probability.) A random event should arguably also lack a cause.
Thus even something as fixed as a
block-universe can (in theory or elusive ontological fact) contain aspects that qualify as random -- they simply can't be captured by algorithm, pattern, law, etc.
In contrast, only the past is fixed in a
Growing Block-Universe (GBU). For instance, if we contend that there are "future happenings" which will not conform to regularities and lack causes, then on those grounds they are still going to be retrospectively classifiable as random once they exist and become the past.
Ironically, those occurrences would still belong to the "future" for people in eras that precede them yet further in the past of GBU, and indeed we in this moment could likewise only delusionally believe we're in the "present" edge of a Growing Block-Universe. That's why GBU as a third option or proposal in philosophy of time is potentially messed-up and perhaps slides or collapses into either Presentism or Eternalism.
Presentism limits existence to a process of ephemeral changes which near-immediately replace/annihilate each other one after the other.
Eternalism allows those differences (stages of development) to substantively co-exist. (The so-called "
flow of time" in the latter is instead consciousness throughout a brain's worldline being broken-up into increments corresponding to chunk-sequences of neural states. There is actually no "flow" in Presentism, either, since there is no past for whatever supposed _X_ to transit from and no future for it to transit to. Only "now" exists.)