(Oct 14, 2020 01:36 AM)Secular Sanity Wrote: [ -> ]Do you think that an octopus's arm has freewill, Yazata?
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And that's the problem when you divorce free will from reason, or redefine free will into impotence. While instinct may have the possibility to do otherwise, it is not consciously chosen from a motive other than external stimuli and natural programming.
Quote: (Oct 13, 2020 06:58 PM)Syne Wrote: [ -> ]Quote:If dualism is not an option and determinism is equally untenable, what other options are we left with? Some scholars have resorted to quantum uncertainty in the brain as the solution, providing the necessary discontinuity in the causal chain of events. This is not unrealistic, as there is evidence that biological organisms can evolve to take advantage of quantum effects. For instance, plants use quantum coherence when harvesting light in their photosynthetic complexes. Until now, however, it has proved difficult to find direct empirical evidence in support of analogous phenomena in brains. Moreover, and more importantly, the pure chance of quantum indeterminism alone is not what anyone would call ‘freedom’. ‘For surely my actions should be caused because I want them to happen for one or more reasons rather that they happen by chance’. This is precisely where the biological mechanisms underlying the generation of behavioral variability can provide a viable concept of freewill.[/spoiler]
Who said dualism wasn't an option?
Egads! Dualism is a hard pill for me to swallow.
Probably because you've only considered substance dualism, where the mental and physical are two fundamentally disparate substances.
Property dualism asserts that an ontological distinction lies in the differences between properties of mind and matter, and that consciousness is ontologically irreducible to neurobiology and physics. It asserts that when matter is organized in the appropriate way (i.e., in the way that living human bodies are organized), mental properties emerge. Hence, it is a sub-branch of emergent materialism.
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Predicate dualism is a view espoused by such non-reductive physicalists as Donald Davidson and Jerry Fodor, who maintain that while there is only one ontological category of substances and properties of substances (usually physical), the predicates that we use to describe mental events cannot be redescribed in terms of (or reduced to) physical predicates of natural languages.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind%E2%80...lism#Types
I doubt you'd object much to the idea that mind is emergent from physical properties, but as such cannot be explained in a reductive manner. Or that our language about mental events does not have a one-for-one correspondence with physical states in the brain.
The problem with physicalism is that neuroplasticity and philosophical zombies seem to defeat the idea. But if we back up to monism, the idea that everything is fundamentally made of the same stuff, we can avoid the logical and evidential problems physicalism presents.
Monism attributes oneness or singleness (Greek: μόνος) to a concept e.g., existence. Various kinds of monism can be distinguished:
Priority monism states that all existing things go back to a source that is distinct from them; e.g., in Neoplatonism everything is derived from The One. In this view only one thing is ontologically basic or prior to everything else.
Existence monism posits that, strictly speaking, there exists only a single thing, the universe, which can only be artificially and arbitrarily divided into many things.
Substance monism asserts that a variety of existing things can be explained in terms of a single reality or substance. Substance monism posits that only one kind of stuff exists, although many things may be made up of this stuff, e.g., matter or mind.
Dual-aspect monism is the view that the mental and the physical are two aspects of, or perspectives on, the same substance.
Being a theist, I think the single substance is metaphysical, which can present as either physical or mental (substance and/or dual-aspect monism). But it's often easier to just talk about dualism, as that's the relationship between the mental and physical. For someone of a more materialist bent, you might consider the single substance to be the strings of String Theory, that can both make up physical matter and account for the quantum processes in the brain, as two fundamentally different domains, where the biological matter alone does not account for the mental.