Regarding presenting something that lacks experiential properties

[C C]

Concerning its usage in philosophy of mind, the etymology of the adjective "phenomenal" descends from Greek phainomenon, from Latin phaenomenon and means that "that which appears or is seen." Shown, IOW.

"Shown" in contrast to (say) invisible. All the five basic senses exhibit content, exhibit their unique characteristics. This is the fundamental fact of thought and perceptual "experiences" that the hard problem of consciousness addresses (or should be clarified as addressing).

Technical description as either symbol-based formulations or as the language and nomenclature of a specific discipline is phenomenal. Description and schematics have visual (seen), auditory (spoken), or tactile (braille) properties. So-called "rational objects or furniture" are actually sensible objects, even if popularly pretended to be the intellectual alternative to the latter. Not to mention the obvious fact that they are artificial (invented) and acquired representations, not the biologically native presentations that a brain comes equipped with.)

Accordingly, physicalism cannot present any example of matter or "natural laws" or an explanatory account dealing in relationships/structure and magnitude/quantity that is literally non-phenomenal. In fact, "presenting" entails manifestation of some kind.

The adjective "physical" does not reference non-phenomenal "stuff" (unless it is desired that _X_ conception of physicalism be grounded in nonsense).

Thus, phenomenal attributes are not a mysterious "outsider" and there is no hard problem of consciousness. This doesn't merely apply to the proponents of this or that proposed solution to the hard problem. But also to those deemed "opponents" for whatever reason. When/if they likewise begin with the either overt or covert error that "physical" references a non-phenomenal manner of existing. A belief which can never be anything other than unsubstantiated dogma since a substance that is indigenously invisible cannot offer direct evidence of that trait or ability (like a tornado destroying a town does) unmediated by reasoning and the latter's usually selected premises/pressuppositions or underlying motivations.

[Syne]

No, mental images of physical objects are not phenomenal. That's why the term noumenal exists. They are constructed by the mind, not just perceived by it. Conflating our senses with our mental perceptions to blur the line between the internal and external worlds does nothing to address the hard problem of consciousness. It just attempts to explain away the noumenal by redefinition.

[C C]

No, mental images of physical objects are not phenomenal. That's why the term noumenal exists. They are constructed by the mind, not just perceived by it. Conflating our senses with our mental perceptions to blur the line between the internal and external worlds does nothing to address the hard problem of consciousness. It just attempts to explain away the noumenal by redefinition.

And here, too, we have the concept "noumenal" having to be expressed by a word that is phenomenal.

[Syne]

No, mental images of physical objects are not phenomenal. That's why the term noumenal exists. They are constructed by the mind, not just perceived by it. Conflating our senses with our mental perceptions to blur the line between the internal and external worlds does nothing to address the hard problem of consciousness. It just attempts to explain away the noumenal by redefinition.

And here, too, we have the concept "noumenal" having to be expressed by a word that is phenomenal.

You think it's fun to make bare assertions, huh?

You're conflating the obvious meaning of "is seen" to arbitrarily include internal mental images, abstractions, etc., where the ancient Greeks never hinted at that use and it runs contrary to modern usage. IOW, you're just redefining "phenomenal" to fallaciously explain away the hard problem of consciousness. Trying to subsume the noumenal into this broad a definition of the phenomenal offers no explanatory benefit. It only serves to quell doubts raised by the hard problem, i.e. motivated reasoning.

But go ahead, explain how things like abstractions, imagination, and other mental activity, that no ancient Greek would ever recognize as phenomenal, physical, or manifest, is somehow justified by your naive misuse of relatively simple language. Identity thinking tends to lump dissimilar things together, while discerning thought tends to differentiate.

[C C]

[...] You're conflating the obvious meaning of "is seen" to arbitrarily include internal mental images, abstractions, etc., where the ancient Greeks never hinted at that use and it runs contrary to modern usage. IOW, you're just redefining "phenomenal" to fallaciously explain away the hard problem of consciousness. [...]

The average person on the street tends to define "phenomenal" as something along the line of "remarkable or wondrous". A meaning that apparently came into vogue by 1850.

So I start out by clarifying what the PoM usage is instead descended from, and you interpret such as redefining that current, specialized usage?

[Syne]

No, I wholly agree that "phenomenal" means physical, manifest, sensible, seen, etc., in philosophy of mind. And I thought I was pretty clear that it shouldn't be conflated with the noumenal...the opposite of that definition of phenomenal.

Since you couched the subject in PoM, it didn't even dawn on me that common parlance played any part at all. When I said "modern usage" it was specifically as opposed to noumenon in PoM.