Quantum mechanics, free will & the Game of Life (John Horgon)

[Ostronomos]

Well said, but we'll never know. It might just be a hierarchy of drives.

Man, that rivals Ostro's "pish posh".

The thing is that you fail to offer the least argument of how a hierarchy of drives could possibly mediate external stimuli and internal randomness and urges. But then, you are just regurgitating the thoughts of others. Why would I expect any better?

You're just jealous because my genius and talent while high off weed is unparalleled by anyone else in history.

You're also acting like those urges need to be held up to some arbitrary moral standard. Internal randomness is a clear sign of superdeterminism, as the product of our instincts and urges leaves us with no choice but to follow one specific path in life. At least in each Quantum universe.

https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/UoCMPGoUxOc

[C C]

I like margaritas. I go to my usual restaurant. The waiter is excellent. I remember him. He goes out of his way to please you. I order the house margarita, but he recommends the cranberry one, and says that I won’t regret it. His likability and confidence influence my choice. I don’t want to disappoint him and I like new experiences. I get the cranberry margarita. Rewind the tape. Something in the chain of events leading up to my decision would have to change. If it played out in the exact same way, could I have chosen differently? I don’t think so.

Either way, the "will" of the first version of you executes what it wants according to its identity slash programming and the environmental input it is presented with (no hijacking force from the outside).

If an injection of major randomness in the surroundings changed circumstances, then it's a different version of the universe that the intrusion has created (though that "you" might still be considered equivalent to the original one reacting to different input).

However, if the intruding randomness was in your brain operations, then it's both a different you and a different universe (since here you represent the altered content of the latter). As well as your "will" being "hijacked" by a non-pattern following invader. OTOH, if you routinely had random events injecting themselves into your neural functioning, arguably that becomes a norm of your identity and volition and thus perhaps not a hijacker or "coercion from the outside".

[Syne]

Might as well lump these two together.

I like margaritas. I go to my usual restaurant. The waiter is excellent. I remember him. He goes out of his way to please you. I order the house margarita, but he recommends the cranberry one, and says that I won’t regret it. His likability and confidence influence my choice. I don’t want to disappoint him and I like new experiences. I get the cranberry margarita. Rewind the tape. Something in the chain of events leading up to my decision would have to change. If it played out in the exact same way, could I have chosen differently? I don’t think so.

Of course not, as studies have shown that belief in free will actually alters behavior. Since you don't believe in free will, you don't question or second guess your motives. If you did, you might not be so easily swayed by his recommendation, might question why his "likability and confidence" have any influence on you at all, or why you care about disappointing him. Those alone sound as if you don't want to question it, so maybe you don't take any responsibility for flirting with him. Whatever happens, happens. New experiences, am I right? ; )

You're just jealous because my genius and talent while high off weed is unparalleled by anyone else in history.

Thanks for continuing to verify my diagnosis of delusions of grandeur.

You're also acting like those urges need to be held up to some arbitrary moral standard. Internal randomness is a clear sign of superdeterminism, as the product of our instincts and urges leaves us with no choice but to follow one specific path in life. At least in each Quantum universe.

You're imagining things, as genuine free will actually requires the ability to do other than good or moral. The only way you can say urges must comply to some moral standard is for the exact superdeterminism you espouse. Way to not only argue a straw man but also defeat your own argument.

[C C]

Caution: Amateur philosopher at work

I like my sperm story. It's new. Before it I used to present the 'X saves lives' conundrum. When it works how would you know who X actually saved? Well , you can't know. All you know is a statistic indicating the decision to use X has worked up till now. But when it doesn't work we know who was not saved. I've always thought the latter could be argued as pre-determined but the former cannot. 

Don't know what that says about a pre-determined event vs non-determined. Greater possibility that if Sally was one of the saved that I wouldn't know but if she died then I would. Maybe an outcome has to have more facts to be classed as determined. Cause would be a fact but when I don't know if the cause actually saved Sally it's because I'm missing information that will never materialize. I'm left with no choice but to reject determinism because it should apply every time. IMHO of course

It's a situation of either underdetermination or overdetermination (quite frankly, if I spent an hour dwelling on it, I might still be undecided as to which).

The sperm and "saved lives" scenarios don't in themselves cast doubt on determinism ontologically, but rather epistemologically ("missing information" as you say) highlight how our knowledge can be limited and subject to revision when it comes to absolutely ascertaining the specific cause. There might actually be a number of reasons converging on _X_ that produced an outcome or consequence, or maintained a ho-hum status quo of Sally still being alive, or whatever.

However, since it is a metaphysical or philosophical doctrine (with many sub-divisional flavors), having suspended judgment about determinism (if not rejecting it) is an acceptable stance. What often makes it difficult to do is the number of scientists and the technocracy in general who seem to wave practical cause/effect around (its usefulness) till its Velcro hooks come into contact with and cling to those of the belief. Creating the appearance that one is challenging or being indifferently aloof about a vetted fact.

[C C]

[...] It's such an odd human longing, isn’t it, C C? On one hand, we want to be part of something bigger than us and (meant to be), but on the other hand, we want to be free from it.
Well, you can’t have your cake and eat it, too.

BTW, maybe we should send Yazata some Kleenex, eh? 

https://quillette.com/2019/07/17/why-we-...m-edwards/

JC: "So much for Edwards’s arguments in favor of “contracausal” free will. He goes on to suggest that there are salubrious personal and social effects of believing in free will—that we should believe in free will, even if there are no rationally compelling reasons to do so. Edwards says this: “Needless to say, there is substantial evidence that people who believe in free will, or at least believe that they are in control of their own lives, are more prone to exhibit good mental health and productive, ethical behaviour.”

But this is selective citation, as the literature on the effects of accepting libertarian free will is complex and contradictory. Edwards, for example, cites a Psychology Today article about a paper showing that belief in free will increased helping behavior and reduced aggression. Yet those results were contradicted by another study showing that disbelief in free will decreases aggression and promotes kindness. A well known paper supposedly showing that free will decreases cheating was contradicted by a set of four studies showing no association between belief in free will and more moral behavior; its results also failed replication in two other studies. This is not surprising given the weaknesses of such studies, which estimate short-term effects in the laboratory produced by reading selected passages.

The upshot is that there’s no convincing evidence that believing in free will has beneficial personal and social effects. Given that, it would seem premature to promote belief in free will as a social good."

I'd agree that assimilating the concept of "free will" and being affected by it does not introduce or connect one to a dualistic situation. But not any dogmatism of it absolutely never having benefits or bringing about changes that otherwise would not happen. (When an agnostic stance or suspended belief is serving the same function as a large object blocking a hallway, it can still equate to dogma.) My reasons for that are plural: ranging from the infamous unreliability of socio-psychological research; to Coyne seemingly cherry-picking himself among its conflicting studies just like Edwards; to personal experience/observations.

People who believe they are endowed with innate programming that keeps them stuck in a rut or trapped in this or that habit, accordingly can't modify themselves. And if an intervening rehabilitator changes them or a sequence of unintended events does so, it still requires an underlying or subconscious receptiveness to the idea of re-programming being possible (i.e., "how can this impossibility be happening, how has it been brought about?"). Of having subconsciously absorbed a new routine or orientation revolving around one's self not being a machine determined by fixed, native settings -- regardless of whether that is ever articulated in words by the individual privately or publicly.

Even if it was determined in advance 14-billion years ago that the concept of FW would be stealthily inputted into them in terms of behavioral effects, the changes would not have occurred without it as a mediator. It can't be denied responsibility any more than the human body can be denied responsibility for enabling a collection of molecules to write literature like "Hamlet" (which an ancient configuration could not do or plan, and indeed even the grand-scale state of the cosmos at large right now cannot do and cognitively intend).

[Secular Sanity]

Of course not, as studies have shown that belief in free will actually alters behavior. Since you don't believe in free will, you don't question or second guess your motives. If you did, you might not be so easily swayed by his recommendation, might question why his "likability and confidence" have any influence on you at all, or why you care about disappointing him. Those alone sound as if you don't want to question it, so maybe you don't take any responsibility for flirting with him. Whatever happens, happens. New experiences, am I right? ; )

No attraction what so ever. Not wanting to disappoint someone doesn’t equate to wanting to have sex with them, nor does trying new things. Likeability is a fundamental tool when it comes to persuasion. Something that you’re obviously oblivious to.

---

Even if it was determined in advance 14-billion years ago that the concept of FW would be stealthily inputted into them in terms of behavioral effects, the changes would not have occurred without it as a mediator. It can't be denied responsibility any more than the human body can be denied responsibility for enabling a collection of molecules to write literature like "Hamlet" (which an ancient configuration could not do or plan, and indeed even the grand-scale state of the cosmos at large right now cannot do and cognitively intend).

Touché.

Hamlet: Denmark’s a prison.
Rosencrantz: Then is the world one?
Hamlet: A Goodly one, in which there are many confines, wards, and dungeons. Denmark being one of the worst.
Rosencrantz: We think not so, my lord.
Hamlet: Why, then, 'tis none to you, for there is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so. To me it is a prison.
Rosencrantz: Why then, your ambition makes it one. 'Tis too narrow for your mind.

Thanks, C C! 

[Syne]

Of course not, as studies have shown that belief in free will actually alters behavior. Since you don't believe in free will, you don't question or second guess your motives. If you did, you might not be so easily swayed by his recommendation, might question why his "likability and confidence" have any influence on you at all, or why you care about disappointing him. Those alone sound as if you don't want to question it, so maybe you don't take any responsibility for flirting with him. Whatever happens, happens. New experiences, am I right? ; )

No attraction what so ever. Not wanting to disappoint someone doesn’t equate to wanting to have sex with them, nor does trying new things. Likeability is a fundamental tool when it comes to persuasion. Something that you’re obviously oblivious to.

You do know that flirting doesn't have to lead to sex, right? Right? o_O

By your own reasoning, you cannot claim to know why you do or feel anything, as you have no will in the matter. You can only make up ad hoc justifications for why you didn't want to disappoint him...you cannot know the underlying cause of that desire.

At the very least, the waiter assumed you had free will by offering you the choice. But you're claiming he had no choice in being likable, confident, or persuasive. In which case, you trying to criticize others for lacking any of those qualities either demonstrates you are a hypocrite or counters your own argument. Either you are criticizing something a person has zero control over, or you are presuming they have some measure of free will.

You can't have it both ways. Nor can you presume your criticism will change anyone, as you supposedly have zero choice in that as well. So any lofty motive would be a fabricated justification.

[Secular Sanity]

By your own reasoning, you cannot claim to know why you do or feel anything, as you have no will in the matter. You can only make up ad hoc justifications for why you didn't want to disappoint him...you cannot know the underlying cause of that desire.

At the very least, the waiter assumed you had free will by offering you the choice. But you're claiming he had no choice in being likable, confident, or persuasive. In which case, you trying to criticize others for lacking any of those qualities either demonstrates you are a hypocrite or counters your own argument. Either you are criticizing something a person has zero control over, or you are presuming they have some measure of free will.

You can't have it both ways. Nor can you presume your criticism will change anyone, as you supposedly have zero choice in that as well. So any lofty motive would be a fabricated justification.

Wow! That’s some circular bullshit right there. ^

You can’t just ignore the initial conditions when doing this thought experiment. Retrace your steps, your upbringing, your thoughts, feelings and environment and ask yourself if you could have chosen otherwise?

[Syne]

By your own reasoning, you cannot claim to know why you do or feel anything, as you have no will in the matter. You can only make up ad hoc justifications for why you didn't want to disappoint him...you cannot know the underlying cause of that desire.

At the very least, the waiter assumed you had free will by offering you the choice. But you're claiming he had no choice in being likable, confident, or persuasive. In which case, you trying to criticize others for lacking any of those qualities either demonstrates you are a hypocrite or counters your own argument. Either you are criticizing something a person has zero control over, or you are presuming they have some measure of free will.

You can't have it both ways. Nor can you presume your criticism will change anyone, as you supposedly have zero choice in that as well. So any lofty motive would be a fabricated justification.

Wow! That’s some circular bullshit right there. ^

You can’t just ignore the initial conditions when doing this thought experiment. Retrace your steps, your upbringing, your thoughts, feelings and environment and ask yourself if you could have chosen otherwise?

Wow! That's some complete lack of argument right there. ^

Notice how you're completely unwilling to engage any argument at all.
It follows logically. If you have no input into the system that determines your choices, it necessarily follows that you have no real idea what contributes to them. You can only make self-satisfying guesses.

Again, you seem to be laboring under the false dilemma that choices are either wholly determined or wholly willed. Neither is true. Yes, your past experience has some influence. But your present actions are contributing to tomorrow's past experience. If you really can't manage to do one thing today that is outside of the influence of your past experience, I pity you. I would really like new experiences too, if I were so helpless to creating them myself.

[Secular Sanity]

Wow! That's some complete lack of argument right there.

Are you completely incapable of having a discussion?

Notice how you're completely unwilling to engage any argument at all.
It follows logically. If you have no input into the system that determines your choices, it necessarily follows that you have no real idea what contributes to them. You can only make self-satisfying guesses.

Again, you seem to be laboring under the false dilemma that choices are either wholly determined or wholly willed. Neither is true. Yes, your past experience has some influence. But your present actions are contributing to tomorrow's past experience. If you really can't manage to do one thing today that is outside of the influence of your past experience, I pity you. I would really like new experiences too, if I were so helpless to creating them myself.

If the physical world follows the Causality Principle, as C C said, I’m part of the physical world, but the definition as I understand it, would mean that free will has no physical cause.