The ethics of "human brain surrogates"

[C C]

https://www.discovermagazine.com/the-sci...surrogates

INTRO: Neuroscience is heading into an ethical minefield with the rise of research on "human brain surrogates". That's according to a new paper by Henry T. Greely in the American Journal of Bioethics, titled Human Brain Surrogates Research: The Onrushing Ethical Dilemma.

Greely defines 'human brain surrogates' as "simulacrums of living human brains that are not inside living human beings." In other words, a human brain surrogate is any living system of human or human-like brain issue, other than an actual brain.

By this definition, surrogates already exist in various forms. The best-known example would be human cortical organoids, tiny spherical 'blobs' of human neurons grown from stem cells. These organoids show patterns of electrical activity similar, in some limited ways, to those of real brains. Other human brain surrogate technologies are, or soon will be, possible, such as genetic modification of animals to make their brains more human-like.

In the paper, Greely discusses a number of possible concerns with emerging surrogate technologies. To my mind the most interesting question is what Greely calls "The Welfare of the Surrogates". Essentially, this is the question of whether an organoid or other brain-derived surrogate could have consciousness and experience suffering... (MORE)

[Syne]

Such dumb dilemmas only exist for those who not only presume that the human brain is the person but also that even a part of a brain is somehow reductively equivalent to a person. The latter is an odd presumption considering those same people very often consider a whole human and brain to be less than a person, in the womb.

If these morons what to play at ethics, they might want to look at their overall ethical consistency first. You can't claim lab-grown pieces of brain are entitled to ethical considerations before admitted that natural humans are. So as soon as the scientific community does the latter, I'll take the former seriously. Until then, they're just idiot hypocrites.

[Yazata]

https://www.discovermagazine.com/the-sci...surrogates

INTRO: Neuroscience is heading into an ethical minefield with the rise of research on "human brain surrogates". That's according to a new paper by Henry T. Greely in the American Journal of Bioethics, titled Human Brain Surrogates Research: The Onrushing Ethical Dilemma.

Greely defines 'human brain surrogates' as "simulacrums of living human brains that are not inside living human beings." In other words, a human brain surrogate is any living system of human or human-like brain issue, other than an actual brain.

He's free to define his own terms, but I think that his ethical dilemmas only arise when the "human brain surrogates" are close enough to human brains functionally to experience suffering.

By this definition, surrogates already exist in various forms. The best-known example would be human cortical organoids, tiny spherical 'blobs' of human neurons grown from stem cells. These organoids show patterns of electrical activity similar, in some limited ways, to those of real brains.

I doubt very much whether these 'cortical organoids' even come close to human brains in functionality. Their importance is probably more in observing how neural networks initially form.

Other human brain surrogate technologies are, or soon will be, possible, such as genetic modification of animals to make their brains more human-like.

Which suggests another bioethical problem. Why all the emphasis on human brains? Is it ok to inflict suffering on animals and other non-human consciousnesses? I'm something of an anti-vivisectionist myself.

In the paper, Greely discusses a number of possible concerns with emerging surrogate technologies. To my mind the most interesting question is what Greely calls "The Welfare of the Surrogates". Essentially, this is the question of whether an organoid or other brain-derived surrogate could have consciousness and experience suffering... (MORE)

Yes, that's the primary concern I guess.

And once again we are at the place where the philosophy-of-mind sails into the rocks. We need a convincing definition of 'consciousness'. We all feel like we can intuit what it is, but none of us can describe, communicate or explain it. It may not even exist and I find myself agreeing with Dennett in some of my moods. (Please don't hate me CC!)

But whatever 'consciousness' supposedly is, we need some way of recognizing it in others. Our social instincts probably take care of that for us in the case of other humans. (Except for autistic people perhaps.) But what about non-human consciousness, whether animal, cortical organoid, AI or space-alien? How are we supposed to recognize that kind of hypothetical consciousness and know when it is present? (I'm 100% confident that my dog is conscious, but what about an insect? Is there some lower bound on it and where on the phylogenetic tree is that cut-off located?)

To do that, we need to raise our understanding of what consciousness is beyond our own subjective phenomenal intuitions and give the whole thing some kind of objective scientific basis. I still think that the best candidate to do that is functional. In my opinion consciousness isn't some kind of mysterious soul-stuff or qualia-stuff, it's what a physical system (the brain and its neural networks) is doing. It's an activity rather than a substance or even a property (depending on how we conceptualize 'property').

Anyway, that's my initial response to Greely. I fully agree that real bioethical problems do arise. But resolving them will probably require far better neuroscience, cognitive science and above all, philosophy of mind, than we currently have.