Erwin Schrödinger: "The world is a construct of our sensations, perceptions, memories. It is convenient to regard it as existing objectively on its own. But it certainly does not become manifest by its mere existence. Its becoming manifest is conditional on very special goings-on in very special parts of this very world, namely on certain events that happen in a brain." --What is Life? Mind and Matter ... Cambridge University Press, 1959, page-1
The Interface Theory of Perception: The Future of the Science of the Mind?
https://featuredcontent.psychonomic.org/...-the-mind/
EXCERPT: If you believe in evolution, you must then believe that the world we perceive is not the world we actually inhabit. Not even close. The objects we see or hear or touch do not exist independently of the mind that constructs them. Our perception is nothing more than a useful fiction. This is the core of Hoffman, Singh, and Prakash’s Interface Theory of Perception [...] The idea is far from new. Indeed, philosophers have entertained it for centuries. But Hoffman and colleagues give the theory some empirical teeth and force us to take it seriously, along with its mind-blowing implications.
The empirical teeth come in the form of evolutionary game simulations and genetic algorithms to model natural selection. Scenarios were set up in which the probability of the evolution of different perceptual strategies could be assessed. [...] The result of many such simulations under a range of scenarios is strikingly consistent: fitness wins every time and truth goes extinct. In fact, truth never gets on the evolutionary game board.
This should be no surprise. How could evolution favor veridical perception if the truth doesn’t help make babies? It can’t unless it does so accidentally (i.e., it’s a spandrel), which is highly unlikely given the complexity of our perceptual systems, or unless truth and fitness are monotonically related. Hoffman and colleagues offer arguments for why truth and fitness are generally unlikely to be monotonically related, for example, the need for homeostasis in biological systems. I can offer, in addition, a simple example. It is quite difficult to invoke “truth” to explain species-specific sexual attraction (humans are attracted to humans, baboons to baboons), whereas fitness considerations readily explain why beauty is in the eye of the (species) beholder.
Hoffman et al. call their model the Interface Theory of Perception (ITP) and illustrate it intuitively using a graphical user interface analogy. The desktop display of your computer shows a set of icons representing files, folders, operations (such as trash/delete), and apps. You don’t take that interface literally. You understand that your latest manuscript isn’t literally a little rectangle sitting in a clutter of other little rectangles in the upper left corner of your display. Rather that little rectangle is just a convenient icon that represents your manuscript. Similarly you understand that if you drag that little rectangle to the trashcan in frustration, the rectangle isn’t literally in the trashcan. Rather, the desktop is a convenient means to interface with the underlying reality of your computer.
It’s useful because it hides the truth and presents instead a set of user-friendly shortcuts for writing papers, sending messages, and manipulating photos. Notice too how notions of causality play out in the interface. The cursor, the little rectangle, and the trashcan icons themselves have no causal power. It’s not the movement of the rectangle icon to the trashcan icon that causes the file to disappear; it’s the underlying electric currents and switches that actually have causal power. We understand this because sometimes something goes wrong with our GUI and a successful move of an icon from one place to another results in no actual effect (e.g., the drive doesn’t eject). Perception, Hoffmann et al. argue, is precisely the same: what we experience is nothing more than a set of species-specific icons, user-friendly shortcuts for staying alive and reproducing. Similarly, there is no causal power inherent to the objects we perceive. It appears that a tennis racquet can cause a ball to move, but that is nothing more than a juxtaposition of icons in our interface. The real causal powers are hidden from us, according to ITP... (MORE)
Consciousness and the Interface Theory of Perception by Donald D. Hoffman, Ph.D.
http://cogsci.uci.edu/~ddhoff/Chapter17Hoffman.pdf
EXCERPT: Questioning fundamental and widely believed assumptions is no easy task. Such assumptions are widely held for good reason, and it is natural and healthy that new proposals, such as are offered here, should be met with skepticism. In this last section, I canvas a few objections and offer responses.
Your interface theory of perception is clearly false. It says that physical objects are just icons of a species-specific interface, and, thus, are not real. But if a bus hurtles down a road at high speed, would you step in front of it? If you did, you would find out that it is not just an icon, it is real, and your theory is nonsense.
The interface theory of perception does indeed assert that physical objects are simply icons of a species-specific perceptual interface. Still, I would not step in front of the bus for the same reason I wouldn’t carelessly drag a file icon on my desktop to the trashcan. Why? I don’t take the icon literally, but I do take it seriously. The color, shape, and position of the icon are not literally true descriptions of the file. Indeed, color and shape are even the wrong language to attempt a true description. But the interface is designed to guide useful behaviors, and those behaviors have consequences even if the interface does not literally resemble the truth. Natural selection shaped our perceptions, in part, to keep us alive long enough to reproduce. We had better take our perceptions seriously. If you see a tiger, keep away. If you see a cliff, don’t step over. Natural selection ensures that we must take our perceptions seriously. But it is a logical error to conclude that we must, therefore, take our perceptions literally.
As discussed before, the interface theory of perception fits well with QBist interpretations of quantum theory, which say that we should not take quantum states literally as descriptions of an objective reality independent of the observer. Thus, the interface theory is not falsified by current physics but instead fits well with and even offers evolutionary explanations for puzzling aspects of quantum physics. The objection uses the world real. This word is used with two very different meanings. In the objection, it is used to mean that something exists even if it is not observed. So, the bus is argued to be real in the sense that it would exist even if no one observed it. But there is another sense of real, as when I say I have a real headache. The headache would not exist if no one (e.g., me) observed it. But if you claimed on those grounds that my headache wasn’t real, I would be cross with you. So the interface theory says that physical objects such as a bus are real in the headache sense of real. But it denies that they are real in the sense of existing whether or not they are observed.
OTHER OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES IN SPOILER (plus predictions)
-2013-
https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/dqDP34a-epI
The Interface Theory of Perception: The Future of the Science of the Mind?
https://featuredcontent.psychonomic.org/...-the-mind/
EXCERPT: If you believe in evolution, you must then believe that the world we perceive is not the world we actually inhabit. Not even close. The objects we see or hear or touch do not exist independently of the mind that constructs them. Our perception is nothing more than a useful fiction. This is the core of Hoffman, Singh, and Prakash’s Interface Theory of Perception [...] The idea is far from new. Indeed, philosophers have entertained it for centuries. But Hoffman and colleagues give the theory some empirical teeth and force us to take it seriously, along with its mind-blowing implications.
The empirical teeth come in the form of evolutionary game simulations and genetic algorithms to model natural selection. Scenarios were set up in which the probability of the evolution of different perceptual strategies could be assessed. [...] The result of many such simulations under a range of scenarios is strikingly consistent: fitness wins every time and truth goes extinct. In fact, truth never gets on the evolutionary game board.
This should be no surprise. How could evolution favor veridical perception if the truth doesn’t help make babies? It can’t unless it does so accidentally (i.e., it’s a spandrel), which is highly unlikely given the complexity of our perceptual systems, or unless truth and fitness are monotonically related. Hoffman and colleagues offer arguments for why truth and fitness are generally unlikely to be monotonically related, for example, the need for homeostasis in biological systems. I can offer, in addition, a simple example. It is quite difficult to invoke “truth” to explain species-specific sexual attraction (humans are attracted to humans, baboons to baboons), whereas fitness considerations readily explain why beauty is in the eye of the (species) beholder.
Hoffman et al. call their model the Interface Theory of Perception (ITP) and illustrate it intuitively using a graphical user interface analogy. The desktop display of your computer shows a set of icons representing files, folders, operations (such as trash/delete), and apps. You don’t take that interface literally. You understand that your latest manuscript isn’t literally a little rectangle sitting in a clutter of other little rectangles in the upper left corner of your display. Rather that little rectangle is just a convenient icon that represents your manuscript. Similarly you understand that if you drag that little rectangle to the trashcan in frustration, the rectangle isn’t literally in the trashcan. Rather, the desktop is a convenient means to interface with the underlying reality of your computer.
It’s useful because it hides the truth and presents instead a set of user-friendly shortcuts for writing papers, sending messages, and manipulating photos. Notice too how notions of causality play out in the interface. The cursor, the little rectangle, and the trashcan icons themselves have no causal power. It’s not the movement of the rectangle icon to the trashcan icon that causes the file to disappear; it’s the underlying electric currents and switches that actually have causal power. We understand this because sometimes something goes wrong with our GUI and a successful move of an icon from one place to another results in no actual effect (e.g., the drive doesn’t eject). Perception, Hoffmann et al. argue, is precisely the same: what we experience is nothing more than a set of species-specific icons, user-friendly shortcuts for staying alive and reproducing. Similarly, there is no causal power inherent to the objects we perceive. It appears that a tennis racquet can cause a ball to move, but that is nothing more than a juxtaposition of icons in our interface. The real causal powers are hidden from us, according to ITP... (MORE)
Consciousness and the Interface Theory of Perception by Donald D. Hoffman, Ph.D.
http://cogsci.uci.edu/~ddhoff/Chapter17Hoffman.pdf
EXCERPT: Questioning fundamental and widely believed assumptions is no easy task. Such assumptions are widely held for good reason, and it is natural and healthy that new proposals, such as are offered here, should be met with skepticism. In this last section, I canvas a few objections and offer responses.
Your interface theory of perception is clearly false. It says that physical objects are just icons of a species-specific interface, and, thus, are not real. But if a bus hurtles down a road at high speed, would you step in front of it? If you did, you would find out that it is not just an icon, it is real, and your theory is nonsense.
The interface theory of perception does indeed assert that physical objects are simply icons of a species-specific perceptual interface. Still, I would not step in front of the bus for the same reason I wouldn’t carelessly drag a file icon on my desktop to the trashcan. Why? I don’t take the icon literally, but I do take it seriously. The color, shape, and position of the icon are not literally true descriptions of the file. Indeed, color and shape are even the wrong language to attempt a true description. But the interface is designed to guide useful behaviors, and those behaviors have consequences even if the interface does not literally resemble the truth. Natural selection shaped our perceptions, in part, to keep us alive long enough to reproduce. We had better take our perceptions seriously. If you see a tiger, keep away. If you see a cliff, don’t step over. Natural selection ensures that we must take our perceptions seriously. But it is a logical error to conclude that we must, therefore, take our perceptions literally.
As discussed before, the interface theory of perception fits well with QBist interpretations of quantum theory, which say that we should not take quantum states literally as descriptions of an objective reality independent of the observer. Thus, the interface theory is not falsified by current physics but instead fits well with and even offers evolutionary explanations for puzzling aspects of quantum physics. The objection uses the world real. This word is used with two very different meanings. In the objection, it is used to mean that something exists even if it is not observed. So, the bus is argued to be real in the sense that it would exist even if no one observed it. But there is another sense of real, as when I say I have a real headache. The headache would not exist if no one (e.g., me) observed it. But if you claimed on those grounds that my headache wasn’t real, I would be cross with you. So the interface theory says that physical objects such as a bus are real in the headache sense of real. But it denies that they are real in the sense of existing whether or not they are observed.
OTHER OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES IN SPOILER (plus predictions)
-2013-