(Feb 25, 2018 05:14 AM)Leigha Wrote: But, the article is curious, just the same. Do you agree with the article?
Although it did have contributors from Continental Europe, analytic philosophy is largely comprised of English-speaking movements and schools of thought (in various countries across the globe), and thereby is sometimes called "Anglophone philosophy" or grouped under that casual category. It once vehemently emphasized its separation from Europe proper, or its contrasting counterpart in the 20th century (i.e., "continental philosophy").
Ted Honderich: "One thinks of French philosophy that it aspires to the condition of literature or the condition of art, and that English and American philosophy aspires to the condition of science. French philosophy, one thinks of as picking up an idea and running with it, possibly into a nearby brick wall or over a local cliff, or something like that." ("Today"; BBC Radio 4; 1990s)
But analytic philosophy was anti-historical early on, thereby also distinguishing itself from the whole of European tradition going back centuries.
Ludwig Wittgenstein: "My method throughout is to point out mistakes in language. I am going to use the word "philosophy" for the activity of pointing out such mistakes. Why do I wish to call our present activity philosophy, when we also call Plato's activity philosophy? Perhaps because of a certain analogy between them, or perhaps because of the continuous development of the subject. Or the new activity may take the place of the old because it removes mental discomforts the old was supposed to."
Aaron Preston: "Because analytic philosophy initially saw itself as superseding traditional philosophy, its tendency throughout much of the twentieth century was to disregard the history of philosophy. It is even reported that a sign reading 'just say no to the history of ideas' once hung on a door in the Philosophy building at Princeton University. Though earlier analytic philosophers would sometimes address the views of a philosopher from previous centuries, they frequently failed to combine philosophical acumen with historical care, thereby falling into faulty, anachronistic interpretations of earlier philosophers."
The Historical Turn in Analytic Philosophy: "Expressions of an extreme anti-historical bias in analytic philosophy can be found, among others, in remarks that have been attributed to several well-known analytic philosophers. [...] John Searle supposedly declared: "I am an analytic philosopher. I think for myself!" (edited by E. Reck)
The rootless attitude began to change in the 1970s, when a legitimate historical discipline emerged that at least tried to represent the past accurately, if not wholly re-integrating analytic philosophy with traditional philosophical lineage.
Daniel Garber: "What my generation of historians of philosophy was reacting against was a bundle of practices that characterized the writing of the history of philosophy in the period: the tendency to substitute rational reconstructions of a philosopher’s views for the views themselves; the tendency to focus on an extremely narrow group of figures (Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley and Hume in my period); within that very narrow canon the tendency to focus on just a few works at the exclusion of others, those that best fit with our current conception of the subject of philosophy; the tendency to work exclusively from translations and to ignore secondary work that was not originally written in English; the tendency to treat the philosophical positions as if they were those presented by contemporaries, and on and on and on."
Despite its
linguistic direction beginning to fade or collapse in the 1960s, and a common set of interests dissolving over the years into a current situation of "eclecticism or pluralism", Anglophone philosophy still clings to the "analytic" label in terms of its investigative spirit or critique. And the self-image that it is still progressive in some way vaguely akin to science (or revolves around it in satellite fashion). In those institutions where it holds the most influence, the latter may be why there is reluctance to embrace an international landscape of intellectual thought (i.e., afraid it's going to step a foot into a mystical cow-patty or something).
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