Feb 21, 2018 07:04 PM
(This post was last modified: Feb 21, 2018 07:30 PM by C C.)
On our craving for generality
https://blog.oup.com/2018/02/craving-for-generality/
EXCERPT: Ludwig Wittgenstein, in his *Blue Book*, chastised philosophers for what he called “our craving for generality.” Philosophers (including the earlier Wittgenstein of the Tractatus) certainly have exhibited this craving, and despite his admonishment, we continue to do so. Philosophers seek general accounts of the nature of propositions, properties, virtues, mental states–you name it.
Wittgenstein portrays the craving for generality as a kind of philosophical sin, but it is not that. First, it is hardly confined to philosophy–scientists crave generality, as do humans generally. Second, it can’t really be a sin–or at least an unpardonable sin–for without knowing anything general, we cannot succeed in understanding or acting in the world. But sinful or not, the craving can be dangerous, because the world often does not cooperate with our generalizations.
The crux of our predicament is this: nature is heterogeneous and particular, but epistemic and practical needs require us to generalize. To say that nature is particular is just to say that one thing is not like another. Each cell, each bird, each child, each family, each society is different from the next. Even in the physical sciences, anything with any complexity is heterogeneous–no two materials or solutions are just the same. But in spite of this heterogeneity, we must generalize, and often do so with great success. We use randomized controlled trials on one population to predict the effect of an intervention (like a medication) on a different or larger population. We use model organisms from e coli to drosophila to rats to understand our own biology. We use information from one earthquake or volcanic eruption to predict the behavior of the next. But such generalizations have their limits. A treatment that works on one patient does not work as well on the next, and our knowledge of past earthquakes and eruptions are far from sufficient to predict when the next one will happen, and how bad it will be....
MORE: https://blog.oup.com/2018/02/craving-for-generality/
The Good Place: How a sitcom made philosophy seem cool
https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio...-seem-cool
EXCERPT: Oh, to have been a fly on the wall during the pitch meeting for The Good Place. Who’d have thought that ratings gold would be found in a sitcom about the afterlife, with regular references to Immanuel Kant, David Hume and Aristotle? It presumably helped to have comedy heavyweights Kristen Bell and Ted Danson attached and that it was created by Michael Schur, who has *The Office*, *Parks and Recreation* and *Brooklyn Nine-Nine* on his credits.
And the original premise is solid: selfish and immoral Eleanor Shellstrop (Bell) dies and is sent to a non-denominationally pleasant Heaven by accident but becomes determined to become a good person in order to be worthy enough to stay. The writing is reliably hilarious and the ensemble cast have an exceptional chemistry. The show is also peppered with adorable quirks such as the characters being unable to swear in the Good Place, instead defaulting to curses such as “holy shirt!” and “motherforker!”
But moral philosophy is the beating heart of the program, and it has some of the best jokes that this one-time postgraduate in moral philosophy has ever heard.
So, what are the concepts that guarantee The Good Place will endure as both a brilliantly inventive comedy and a tiresomely obvious thesis topic for lazy undergrads?
MORE: https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio...-seem-cool
https://blog.oup.com/2018/02/craving-for-generality/
EXCERPT: Ludwig Wittgenstein, in his *Blue Book*, chastised philosophers for what he called “our craving for generality.” Philosophers (including the earlier Wittgenstein of the Tractatus) certainly have exhibited this craving, and despite his admonishment, we continue to do so. Philosophers seek general accounts of the nature of propositions, properties, virtues, mental states–you name it.
Wittgenstein portrays the craving for generality as a kind of philosophical sin, but it is not that. First, it is hardly confined to philosophy–scientists crave generality, as do humans generally. Second, it can’t really be a sin–or at least an unpardonable sin–for without knowing anything general, we cannot succeed in understanding or acting in the world. But sinful or not, the craving can be dangerous, because the world often does not cooperate with our generalizations.
The crux of our predicament is this: nature is heterogeneous and particular, but epistemic and practical needs require us to generalize. To say that nature is particular is just to say that one thing is not like another. Each cell, each bird, each child, each family, each society is different from the next. Even in the physical sciences, anything with any complexity is heterogeneous–no two materials or solutions are just the same. But in spite of this heterogeneity, we must generalize, and often do so with great success. We use randomized controlled trials on one population to predict the effect of an intervention (like a medication) on a different or larger population. We use model organisms from e coli to drosophila to rats to understand our own biology. We use information from one earthquake or volcanic eruption to predict the behavior of the next. But such generalizations have their limits. A treatment that works on one patient does not work as well on the next, and our knowledge of past earthquakes and eruptions are far from sufficient to predict when the next one will happen, and how bad it will be....
MORE: https://blog.oup.com/2018/02/craving-for-generality/
The Good Place: How a sitcom made philosophy seem cool
https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio...-seem-cool
EXCERPT: Oh, to have been a fly on the wall during the pitch meeting for The Good Place. Who’d have thought that ratings gold would be found in a sitcom about the afterlife, with regular references to Immanuel Kant, David Hume and Aristotle? It presumably helped to have comedy heavyweights Kristen Bell and Ted Danson attached and that it was created by Michael Schur, who has *The Office*, *Parks and Recreation* and *Brooklyn Nine-Nine* on his credits.
And the original premise is solid: selfish and immoral Eleanor Shellstrop (Bell) dies and is sent to a non-denominationally pleasant Heaven by accident but becomes determined to become a good person in order to be worthy enough to stay. The writing is reliably hilarious and the ensemble cast have an exceptional chemistry. The show is also peppered with adorable quirks such as the characters being unable to swear in the Good Place, instead defaulting to curses such as “holy shirt!” and “motherforker!”
But moral philosophy is the beating heart of the program, and it has some of the best jokes that this one-time postgraduate in moral philosophy has ever heard.
So, what are the concepts that guarantee The Good Place will endure as both a brilliantly inventive comedy and a tiresomely obvious thesis topic for lazy undergrads?
MORE: https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio...-seem-cool