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How do we find the ''best'' explanation?

#11
C C Offline
(Oct 16, 2016 05:05 PM)Leigha Wrote: Here's one more abstract question, though - Will the ''best'' explanation only be what is best to us, or what is best in general? I may have more knowledge than another person about a particular topic, but he might have more about another. If he doesn't understand the topic to begin with very well, how will he decipher a ''good'' explanation from the ''best'' one?


ALAN PRATT: In contrast to Nietzsche’s fears and the angst of the existentialists, [epistemological] nihilism becomes for the anti-foundationalists just another aspect of our contemporary milieu, one best endured with sang-froid. [...] If we accept that all perspectives are equally non-binding, then intellectual or moral arrogance will determine which perspective has precedence. Worse still, the banalization of nihilism creates an environment where ideas can be imposed forcibly with little resistance, raw power alone determining intellectual and moral hierarchies. It’s a conclusion that dovetails nicely with Nietzsche’s, who pointed out that all interpretations of the world are simply manifestations of will-to-power. --Nihilism ... IEP

IOW, depending on how lax his government is or even his local community in allowing personal views that differ from those endorsed by the state or applicable subculture, he's free to harbor such nescience ("doesn't understand the topic very well") and its interpretational shortcomings in his private life. But outside of that he'll have to genuflect to the knowledge stances of those who employ him and the authorized institutions that regulate and dispense education (whether those concern "explanations" or propaganda). He bows to the "powers" which make the determinations, as referenced in Pratt's quote above.

Christian scientists, for instance, are comfortable with conceiving the preset conditions of science as "methodological naturalism" rather than grounded in the metaphysically realist conviction of materialism which an atheist like biologist Richard Lewontin conceived it as (in a quote further down). They slip in and out of their split, cognitive duality of becoming a practical naturalist at work and becoming a believing theist in their domestic life.

Quote:Maybe we need to come to the table with a foundation of knowledge to begin with, before being able to determine a ''best'' explanation, even if it's only ''best'' for us. Do you agree?


The centuries-long problem there is that a stable, long-lived or universal consensus in respect to a "foundation" for knowledge is elusive (i.e., the idea of having only one and it being perpetual). As you may have also noted in the Pratt quote above, anti-foundationalism was in vogue during the latter half of the 20th century, after the "empirical consensus" collapsed earlier. (A Henry Folse quote will elaborate on the latter at the bottom of this post, which was mingling of logical positivism, pragmatism, etc)

Since philosophical activity (in general) is the earliest and most basic level of knowledge study and inquiry, it isn't as restricted with core beliefs, preconceptions and doctrines of operation as particular schools of thought and methodological enterprises are. This enables it to dissect and challenge almost any supposed given or assumption, canon, and intellective construct. Which has had the downside of a stable or long-term consensus for an epistemological foundation being unobtainable for it.

MARKUS LAMMENRANTA: [...] there is no way to know or to be justified in believing that our basic sources of belief -- such as perception, introspection, intuitive reason, memory and reasoning -- are reliable except by using [...] epistemically circular arguments. And many contemporary accounts of knowledge and justification allow our gaining knowledge and justified beliefs by relying on such arguments. Indeed, any account that accepts that a belief source can deliver knowledge (or justified beliefs) prior to one’s knowing (or believing justifiably) that the source is reliable allows this. [...] Still, we have the intuition that any such account makes knowledge too easy.

In order to avoid too easy knowledge via epistemic circularity, we need to assume that a source can yield knowledge only if we first know that it is reliable. However, this assumption leads to the ancient problem of the criterion and the danger of landing in radical skepticism. Skepticism could be avoided if our knowledge about reliability were basic or non-inferential. It could also be avoided if we had some sort of “non-evidential” entitlement to taking our sources to be reliable. Both options are problematic.

One might think that we have to allow easy knowledge and some epistemic circularity because it is the only way to avoid skepticism. If we do so, however, we still need to explain what is then wrong with other epistemically circular arguments. [...] Thus there seems to be no completely satisfactory solution to the problem of epistemic circularity. This suggests that the ancient problem of the criterion is a genuine skeptical paradox.
--Epistemic Circularity ... IEP

OTOH, when narrowing down from to the particular schools of thought (like natural philosophy) and their practices, if any... The natural sciences are by definition confined to preset standards or preset paths of procedure.

RICHARD LEWONTIN: We take the side of science in spite of the patent absurdity of some of its constructs, in spite of its failure to fulfill many of its extravagant promises of health and life, in spite of the tolerance of the scientific community for unsubstantiated just-so stories, because we have a prior commitment, a commitment to materialism. It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door [or accordingly any other species of alternatives]. --Billions and Billions of Demons ... NY Times Book Reviews, January 9, 1997

NOTE: Again, the above can be mitigated to a companion conception like "methodological naturalism" by those scientists who are either religious or "nonconformists to the system" in their private lives. More liberal advocates have also contended that science's "preset standards" could be revised if future empirical evidence warrants it. But that would actually be introducing something very different that was merely clinging to the label of the old identity. Sort of like a new "Mary" living on the north side of Park City asserting that she's the same "Mary" who once lived on the south side of Park City because they subscribe to the same name.

At first glance, these governing limitations of science would seem to allow an epistemological foundation to be derived from it (even if upheld by dogmatism or those preconditions of how to proceed and interpret). But since philosophy of science (or philosophical activity in general) would be the mediator to the world abroad of such an idealized consensus, this would likewise be challenged, dismantled, and scrutinized for vulnerabilities much as any other attempt of the past. Here's an example, wherein a basic supposition that observations and data collection lack a background belief -- are neutral or independent of theory -- is itself questioned:

HENRY J. FOLSE: One of the most influential of the attacks on the empiricist, foundationalist view of science shared by inductivists, hypothetico-deductivists, and falsificationists is the thesis that observation statements are "theory-laden." Because all of these views hold that the authority for the rational acceptability of scientific claims relies on a method by which theoretical statements are justified by observation, the attack on observation literally undermines the foundation of traditional views of science. Even if we grant that the observational evidence does confirm (or at least does not falsify, i.e. "corroborates") any given theory, the question still remains, does this confirmation by observation establish the rational acceptability of that theory?

In order to see why this is so, it is useful to reexpress the question that philosophers are addressing. Philosophers within the consensus often spoke as though the question facing the scientist can be expressed as "Does the observational evidence support this theory?" However, in real science the question is more usually in the form, "Which of two (or more) rival theories is better (or best) supported by the evidence?"

When we speak in this way of theories as being "rivals" we mean that a) they both purport to explain (at least some of) the same phenomena, and b) the explanations they offer are incompatible in the sense that they cannot both be considered "true" or that logically acceptance of one precludes acceptance of the other. Given this way of posing the question it becomes more obvious that we turn to observation to decide the choice between rival theories. Let us call this "the question of theory choice." In order for this decision to be rational, it is necessary that the observational evidence to which we turn is "neutral" at least with respect to these rivals. If it can be shown that this evidence by its very nature is such that it cannot be so "neutral," i.e. if the observational evidence is essentially theory-laden then appealing to it to justify the choice of one theory over another can no longer provide an objective ground on which to make such a rational choice.
--The Theory-Ladeness Of Observation

In regard to that "empiricist, foundationalist view of science" he referenced:

HENRY J. FOLSE: The term "empiricist consensus" is an artificial label, which I have coined for teaching purposes, to designate a very general position with respect to scientific knowledge. [...] It can also be called the "empiricist model" of scientific explanation. These names refer to the view of science that tended to dominate in most (but not all) philosophy of science for roughly the first half of this century.

[...] It is important to stress that within this general consensus, there was considerable room for diversity among philosophers. Thus one large group of philosophers within this consensus would be labeled "positivists," or more specifically "logical positivists" or "logical empiricists." This group tended to dominate, but other philosophers, for example, Bertrand Russell, Karl Popper, and many American pragmatists could be placed within this consensus, but disagreed sharply with the positivists.

[...] Thus in the last forty years philosophy of science has gone from a field formerly dominated by a single "received view" to an arena of volatile debate with no single dominant contender for a new acceptable model of scientific knowledge. This fact has made it one of the most lively and pivotal domains of philosophy, for the issues now occupying center stage in philosophy of science touch upon basic questions of epistemology, metaphysics, and axiology.

Through these debates the nature of philosophy of science has changed tremendously from the attempt to build a formal model of an idealized perfect science quite apart from any historical account of what scientists really do, to the attempt to build a philosophically acceptable view of science based upon a detailed historical examination of the actual patterns of reasoning employed in concrete episodes in the advance of science. En route these discussions have called into question such basic presuppositions as the belief that there is some pattern of reasoning which justifies acceptance of scientific theories, that there is some methodology called "the scientific method," that science has anything at all to say about the nature of reality, and that science can be examined apart from the social, cultural context in which it actually evolves.

Because of the central role that science plays in contemporary culture, these upheavals in philosophy of science have reverberated in a variety of disciplines including history, political science, sociology, art, religious studies, and other disciplines too numerous to name.
--Introduction To Philosophy Of Science
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#12
Leigha Offline
Thanks CC for posting this! What stuck out to me is this:

MARKUS LAMMENRANTA: [...] there is no way to know or to be justified in believing that our basic sources of belief -- such as perception, introspection, intuitive reason, memory and reasoning -- are reliable except by using [...] epistemically circular arguments. And many contemporary accounts of knowledge and justification allow our gaining knowledge and justified beliefs by relying on such arguments.

This answers the question, perfectly. I like that perception and reasoning are being correlated, because it could be that before we are convinced of a known and proven ''truth,'' we only perceive it to be as such. Perception is reality for many people though, and they will stand by their own perceptions over reasoning and logic. In some cases, this works as with religious beliefs, but when it comes to truths that require evidence in order for them to be accepted in the mainstream, such as scientific theories, perception isn't enough, of course. But, it could be why science forums need a pseudo-science area. Big Grin
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