http://www.cognitivequestions.org/contents.htm
EXCERPT: Gives a précis of the book, and describes how its thesis arises in response to the post-analytic neurophilosophy of the Churchlands, and how it resembles the Pragmatism of Dewey. Defines Cartesian Materialism (in contrast to Dennett’s definition) as being the claim that the mind is a particular part of the nervous system that occupies the skull, and explains why this is not the only possible alternative to dualism. [...] We cannot save Cartesian Materialism by positing a mind-nervous system identity, rather than a mind-brain identity. This chapter describes evidence that the mind is hormonal as well as neural. Any attempt to make a principled distinction between these hormonal activities as physical and the neural activities as mental seems doomed-- which makes it difficult to ignore the possibility that almost anything that takes place within the skin has some claim to being part of the embodiment of mind....
EXCERPT: Gives a précis of the book, and describes how its thesis arises in response to the post-analytic neurophilosophy of the Churchlands, and how it resembles the Pragmatism of Dewey. Defines Cartesian Materialism (in contrast to Dennett’s definition) as being the claim that the mind is a particular part of the nervous system that occupies the skull, and explains why this is not the only possible alternative to dualism. [...] We cannot save Cartesian Materialism by positing a mind-nervous system identity, rather than a mind-brain identity. This chapter describes evidence that the mind is hormonal as well as neural. Any attempt to make a principled distinction between these hormonal activities as physical and the neural activities as mental seems doomed-- which makes it difficult to ignore the possibility that almost anything that takes place within the skin has some claim to being part of the embodiment of mind....