Aug 19, 2026 06:07 PM
(This post was last modified: Aug 19, 2026 06:08 PM by C C.)
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2026...=url-share
INTRO: In February of last year, the journal Cell published a study in which virologists in China screened nearly a thousand bat samples, gathered from five provinces and stored at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, in search of new coronaviruses. The intended purpose of work like this is to give early warning: to learn which animal viruses are close to being able to infect people, so that virologists know what to watch for and have a chance to prepare.
They found that a handful of samples carried relatives of MERS, a deadly coronavirus. The researchers then showed that one of those viruses could enter human cells through the same cellular doorway as the viruses that cause SARS and Covid-19.
The scientists grew the virus in lab-made versions of human airway, nose and intestine cells, where it multiplied. They proposed testing it next in mice engineered with the same human cellular doorway. They also identified features that limited how efficiently the virus could infect human cells. More lab work could create a virus without those limitations, and members of this group did those kinds of experiments previously.
All of this was done outside high containment, two rungs short of the sort of precautions reserved for the deadliest pathogens. Leading virologists rang the alarm, saying that the level of safety was inadequate for a new virus potentially capable of infecting people through the air.
When Cell drew criticism for publishing the study, a spokesperson for the journal said that biosafety decisions like these rest with a study’s lead scientist and its institution and that the researchers “did not break any rules or policies of the journal.” Cell was right. In China and in the United States there are surprisingly few constraints on this type of research. Scientists can still gather novel coronaviruses, enhance them in the lab under relatively low biosafety conditions and even accidentally cause an outbreak - without breaking any rules.
Rules would not have prevented what happened a month later, when a worker at a Fort Detrick laboratory in Frederick, Md., found a large hole in an airtight suit. About an hour’s drive from Washington, Fort Detrick contains some of the country’s maximum-containment laboratories, where scientists handle deadly pathogens, including Ebola and hantavirus. The F.B.I. was brought in, and dozens of staff members were interviewed.
Investigators concluded that the damage was deliberate but were unable to determine who was responsible. The investigation also turned up evidence of other serious violations of safety protocols - failures that had nothing to do with the apparent sabotage and would probably not have come to light without it. The laboratory was shut down for nearly six months.
I have worked in a laboratory that engineers viruses (of the type that do not cause disease), and what strikes me about both of these episodes is how much rests on the judgment and the good behavior of individuals. Scientists are people. Mistakes, bad calls and moments of anger all happen, and pathogens escape from laboratories more often than you might think... (MORE - details)
INTRO: In February of last year, the journal Cell published a study in which virologists in China screened nearly a thousand bat samples, gathered from five provinces and stored at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, in search of new coronaviruses. The intended purpose of work like this is to give early warning: to learn which animal viruses are close to being able to infect people, so that virologists know what to watch for and have a chance to prepare.
They found that a handful of samples carried relatives of MERS, a deadly coronavirus. The researchers then showed that one of those viruses could enter human cells through the same cellular doorway as the viruses that cause SARS and Covid-19.
The scientists grew the virus in lab-made versions of human airway, nose and intestine cells, where it multiplied. They proposed testing it next in mice engineered with the same human cellular doorway. They also identified features that limited how efficiently the virus could infect human cells. More lab work could create a virus without those limitations, and members of this group did those kinds of experiments previously.
All of this was done outside high containment, two rungs short of the sort of precautions reserved for the deadliest pathogens. Leading virologists rang the alarm, saying that the level of safety was inadequate for a new virus potentially capable of infecting people through the air.
When Cell drew criticism for publishing the study, a spokesperson for the journal said that biosafety decisions like these rest with a study’s lead scientist and its institution and that the researchers “did not break any rules or policies of the journal.” Cell was right. In China and in the United States there are surprisingly few constraints on this type of research. Scientists can still gather novel coronaviruses, enhance them in the lab under relatively low biosafety conditions and even accidentally cause an outbreak - without breaking any rules.
Rules would not have prevented what happened a month later, when a worker at a Fort Detrick laboratory in Frederick, Md., found a large hole in an airtight suit. About an hour’s drive from Washington, Fort Detrick contains some of the country’s maximum-containment laboratories, where scientists handle deadly pathogens, including Ebola and hantavirus. The F.B.I. was brought in, and dozens of staff members were interviewed.
Investigators concluded that the damage was deliberate but were unable to determine who was responsible. The investigation also turned up evidence of other serious violations of safety protocols - failures that had nothing to do with the apparent sabotage and would probably not have come to light without it. The laboratory was shut down for nearly six months.
I have worked in a laboratory that engineers viruses (of the type that do not cause disease), and what strikes me about both of these episodes is how much rests on the judgment and the good behavior of individuals. Scientists are people. Mistakes, bad calls and moments of anger all happen, and pathogens escape from laboratories more often than you might think... (MORE - details)