Article ‘Seems like losing’: What the US hasn’t won in Iran?

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‘Seems like losing’: What the US hasn’t won in Iran
https://www.politico.com/news/2026/04/08...r-00864337

EXCERPTS: American forces have dominated on tactics, sinking the Iranian navy, crippling its ballistic missile and drone-making capabilities, and decimating most of its air defenses.

Yet the hardliners who have ruled Tehran for the past 47 years are still in charge. Iran still possesses its stockpile of highly enriched uranium — one of President Donald Trump’s key reasons for starting the war. And it can claim a newfound dominance over the Strait of Hormuz, a growing threat to world energy markets.

As negotiations begin this weekend in Pakistan for a permanent end to the conflict, the war has reaffirmed Iran’s regional significance, including its ability to strike its neighbors with missiles and drones — and inflict economic and political pain on its adversaries.

“I don’t know how the genie goes back in the bottle without the U.S. massively redefining our strategic objectives,” said a defense official. “I can’t imagine what the U.S. could offer or threaten Iran with at this point that generates a satisfying outcome.”

[...] And some in the Pentagon disagreed with Hegseth’s contention that the Iranian regime — which Tehran says is now led by Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of the killed supreme leader — would begin cooperating with the U.S.

[...] some Trump supporters disagreed this was in any way a win.

“There’s a profound paradox here,” said a Trump ally close to the White House. “If you’re not willing to go to total war, and we clearly are not, then the attacks ultimately enhance the leverage of this awful regime. They know Trump desperately wants out. And they’re going to get their pound of flesh, even though we hammered them with our attacks.”

Iran’s initial proposals for ending the war — under a “10-point” plan — would enshrine several hard-to-swallow elements, including Tehran’s power to charge $2 million tolls for ships passing through the strait.

[...] Republican Rep. Don Bacon, a retired Air Force general and member of the House Armed Services Committee, welcomed a pause in fighting but warned that the U.S. merely “bought time” with the ceasefire deal. “As long as this regime exists, they’ll be a threat,” he said. “We are safer today because Iran is significantly weakened. But the government is still in place and that means they’ll threaten us in the long term.” (MORE - missing details)
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It might seem like losing if you base the explanation for the war on seeking a truly favorable regime change. But Trump either dropped that after the early going or certainly by the time of his April 1st speech. In the end, the takeaway is that Iran was "set back" temporarily with regard to whatever -- whether that was the extent of the original reason or not.

Regime change efforts in the 2026 Iran war: "Shortly following the beginning of U.S.–Israeli strikes on Iranian targets and the assassination of Ali Khamenei on 28 February 2026, both U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu indicated that the goal of the strikes was regime change."

Rationale for the 2026 Iran war: "President Donald Trump has stated the goals of the war were to destroy Iran's ballistic missiles, eliminate their navy, prevent them from acquiring nuclear weapons, and to stop Iranian proxies from holding power."

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What Trump's critics are getting wrong about Iran
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-...52323.html

EXCERPT: President Donald Trump's Iran war has already been declared a strategic failure-costly, destabilizing, and self-defeating-across Washington's policy and media elite. Not for nothing. [...] The fight has shifted, for now at least, from sorties to terms. Vice President JD Vance is headed to Islamabad for direct talks with Iranian officials on a final settlement to end the conflict.

[...] The White House never treated regime change as a core war aim. It saw such an outcome as welcome, but not essential. The main goals were to destroy Iran's missile capabilities, destroy its navy, wreck the industrial base behind those systems, constrain Tehran's regional proxies, and deny it a nuclear bomb. By those measures, the war has clearly produced results so far.

All of the above have been severely degraded, even if not fully destroyed by the U.S. and Israeli strikes. It would take Iran years, perhaps decades, to rebuild its military capabilities and nuclear sites to their prewar state. Iran's enrichment facilities and uranium stockpiles now lie beneath piles of rubble, though uncertainty remains about where some material is.

The U.S. has neutralized Iran's navy and ultimately forced Tehran to reopen the strait to safe passage. It's true Iran initially exploited Hormuz as a pressure point, but only because it was one of the few cards Tehran had left. That caused short-term pain, but it didn't break the U.S.-Israeli campaign.

In fact, Iran's gambit triggered intense global pressure-even China pushed Tehran to stand down-and helped open the door to diplomacy. Tehran's leverage here is temporary. If it overplays its hand, the U.S. still has overwhelming force to respond, as Trump has repeatedly threatened to do.

And despite tensions within NATO, allies including the U.K. and France have said they would help reopen the strait to commercial traffic, through escorts, minesweeping, or other support for transiting vessels.

Gulf states have also relied on U.S. forces and hardware to defend against Iranian missile and drone attacks. Iran's own overreach helped rally broader, if tacit, alignment behind the U.S. position. They'll continue to rely on U.S. defense, economic, and diplomatic partnerships, which have deepened in recent years. These Gulf states have long viewed the Iranian regime as a major source of regional instability and welcome its military neutering, not least the end of any plausible nuclear threat.

Far from isolating the U.S., the war underscored a harder reality: American power remains the backbone of regional security. Europe, Russia, and China didn't step up to contain Iran. Only the U.S. and Israel acted. The regime in Tehran has also proved unable to mount any real defense against Israeli strikes on Hezbollah in Lebanon or Hamas in Gaza. Its links to those proxies are weakened, perhaps fatally so. Moreover, while the regime has survived, it has been fundamentally shaken... (MORE - missing details)