How can truly abstract objects be causal? (George F. R. Ellis video interview)

[C C]

In the video, Ellis contends anything with causal powers is "real" -- even abstract entities.

Since the "ideas" we encounter with "causal powers" actually correspond to widely replicable concrete or physical patterns (instances of language/graphics, digital information, thoughts with neural correlates, etc) -- I'd similarly disagree (like Kuhn) that they literally need to be fully abstract or non-physical. ("A philosophical naturalist can still accommodate them.")

Ellis apparently believes, though, that their ultimate provenance (beyond those specific material instantiations) is something outside space/time and conventional causation (the latter as relationally expressed in the linear nature of time).

And since he asserts that even those "immaterial" counterparts of ideas are causal (i.e., that's what makes them "real"), this is consequently introducing a type of causation that might figuratively be represented as "vertical" rather than the familiar "horizontal" type in time. Akin to treating a hypernym (category) as being the "cause" of its hyponyms (the subcategories and particulars grouped under it).

This is also how you sort out how Kant's noumena or "things in themselves" could influence the phenomenal world when he advocates agnosticism about "causation" being applicable to their non-spatiotemporal domain. It is not the time-dependent kind of causation that we represent the empirical world as exhibiting that he was referring to and banning. But a time-less, "hierarchical" version (i.e., the vertical metaphor).

Straying into theology, this is how an absolute god or world-principle (immutable and ideal via by being prior-in-rank to the changes/differences of space/time) could be outside the chain of causation in the universe and still be considered its "maker" and governance. It would be "cause" of the world in that hierarchical sense. Similarly, it requires no cause or origin or "history of development" for itself since -- again, it is prior-in-rank to the mutable, vulnerable things confined to spatiotemporal characteristics (their enslavement to beginnings and endings).

SEP: "The contemporary distinction between abstract and concrete is not an ancient one. Indeed, there is a strong case for the view that, despite occasional exceptions, it played no significant role in philosophy before the 20th century. The modern distinction bears some resemblance to Plato’s distinction between Forms and Sensibles. But Plato’s Forms were supposed to be causes par excellence, whereas abstract objects are generally supposed to be causally inert."

Closer To Truth: "George F. R. Ellis - Metaphysics vs. Materialism?" ... https://youtu.be/Me5hi_b1VG4

https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/Me5hi_b1VG4

[Secular Sanity]

Straying into theology, this is how an absolute god or world-principle (immutable and ideal via by being prior-in-rank to the changes/differences of space/time) could be outside the chain of causation in the universe and still be considered its "maker" and governance. It would be "cause" of the world in that hierarchical sense. Similarly, it requires no cause or origin or "history of development" for itself since -- again, it is prior-in-rank to the mutable, vulnerable things confined to spatiotemporal characteristics (their enslavement to beginnings and endings).

That’s a good point, but theology always seems to place the greatest weight on the subjects that are the most speculative, i.e. t=0.

And like Kuhn said, ideas can be viewed as products of physical processes that allow us to navigate, understand, and manipulate our surroundings. The relationship between thought and reality can be explored without invoking the necessity of a creator.

[C C]

Straying into theology, this is how an absolute god or world-principle (immutable and ideal via by being prior-in-rank to the changes/differences of space/time) could be outside the chain of causation in the universe and still be considered its "maker" and governance. It would be "cause" of the world in that hierarchical sense. Similarly, it requires no cause or origin or "history of development" for itself since -- again, it is prior-in-rank to the mutable, vulnerable things confined to spatiotemporal characteristics (their enslavement to beginnings and endings).

That’s a good point, but theology always seems to place the greatest weight on the subjects that are the most speculative, i.e. t=0.

And like Kuhn said, ideas can be viewed as products of physical processes that allow us to navigate, understand, and manipulate our surroundings. The relationship between thought and reality can be explored without invoking the necessity of a creator.

A universe grounded in philosophical presentism -- where only "now" exists and the world becomes an unfolding process, would seem more vulnerable to the idea of a hidden Platonic level. Since new moments or states of the cosmos are constantly being generated (and annihilated or replaced), the human craving for "cause" over brute magic ("it just happens, reality conforming to lawful regularities") causes the abstract-object devoteees to infer that there must be "governing principles" that are real. That there is a nomological stratum managing events of the temporal process.

That's one reason why I favor eternalism over presentism, because via all the developmental changes/differences of the universe co-existing, there is no need to succumb to the temptation that there is a prior-in-rank level that is outputting and governing a process of ephemeral world configurations. In a very legit sense, the "presentism" view discreetly screams that we're living in something akin to a simulation.

But there's nothing preventing a four-dimensionalism scenario from also having a timeless/spaceless origin, either (a "cause" for the entire continuum, in the context of a hierarchical relationship). But since that option would much more appear to be a superfluous or unnecessary add-on to eternalism (like introduced purely for the sake of personal or societal preferences to reinforce a particular set of moral codes), the temptation is far less to venture into either realism about an abstract level or some simulated reality situation.

[Syne]

How does presentism deny "conforming to lawful regularities?"
Just because the past is not ontologically real doesn't imply that it doesn't follow lawful regularities.

[C C]

How does presentism deny "conforming to lawful regularities?"

It doesn't, which is why it can invite the idea that the process is being governed (regulated by laws or whatever abstraction or prior-in-rank nomological level), rather than that merely being an appearance of such falling out of some extraordinarily billions of years long, maintained coincidental streak. I certainly don't advocate the latter being the case, but if _X_ school of thought disdains the reality of such rules or abstract entities...

[Syne]

I still don't see how that uniquely distinguishes presentism from eternalism. Just because the past is "no longer" ontologically real doesn't imply that it didn't have the exact same ontological impact on the present that eternalism posits. After all, the past is just as real in both views when it is the present.

IMO, eternalism can invite abstract guiding principles just as much. If all time/space is equally real, there's no reason to believe that it didn't all come into existence at once. In which case, there is no maintained coincidental streak, just the principles of causation that connect past to present to future.

Now you can avoid that with the "growing block universe" view, but that's distinct from eternalism.

[C C]

I still don't see how that uniquely distinguishes presentism from eternalism. Just because the past is "no longer" ontologically real doesn't imply that it didn't have the exact same ontological impact on the present that eternalism posits. After all, the past is just as real in both views when it is the present.

IMO, eternalism can invite abstract guiding principles just as much. If all time/space is equally real, there's no reason to believe that it didn't all come into existence at once. In which case, there is no maintained coincidental streak, just the principles of causation that connect past to present to future.

Now you can avoid that with the "growing block universe" view, but that's distinct from eternalism.

In the eternalism view, the "railroad tracks" (so to figuratively speak) are already laid out. There's no need to appeal to abstract rules (the geometrical patterns of the structure itself provide the "lawfulness"). And as I brought up, yes, we can add an origin for the block-universe or whatever extra-dimensional structure is the case. But such seems superfluous, since it just exists (it's not an unfolding process requiring governance as one step or change after another is generated, like a simulated reality requiring the computer that's hidden from its virtual denizens).

Since we could be in the past of the GBU as much as at its growing edge (a past where part of the future would already exist for us), the "growing-block" becomes a rather otiose idea that threatens to collapse into eternalism. And if we assert that only people occupying the edge are conscious, its "real" past thereby seems superfluous -- we might as well be in the presentism scenario.

I'm not wholly against either possibility. As mentioned, presentism opens the possibility that we're occupying a process akin to a simulated reality, which would open up a variety of amazing possibilities. And if time is actually infinite in the future direction, then that can never be a completed situation (otherwise it is finite). And accordingly GBU accommodates an endless future better than eternalism.

But when wearing a skeptical hat in an ultra-skeptical community that wants to minimize extraordinary possibilities, eternalism is what I tend to favor.

[Syne]

I agree that the GBU ultimately devolves to either presentism (where we only ever exist on the leading edge) or eternalism (where we could exist anywhere in the block). It's trying to compromise without sufficient justification.

But the "laying out" is still just as open to abstract rules. A reality could be equally simulated like a movie, where the entire journey is pre-scripted, as it could be like a video game, that is interactive. The only difference is the feeling of free will involved, but without an external perspective of "watch a movie," how would we know the difference? At least considering the arguments that our perception of free will is an illusion.

So whether you like the "movie" reality, where free will is an illusion, or the video game reality, where agency exists, will probably inform whether you prefer eternalism or presentism. Seems to have little to nothing to do with the presence or absence of abstract rules.

[Secular Sanity]

That's one reason why I favor eternalism over presentism, because via all the developmental changes/differences of the universe co-existing, there is no need to succumb to the temptation that there is a prior-in-rank level that is outputting and governing a process of ephemeral world configurations. In a very legit sense, the "presentism" view discreetly screams that we're living in something akin to a simulation. 

So, deterministic then?

[C C]

That's one reason why I favor eternalism over presentism, because via all the developmental changes/differences of the universe co-existing, there is no need to succumb to the temptation that there is a prior-in-rank level that is outputting and governing a process of ephemeral world configurations. In a very legit sense, the "presentism" view discreetly screams that we're living in something akin to a simulation. 

So, deterministic then?

At least in the way that a book is, where an external reader could cheat by jumping ahead and sampling later chapters. But...

"Random" can be conceived as just not conforming to any pattern that allows predictability (apart from broad expectations falling out of statistical probabilities, which seem capable of corralling almost anything in that way). A block-universe[1] or even that section of GBU (growing block universe) that is its existing past can potentially be strewn with events in the structure which are not rigidly adhering to the tool-like principles we abstract from our experiences.

As an overly simplistic metaphor... Consider a large mural featuring a design of predictably repeating multicolored squares on it, that are occasionally disrupted by circles following no rhyme or reason.

GBU might even be best for illustrating this. For instance, if a group of researchers residing on GBU's growing edge (its "now") validly assert that _X_ occurrence in their lab was "random", then they are still validly proclaiming that after 20 years pass (for the growing edge) and they are residing deep in the past block of GBU, with a "future" (from their POV) existing ahead of them covering two decades. A classification of "random" is not dependent on a non-existing future.

With respect to free will, the emphasis should be placed on our capacity to reprogram ourselves if we believe we have free will (and if we need to do so because we have destructive or harmful habits). Rather than randomness. An insane person behaves in a way that many might construe as "severely random", which is hardly desirable. Compatibilists point-out that we actually want to adhere to our routines and personal templates if they are producing more or less desirable results (i.e., to hell with being unpredictable for the sake of being unpredictable).

But this does not mean that slight randomness is incompatible with or deleterious to a predictable lifestyle that is constructive and positive. It's only the high levels which -- again, the madhouse individual can figuratively exemplify (that can disrupt the proper functioning of any organization, or utterly destroy it).

Via the universe of eternalism (or physical be-ing as a whole) simply stably existing in its developmental entirety, rather than being constantly re-made or re-created by process, there is no necessity to import abstract or hidden realms as either source of regulation or for origins. Which the militant skeptic (agnostic who wants to minimize extreme possibilities) or nihilist (denier of _X_) will arguably find suitable. "Necessity" here merely signifies that "add-ons" may be superfluous or something motivated by personal or societal interests, etc-- and not that they are impossible or absolutely forbidden from being "the case". Parsimony, assuming no more than needed.

BACKGROUND FOR GENERAL AUDIENCE: Presentism, the Growing-Past, Eternalism, and the Block-Universe

- - - footnote - - -

[1] Note that the simplistic "block-universe" stereotype does not have to be the structure that realizes eternalism (and most certainly it is more complicated than that when it comes to specific details). Eternalism can be considered an umbrella concept that has multiple potential options grouped under it, including whatever "multiverse or many-world" mathematical structures that Max Tegmark entertains. Since his whole motivation for MUH seems to revolve around the traditional block (single universe) not accommodating his passion for parallel universes. But the aforementioned "militant skeptic" thought orientation would not want some of those excessive options (like Tegmark's). That's why conservative options would prevail in that context.