Aug 24, 2024 03:03 AM
(This post was last modified: Aug 24, 2024 03:10 AM by C C.)
PETER ZEIHAN
https://youtu.be/_AVSki6dIgg
EXCERPTS: [...] The Ukrainians have already destroyed the three permanent bridges that are over the River Cem, which is an East-West river that cuts through Kursk Province. By doing that, they’ve made it very difficult for the Russians to reinforce the territories around where this incursion has been...
[...From a Russian point of view...] The 1,000 square kilometers that the Ukrainians have captured so far ... is a small amount of territory. From a Ukraine war point of view, it’s a huge amount of territory. And because those bridges are now out, the Russians can only resupply with pontoons.
Unlike hard bridges that require some pretty heavy weaponry to take out, pontoons can be taken out by much shorter-range things like artillery. And they are. So, the Russian ability to fight back has been relatively limited.
[...] I have always identified the city of Belgorod as one of the cities that the Ukrainians have to neutralize if they're ever going to win this war. Because it's the tip of the spear for Russian forces. [...] It's at the end of the logistical lines -- it's a big rail and road hub. If ... they take out most of the infrastructure that feeds into Belgorod ... it neutralizes a city of a million people without actually going into and conquering a city... Which I've got to say is pretty clever if they can pull it off... (Belgorod Oblast has over a million people; the city itself has less than 350,000).
[...] the Ukrainians have been able to basically locate a battlefield that plays to their strengths rather than the Russian strengths. And they’re kicking some serious ass. The problem is they probably don’t have enough men to fully take advantage of it.
But neither do the Russians have the men necessary to eject the Ukrainians. [...] Basically, they scrape together whatever men they can [...] They prefer to go to those occupied minority populations where they think the young men are disposable. And in fact, if they die, that’s actually a plus from the Russian point of view because it means they can’t rebel against Russian rule. But they’ve basically dragged all the people they can of the appropriate age group out of those zones.
And now the cupboard is getting dry.
The pipeline isn’t simply running low in terms of forces but in leadership. Putin has basically used every military commander that he has already that’s even remotely competent. And so, he’s just assigned one of his former bodyguards to run the operation in Kursk. And you can imagine how well that’s going.
[...] So, their options are to either partially abandon the Donbas offensive or dig deep into the Russian population.
[...] They’ve even raided the security forces around the Cosmodrome in the Far East. And I’ve got to tell you, if your security force was designed to keep a launch pad safe, it’s probably not very good in the face of an Abrams barrel. There’s nothing left. They haven’t been able to find the 30,000 to 70,000 troops that they need in order to retake Kursk.
[...] So, the Ukrainians are having a bit of a heyday at the moment, running around in Kursk, dealing with lightly armed and wildly untrained troops that don’t even have the benefit of large-scale artillery support.
I don’t mean to suggest for a second that the Ukrainians are not taking casualties themselves. It’s an active war zone. I don’t have good data. I would be shocked if, in an offensive operation of this scale, they’re not taking heavy losses, especially in their armor. But the fact remains that the Ukrainians have found a way, relatively on the cheap, to play to their strengths, neutralize Belgorod, and change the narrative of the war.
[...] Anyway, all of this collectively pales in significance to the real shift that we’ve identified as a result of the Kursk operation. Nukes haven’t flown.
[...] Because if the Ukrainians can do this without that sort of counter-reaction, then pretty much every Russian threat to this point is meaningless. Is there eventually a red line where if you step across it, the Russians will pull the trigger? Probably. But we now know it doesn’t involve population centers, territory, or cities within a few dozen miles of the wrong side of Russia’s internationally recognized borders...
https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/_AVSki6dIgg
https://youtu.be/_AVSki6dIgg
EXCERPTS: [...] The Ukrainians have already destroyed the three permanent bridges that are over the River Cem, which is an East-West river that cuts through Kursk Province. By doing that, they’ve made it very difficult for the Russians to reinforce the territories around where this incursion has been...
[...From a Russian point of view...] The 1,000 square kilometers that the Ukrainians have captured so far ... is a small amount of territory. From a Ukraine war point of view, it’s a huge amount of territory. And because those bridges are now out, the Russians can only resupply with pontoons.
Unlike hard bridges that require some pretty heavy weaponry to take out, pontoons can be taken out by much shorter-range things like artillery. And they are. So, the Russian ability to fight back has been relatively limited.
[...] I have always identified the city of Belgorod as one of the cities that the Ukrainians have to neutralize if they're ever going to win this war. Because it's the tip of the spear for Russian forces. [...] It's at the end of the logistical lines -- it's a big rail and road hub. If ... they take out most of the infrastructure that feeds into Belgorod ... it neutralizes a city of a million people without actually going into and conquering a city... Which I've got to say is pretty clever if they can pull it off... (Belgorod Oblast has over a million people; the city itself has less than 350,000).
[...] the Ukrainians have been able to basically locate a battlefield that plays to their strengths rather than the Russian strengths. And they’re kicking some serious ass. The problem is they probably don’t have enough men to fully take advantage of it.
But neither do the Russians have the men necessary to eject the Ukrainians. [...] Basically, they scrape together whatever men they can [...] They prefer to go to those occupied minority populations where they think the young men are disposable. And in fact, if they die, that’s actually a plus from the Russian point of view because it means they can’t rebel against Russian rule. But they’ve basically dragged all the people they can of the appropriate age group out of those zones.
And now the cupboard is getting dry.
The pipeline isn’t simply running low in terms of forces but in leadership. Putin has basically used every military commander that he has already that’s even remotely competent. And so, he’s just assigned one of his former bodyguards to run the operation in Kursk. And you can imagine how well that’s going.
[...] So, their options are to either partially abandon the Donbas offensive or dig deep into the Russian population.
[...] They’ve even raided the security forces around the Cosmodrome in the Far East. And I’ve got to tell you, if your security force was designed to keep a launch pad safe, it’s probably not very good in the face of an Abrams barrel. There’s nothing left. They haven’t been able to find the 30,000 to 70,000 troops that they need in order to retake Kursk.
[...] So, the Ukrainians are having a bit of a heyday at the moment, running around in Kursk, dealing with lightly armed and wildly untrained troops that don’t even have the benefit of large-scale artillery support.
I don’t mean to suggest for a second that the Ukrainians are not taking casualties themselves. It’s an active war zone. I don’t have good data. I would be shocked if, in an offensive operation of this scale, they’re not taking heavy losses, especially in their armor. But the fact remains that the Ukrainians have found a way, relatively on the cheap, to play to their strengths, neutralize Belgorod, and change the narrative of the war.
[...] Anyway, all of this collectively pales in significance to the real shift that we’ve identified as a result of the Kursk operation. Nukes haven’t flown.
[...] Because if the Ukrainians can do this without that sort of counter-reaction, then pretty much every Russian threat to this point is meaningless. Is there eventually a red line where if you step across it, the Russians will pull the trigger? Probably. But we now know it doesn’t involve population centers, territory, or cities within a few dozen miles of the wrong side of Russia’s internationally recognized borders...