Article HSE researchers question the correctness of experiments denying free will

[C C]

How many time does _X_ have to be debunked? re: (Sep-2019) A famous argument against free will has been debunked
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HSE researchers question the correctness of experiments denying free will
https://iq.hse.ru/en/news/850453515.html

PRESS RELEASE: Neuroscientists from HSE University have criticized the famous studies that question the free will of our decisions. You can’t shift responsibility for your actions to the brain. The results of the new work were published in the Neuropsychologia journal.

The dispute about how much free will people have in making their decisions has been going for decades. Neuroscientists have joined this discussion thanks to the electroencephalographic (EEG) experiments of Benjamin Libet.

In the 1970-1980s, he showed that 0.5–1.5 seconds before conscious awareness of the intention to perform a movement, subjects emit EEG activity that predicts this movement. It turns out that the brain makes a decision and sends readiness potential before a person realises it, and our actions are nothing more than the result of an unconscious physiological process in the brain.

The results of Libet's experiments have generated a lot of controversy about free will, and some neurophysiologists have even concluded that it does not exist. Moreover, Libet's experiment has been repeated using functional magnetic resonance imaging, and it turns out that the decision of the subject can be predicted even 6-10 seconds before their conscious awareness of it.

The staff of the HSE Institute for Cognitive Neuroscience questioned this experimental paradigm and in their new study confirmed that the time of intention awareness in Libet's experiments was determined incorrectly. In addition, EEG activity, or the brain signal indicating the readiness of a decision, which was recorded by Benjamin Libet before the decision was made, actually has no direct link to this decision.

In the Libet's original experiment, the subjects were asked to occasionally bend their wrists and at the same time remember the moment when they felt ready to perform this action. The time of intention awareness was recorded from the words of the subjects themselves: they observed a point that moved along the screen-dial, similar to a clock hand, and indicated the position of the point when they felt the desire to bend their hand. The moment of the final decision was determined by the exact reading of the sensor attached to the wrist of the subjects.

The HSE neuroscientists repeated the experiment with two groups of subjects, adding small changes to the task in one of the groups. Using behavioral reports and hypersensitive EEG techniques, the scientists investigated the correlation between the time of intention awareness and the time of final decision.

It turned out that the time of awareness can be influenced by experimental procedures: for example, without certain training, the subjects are barely able to determine their intentions, and the traditional Libet paradigm pushes them to the feeling that they can determine the moment of decision-making and intention. Apparently, the instruction itself in the Libet task makes the participants feel that the intention should emerge long before the final decision is made.

In addition, the study confirmed that there is no direct link between the activity of the brain preceding the action and the intention to perform the action. The sense of intention emerged in the subjects at different points in time, whereas the readiness potential was always registered at about the same time. Thus, the readiness potential may reflect the general dynamics of the decision-making process about making a move, but it does not mean that the intention to act has already been generated.

"Our study highlights the ambiguity of Libet's research and proves the absence of a direct correlation between the brain signal and decision-making. It appears that the classical Libet paradigm is not suitable for answering the question of whether we have free will while making decisions. We need to come up with a new approach to this extremely interesting scientific puzzle," says Dmitry Bredikhin, author of the research, Junior Research Fellow at the Centre for Cognition & Decision Making.

"Neuroscience tries to answer key questions in our life, including questions of free will and responsibility for our actions. We need to be especially precise in order to draw conclusions that affect our outlook and attitude to life. Therefore, we tried to understand the predetermination of our decisions and confirmed a number of shortcomings in the famous experiments of Benjamin Libet. This does not mean that we have closed this issue of the illusory nature of our free will, but rather emphasizes that the discussion continues. This might be one of the most interesting questions in modern science, to which we have yet to give a definitive answer," comments Vasily Klucharev, Project coordinator, Leading Research Fellow of the Institute for Cognitive Neuroscience.

[confused2]

Here's a thing I found [ see https://visme.co/blog/subliminal-messages/ ]

Our subconscious mind is way more powerful when it comes to information processing. Subconsciousness is able to process 20,000 bits of information simultaneously, while consciousness nan deal only with 7 +-2 bits of information at the same time. All meaningful decisions are made at the subconscious level.

Is it true? Probably not. Playing Scrabble .. I don't have 30,000 or more words immediately to hand. Assuming I can check words at roughly the speed I can mentally count (about 10 counts a second) even without checking for usefulness it would take over 8 hours to run through all the words I know. So I don't think Scrabble is played at a 'conscious' level. If Scrabble isn't played at a conscious level is anything else? Probably not.

[C C]

Here's a thing I found [ see https://visme.co/blog/subliminal-messages/ ]

Our subconscious mind is way more powerful when it comes to information processing. Subconsciousness is able to process 20,000 bits of information simultaneously, while consciousness nan deal only with 7 +-2 bits of information at the same time. All meaningful decisions are made at the subconscious level.

Is it true? Probably not. Playing Scrabble .. I don't have 30,000 or more words immediately to hand. Assuming I can check words at roughly the speed I can mentally count (about 10 counts a second) even without checking for usefulness it would take over 8 hours to run through all the words I know. So I don't think Scrabble is played at a 'conscious' level. If Scrabble isn't played at a conscious level is anything else? Probably not.

"Free will" as incompatibilists define it is self-conflicting to begin with, anyway. Here, it's just that the original experiment was (non-deliberately) bogus in terms of the nonsensical concept it was construed as undermining.

Kind of like somebody declares that there are square circles (a belief which strangely becomes massively popular with people) and then a study supposedly concludes that there are no square circles. But then later studies and analyses determine the study was flawed. And the only reason for bothering to report any of it is because the cherished contradiction of "square circles" is so important to humanity. With respect to both advocating them and warring against them. 

"As traditionally conceived, the will is the faculty of choice or decision, by which we determine which actions we shall perform." --Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Deliberated choices don't fall out of randomness. Will requires systematic governance, an organization that engages in regularities to some degree or another. Will (sans the "free" adjective) is compatible with determinism. Decision-making is determined and carried out by the operations of the autonomous brain/body.

Accordingly, the "free" modifier added to "will" cannot incoherently refer to being free from the very past states and (predictable in theory) constraints and personal identity of the physical agent that exercises will to begin with. Well, obviously culture can create such a perverse term, but that makes it a dead idea or horse before it even leaves the starting gate.

Additionally, who wants to be free from their own preferences and goals (if they like themselves, that is)? To be free from who I am and what I want would be equivalent to being controlled or hijacked by another agent, or simply going insane. (Acquiring insanity is a good way to be free from who one previously was and for performing non-deliberated acts at random -- freedom from will or guidance.)

And if an individual hates themselves and their decisions, then it's a matter of using (the non-crazy version of) will to change that. But there's no ability to accomplish the latter if will is free from the very conditions that make it possible. (I.e., would be disorganized and arbitrary impulses.)

Thus, the only context where "free will" makes any sense is when it refers to contingent circumstances where one was forced to do something one ordinarily would not want to: "I didn't do it of my own free will. They made me do it at gunpoint; or they threatened to kill my family. Or the LSD I took made me do it, or my bout of bipolarism made me do it, or childhood abuse made me do it, or poverty made me do it, or growing up spoiled in a rich home made me do it, or living in an oppressive society made me to it, etc. Anyway, I didn't do it of my own free will."

[Syne]

"Free will" as incompatibilists define it is self-conflicting to begin with, anyway. Here, it's just that the original experiment was (non-deliberately) bogus in terms of the nonsensical concept it was construed as undermining.

I was pointing out the flaws in Libet's experiment a decade or more before it was accepted as debunked. What made it easy to see through the obviously flawed "science" was an understanding of actual free will. The simple fact that random choices, to push a button, do not reflect the will at all.

How is incompatibilist free will self-conflicting? It only requires that you believe "that some form of indeterminism is true," and quantum mechanics demonstrates that is so. Free will is ultimately not in the desire alone, but in the execution. You might really really want to lose weight, but until you execute on that desire, you have not exercised (no pun intended) your free will.

Deliberated choices don't fall out of randomness. Will requires systematic governance, an organization that engages in regularities to some degree or another. Will (sans the "free" adjective) is compatible with determinism. Decision-making is determined and carried out by the operations of the autonomous brain/body.

Nor do deliberate (your word choice to overtly insert a necessary history, "deliberation"... begging the question) choices fall out of complete determinism, as that defies the definition of "choice." Your "to some degree" is necessarily the inclusion indeterminism.

Accordingly, the "free" modifier added to "will" cannot incoherently refer to being free from the very past states and (predictable in theory) constraints and personal identity of the physical agent that exercises will to begin with. Well, obviously culture can create such a perverse term, but that makes it a dead idea or horse before it even leaves the starting gate.

Individual indeterministic events are not "predictable in theory." It's only large enough collections of such events that are predictable as probability. Are you a hard determinist, that denies all indeterminism?

Additionally, who wants to be free from their own preferences and goals (if they like themselves, that is)? To be free from who I am and what I want would be equivalent to being controlled or hijacked by another agent, or simply going insane. (Acquiring insanity is a good way to be free from who one previously was and for performing non-deliberated acts at random -- freedom from will or guidance.)

It's not about being "free from," it's about being "free to." No one denies that there is some history to many, but not all, of your preferences. We like many things because of our experience with them, but we also like things for no reason, like favorite color. Free will is about being "free to" act (including the act of changing your mind) on one's desires, whether they are based in experience or not.

And if an individual hates themselves and their decisions, then it's a matter of using (the non-crazy version of) will to change that. But there's no ability to accomplish the latter if will is free from the very conditions that make it possible. (I.e., would be disorganized and arbitrary impulses.)

Now that's self-conflicting. If an individual hates themselves, how can they change what they will (their preference to hate themselves) without having a truly free will?
You seem to believe that all things exist in a strict binary of either determined or undetermined, without any admixture or interaction being possible. If that were so, our universe could not exist as it seems to, with deterministic classical physics coexisting and relying upon with indeterministic quantum physics.

Thus, the only context where "free will" makes any sense is when it refers to contingent circumstances where one was forced to do something one ordinarily would not want to: "I didn't do it of my own free will. They made me do it at gunpoint; or they threatened to kill my family. Or the LSD I took made me do it, or my bout of bipolarism made me do it, or childhood abuse made me do it, or poverty made me do it, or growing up spoiled in a rich home made me do it, or living in an oppressive society made me to it, etc. Anyway, I didn't do it of my own free will."

Like my example of wanting to but not losing weight, many people do things against their own desires. Now you may say that they are essentially being "forced" by their past, but then some people do not let their past (of depression, poor habits, etc.) hinder their desires.

You'd have to show something to explain that inconsistency other than free will, otherwise we're only left with the conclusion that strength of will varies by person. Now you could claim that is inherent, genetic, etc., but that would not explain people who go from one category to the other.

[C C]

"Free will" as incompatibilists define it is self-conflicting to begin with, anyway. Here, it's just that the original experiment was (non-deliberately) bogus in terms of the nonsensical concept it was construed as undermining.

How is incompatibilist free will self-conflicting? It only requires that you believe "that some form of indeterminism is true," and quantum mechanics demonstrates that is so.

"Incompatibilism is the view that a deterministic universe is completely at odds with the notion that persons have free will."

Obviously that [absolute] definition is what was referenced -- not these detouring, contingent claims about a universe being a mix of determinism and indeterminism. The latter are FW'ers accepting the authority of incompatibilism's decree that "will" is incompatible with determinism, but still trying to survive under it.

"As traditionally conceived, the will is the faculty of choice or decision, by which we determine which actions we shall perform." --Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy

"Will" is compatible with determinism. Disorganized activity, lack of procedural stages beforehand, etc isn't its environment.

I'm rejecting the "free" adjective with respect to metaphysical "free will" (FW) because it is either otiose (serves no actual function) or nukes what makes "will" possible in the first place, if it implies being free from the very brain/body system (and its constraints, preferences, etc) that makes will possible in the first place.

A practical, everyday, or mundane usage of the term FW, however, is arguably still applicable. If the "free adjective" isn't superfluous or isn't concerned with denying autonomy to the brain/body due to determinism or whatever, but is addressing particular (especially legal-related) instances where people are coerced into doing things they don't want to. "They didn't do that of their own free will."

Free will is ultimately not in the desire alone, but in the execution. You might really really want to lose weight, but until you execute on that desire, you have not exercised (no pun intended) your free will.

That's detouring from incompatilism context over to the practical usage of "free will".

Deliberated choices don't fall out of randomness. Will requires systematic governance, an organization that engages in regularities to some degree or another. Will (sans the "free" adjective) is compatible with determinism. Decision-making is determined and carried out by the operations of the autonomous brain/body.

Nor do deliberate (your word choice to overtly insert a necessary history, "deliberation"... begging the question) choices fall out of complete determinism, as that defies the definition of "choice." Your "to some degree" is necessarily the inclusion indeterminism.

I'll take that as agreement that "will" is dependent on organization and systemic governance. That while the brain/body is not as rigidly regulated as, say, a computer, that is not detracting from will being dependent on such.

The detour of emphasizing the insecurity of the incompatibilist who believes in FW (i.e., "I must have randonmess infiltrating to the system to have FW") is irrelevant to my perspective. Since "will" is compatible with determinism, it matters not whether the system is rigidly regulated or partially compromised in that respect.

Additionally, who wants to be free from their own preferences and goals (if they like themselves, that is)? To be free from who I am and what I want would be equivalent to being controlled or hijacked by another agent, or simply going insane. (Acquiring insanity is a good way to be free from who one previously was and for performing non-deliberated acts at random -- freedom from will or guidance.)

It's not about being "free from," it's about being "free to." No one denies that there is some history to many, but not all, of your preferences. We like many things because of our experience with them, but we also like things for no reason, like favorite color. Free will is about being "free to" act (including the act of changing your mind) on one's desires, whether they are based in experience or not.

An incompatibilist doesn't believe they are "free to" if determinism is the case. If they also believe in FW, then that incompatibilist requires being free from determinism  -- they have to mitigate determinism. Whether by introduction of randomness, miracles, immaterial souls -- whatever.

Also: It sounds like you're again detouring over to the everyday usage of FW, where the "free" adjective presumedly has a clearer purpose and is amenable to ordinary observation: Was that individual free to do what they wanted when they did _X_, or were they just following orders (coerced by circumstances)? (From a deeper standpoint, however, it's the autonomous brain/body outputting a decision to comply. The person is not a puppet whose actions and choices originate from an external, controlling master.)

And if an individual hates themselves and their decisions, then it's a matter of using (the non-crazy version of) will to change that. But there's no ability to accomplish the latter if will is free from the very conditions that make it possible. (I.e., would be disorganized and arbitrary impulses.)

Now that's self-conflicting. If an individual hates themselves, how can they change what they will (their preference to hate themselves) without having a truly free will?

Obviously not liking one's self is a stimulus for deciding to change to begin with. It doesn't entail fatalistically remaining that way.

I added that item in an edit because it dawned on me after wards that somebody could claim that they're not "happy with their preferences". So what? Change them. "Will" doesn't prevent that.

You seem to believe that all things exist in a strict binary of either determined or undetermined, without any admixture or interaction being possible. If that were so, our universe could not exist as it seems to, with deterministic classical physics coexisting and relying upon with indeterministic quantum physics.

That sounds like insecure incompatibilism, otherwise why be appealing to such, or bring it up? I'm fine even if the world was wholly deterministic. How about the incompatibilist? I don't have a superfluous "free" attached to "will" as far as metaphysical context goes, or a "free" implying being liberated from what makes will possible in the first place.

[Syne]

How is incompatibilist free will self-conflicting? It only requires that you believe "that some form of indeterminism is true," and quantum mechanics demonstrates that is so.

"Incompatibilism is the view that a deterministic universe is completely at odds with the notion that persons have free will."

Obviously that [absolute] definition is what was referenced -- not these detouring, contingent claims about a universe being a mix of determinism and indeterminism. The latter are FW'ers accepting the authority of incompatibilism's decree that "will" is incompatible with determinism, but still trying to survive under it. 

"As traditionally conceived, the will is the faculty of choice or decision, by which we determine which actions we shall perform." --Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy

"Will" is compatible with determinism. Disorganized activity, lack of procedural stages beforehand, etc isn't its environment. 

I'm rejecting the "free" adjective with respect to metaphysical "free will" (FW) because it is either otiose (serves no actual function) or nukes what makes "will" possible in the first place, if it implies being free from the very brain/body system (and its constraints, preferences, etc) that makes will possible in the first place.

A practical, everyday, or mundane usage of the term FW, however, is arguably still applicable. If the "free adjective" isn't superfluous or isn't concerned with denying autonomy to the brain/body due to determinism or whatever, but is addressing particular (especially legal-related) instances where people are coerced into doing things they don't want to. "They didn't do that of their own free will."

A bit imprecise there. Incompatibilism is, generally, the view that a "completely deterministic" universe is at odds with free will. This is rather trivially so, because "choice" is antithetical to the wholly externally and/or previously determined. A mixture including indeterminism is no detour. "In contrast, "metaphysical libertarians", such as Thomas Reid, Peter van Inwagen, and Robert Kane, are those incompatibilists who accept free will and deny determinism, holding the view that some form of indeterminism is true." Accepting the observations of classical and quantum physical laws is no more contingent than accepting determinism alone. Both compatibilist and incompatibilist arguments make use of such.

Can you specify how one use differs enough from the other to make that one-sided criticism valid?

You seem to be conflating "we determine" with determination in general. "Determinism is the philosophical view that events are completely determined by previously existing causes." If those causes include any actual exertion of will, they cannot be completely determined by previous causes. Otherwise the "will" is no more than another word for a mechanistic cause originating solely from the laws of nature. You can dilute the meaning of "free" and "will," but that's just playing word games.

Are you assuming that something that is not wholly determined must, somehow, be wholly disorganized? Probability is still predictable, so the notion that indeterminism is complete chaos is obviously false, right?

Again, plenty of people do things they don't want to without any external coercion at all. Or are their perception and preference of not wanting to do them just an illusion? Fat people really, deep down (no pun intended), want to be fat, huh?

Free will is ultimately not in the desire alone, but in the execution. You might really really want to lose weight, but until you execute on that desire, you have not exercised (no pun intended) your free will.

That's detouring from incompatilism context over to the practical usage of "free will".

If there's a discrepancy between what you prefer (will) and what you do without coercion, compatibilist determinism cannot explain that.

Nor do deliberate (your word choice to overtly insert a necessary history, "deliberation"... begging the question) choices fall out of complete determinism, as that defies the definition of "choice." Your "to some degree" is necessarily the inclusion indeterminism.

I'll take that as agreement that "will" is dependent on organization and systemic governance. That while the brain/body is not as rigidly regulated as, say, a computer, that is not detracting from will being dependent on such.

You seem to misunderstand that free will and determinism being logically incompatible does not mean that they cannot coexist. If there were a world in which choices would not have consequences, any discussion of will would be moot. Everything would just be capricious luck, regardless of choice. Incompatibilism just asserts that both cannot exist as cause of the same event. Your argument seems to bypass that by simply redefining "will" as "natural law" and pretending they somehow differ.

The detour of emphasizing the insecurity of the incompatibilist who believes in FW (i.e., "I must have randonmess infiltrating to the system to have FW") is irrelevant to my perspective. Since "will" is compatible with determinism, it matters not whether the system is rigidly regulated or partially compromised in that respect.

Seems odd to trumpet determinism while ignoring or denying the equally evidence indeterminism in physics. Of course it doesn't matter, when you simply conflate the terms "will" and "determinism." Saying something is compatible with itself by simply defining the same thing as two ostensibly different things is just begging the question.

An incompatibilist doesn't believe they are "free to" if determinism is the case. If they also believe in FW, then that incompatibilist requires being free from determinism  -- they have to mitigate determinism. Whether by introduction of randomness, miracles, immaterial souls -- whatever.

Also: It sounds like you're again detouring over to the everyday usage of FW, where the "free" adjective presumedly has a clearer purpose and is amenable to ordinary observation: Was that individual free to do what they wanted when they did _X_, or were they just following orders (coerced by circumstances)? (From a deeper standpoint, however, it's the autonomous brain/body outputting a decision to comply. The person is not a puppet whose actions and choices originate from an external, controlling master.)

Incompatibilists don't believe that are "free to" is determinism is the sole case, which is why you insist upon conflating the two. If determinism is the sole cause, will must be equally determined...thus completely indistinct from determinism. IOW, you're not even debating will at all. You're just arduously avoiding it with equivocation.

No need to "mitigate determinism" when, by all evidence, determinism, itself, is dependent upon quantum indeterminism. IOW, you have to deny an awful lot of physics to claim that none of your argument involves indeterminism.

Drawing an arbitrary line between natural, deterministic causes within and without the brain/body is a difference without distinction. In a wholly determnistic world, the brain/body is just another in a long chain of deterministic causes, acted upon and outputting solely as determined. Your argument seems replete with drawing such superficial distinctions.

Now that's self-conflicting. If an individual hates themselves, how can they change what they will (their preference to hate themselves) without having a truly free will?

Obviously not liking one's self is a stimulus for deciding to change to begin with. It doesn't entail fatalistically remaining that way.

I added that item in an edit because it dawned on me after wards that somebody could claim that they're not "happy with their preferences". So what? Change them. "Will" doesn't prevent that.

So just a slave to stimuli that variously makes one hate and then not hate oneself? See the lack of distinction there?
Again, people do things they really don't want to all the time, without any external coercion. If they do those things due to external stimuli, everything is ultimately coercive.

You seem to believe that all things exist in a strict binary of either determined or undetermined, without any admixture or interaction being possible. If that were so, our universe could not exist as it seems to, with deterministic classical physics coexisting and relying upon with indeterministic quantum physics.

That sounds like insecure incompatibilism, otherwise why be appealing to such, or bring it up? I'm fine even if the world was wholly deterministic. How about the incompatibilist? I don't have a superfluous "free" attached to "will" as far as metaphysical context goes, or a "free" implying being liberated from what makes will possible in the first place.

You don't even have a "will" attached to "will." You just keep calling some parts of determinism "will," as if that magically makes it so.
A "will" has to be distinct from determinism to exist at all. You have yet to show any real difference other than arbitrary lines in the sand.
Reiterating that determinism is "what makes will possible," is just repeating your conflation/equivocation (depending on your intent/self-awareness).