Feb 21, 2023 11:27 PM
Why would it be so bad if our species came to an end? It is a question that reveals our latent values and hidden fears
https://aeon.co/essays/what-are-the-mora...ng-extinct
EXCERPTS: It’s an ominous sign of the times that human extinction is an increasingly common topic of discussion. [...] This is no doubt due to growing awareness of the climate crisis, as well as the various dangers posed by emerging technologies, from gene editing to artificial intelligence. The obstacle course of existential hazards before us seems to be expanding, and indeed many scholars have argued that, to quote Noam Chomsky, the overall risk of extinction this century is ‘unprecedented in the history of Homo sapiens’...
[...] But so what if we’re wiped out? What does it matter if Homo sapiens no longer exists? The astonishing fact is that, despite acquiring the ability to annihilate ourselves back in the 1950s, when thermonuclear weapons were invented, very few philosophers in the West have paid much attention to the ethics of human extinction. Would our species dying out be bad, or would it in some way be good – or just neutral?
Would it be morally wrong, or perhaps morally right, to cause or allow our extinction to occur? What arguments could support a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer?
These are just some of the questions that I place within a field called ‘existential ethics’, which, as noted, has been largely ignored by the philosophical community. This is a real shame for several reasons: first, even if you don’t think our extinction is likely this century, reflecting on the questions above can provide clarity to a wide range of philosophical issues. The fact is that existential ethics touches upon some of the most fundamental questions about value, meaning, ethics and existence, which makes meditating on why our species might – or might not – be worth saving a very useful exercise.
Second, if you do agree with Chomsky, Hawking and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that our extinction is more probable now than in centuries past, shouldn’t we want to know whether, and why, tumbling into the eternal grave would be right or wrong, good or bad, better or worse? Here we are, inches away from the precipice, tempting the same fate that swallowed up the dinosaurs and the dodo, with hardly anyone thinking seriously about the ethical implications of this possibility. Surely this is a situation that we should not only rectify, but do so with a degree of moral urgency – or so I would argue.
This points to another question: why exactly has existential ethics been so neglected? Why has it languished in relative obscurity while so many other fields – machine ethics, business ethics, animal ethics, bioethics, and so on – have become thriving areas of research over the past several decades?
One explanation is that philosophers have, in general, failed to appreciate just how rich and complicated the topic is. For example, the question ‘Would human extinction be bad?’ looks simple and straightforward, yet it conceals a treasure trove of fascinating complexity. Consider that ‘human’ and ‘extinction’ can be defined in many different, equally legitimate ways.
Most people intuitively equate ‘human’ with our species, Homo sapiens, yet scholars sometimes use the word to mean ‘Homo sapiens and whatever descendants we might have’. On the latter definition, Homo sapiens could disappear completely and forever without human extinction having occurred.
Indeed, one way to ‘go extinct’ would be to evolve into a new posthuman species, something that will inevitably occur over the next million years if only because of Darwinian evolution. Would this be bad? Or we might ‘go extinct’ by replacing ourselves with, say, a population of intelligent machines. Some would see this as a dystopian outcome, though others have recently argued that we should want it to happen.
In his book Mind Children (1988), the computer scientist Hans Moravec, for instance, not only views this kind of extinction as desirable, but hopes to actively bring it about. He thus holds that the extinction of Homo sapiens would constitute a great tragedy – unless it were to coincide with the creation of machinic replacements, in which case it would be very good.
Would it be bad for a child to die prematurely? What about an elderly person, or someone middle-aged?
On my count, there are at least six distinct types of extinction that are relevant to existential ethics, although for our purposes we can focus on what I call the ‘prototypical conception’, whereby Homo sapiens disappears entirely and forever without leaving behind any successors. In other words, our extinction marks a complete and final end to the human story, which is why I label it ‘final’ human extinction.
So, this is one bundle of complexity hidden behind what appears to be a simple question: would human extinction be bad? Whenever someone asks this, the first thing you should do is reply: what do you mean by ‘human’? And which type of ‘extinction’ are you talking about? Once you’re clear on these issues, there’s a second complication to navigate... (MORE - missing details)
https://aeon.co/essays/what-are-the-mora...ng-extinct
EXCERPTS: It’s an ominous sign of the times that human extinction is an increasingly common topic of discussion. [...] This is no doubt due to growing awareness of the climate crisis, as well as the various dangers posed by emerging technologies, from gene editing to artificial intelligence. The obstacle course of existential hazards before us seems to be expanding, and indeed many scholars have argued that, to quote Noam Chomsky, the overall risk of extinction this century is ‘unprecedented in the history of Homo sapiens’...
[...] But so what if we’re wiped out? What does it matter if Homo sapiens no longer exists? The astonishing fact is that, despite acquiring the ability to annihilate ourselves back in the 1950s, when thermonuclear weapons were invented, very few philosophers in the West have paid much attention to the ethics of human extinction. Would our species dying out be bad, or would it in some way be good – or just neutral?
Would it be morally wrong, or perhaps morally right, to cause or allow our extinction to occur? What arguments could support a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer?
These are just some of the questions that I place within a field called ‘existential ethics’, which, as noted, has been largely ignored by the philosophical community. This is a real shame for several reasons: first, even if you don’t think our extinction is likely this century, reflecting on the questions above can provide clarity to a wide range of philosophical issues. The fact is that existential ethics touches upon some of the most fundamental questions about value, meaning, ethics and existence, which makes meditating on why our species might – or might not – be worth saving a very useful exercise.
Second, if you do agree with Chomsky, Hawking and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that our extinction is more probable now than in centuries past, shouldn’t we want to know whether, and why, tumbling into the eternal grave would be right or wrong, good or bad, better or worse? Here we are, inches away from the precipice, tempting the same fate that swallowed up the dinosaurs and the dodo, with hardly anyone thinking seriously about the ethical implications of this possibility. Surely this is a situation that we should not only rectify, but do so with a degree of moral urgency – or so I would argue.
This points to another question: why exactly has existential ethics been so neglected? Why has it languished in relative obscurity while so many other fields – machine ethics, business ethics, animal ethics, bioethics, and so on – have become thriving areas of research over the past several decades?
One explanation is that philosophers have, in general, failed to appreciate just how rich and complicated the topic is. For example, the question ‘Would human extinction be bad?’ looks simple and straightforward, yet it conceals a treasure trove of fascinating complexity. Consider that ‘human’ and ‘extinction’ can be defined in many different, equally legitimate ways.
Most people intuitively equate ‘human’ with our species, Homo sapiens, yet scholars sometimes use the word to mean ‘Homo sapiens and whatever descendants we might have’. On the latter definition, Homo sapiens could disappear completely and forever without human extinction having occurred.
Indeed, one way to ‘go extinct’ would be to evolve into a new posthuman species, something that will inevitably occur over the next million years if only because of Darwinian evolution. Would this be bad? Or we might ‘go extinct’ by replacing ourselves with, say, a population of intelligent machines. Some would see this as a dystopian outcome, though others have recently argued that we should want it to happen.
In his book Mind Children (1988), the computer scientist Hans Moravec, for instance, not only views this kind of extinction as desirable, but hopes to actively bring it about. He thus holds that the extinction of Homo sapiens would constitute a great tragedy – unless it were to coincide with the creation of machinic replacements, in which case it would be very good.
Would it be bad for a child to die prematurely? What about an elderly person, or someone middle-aged?
On my count, there are at least six distinct types of extinction that are relevant to existential ethics, although for our purposes we can focus on what I call the ‘prototypical conception’, whereby Homo sapiens disappears entirely and forever without leaving behind any successors. In other words, our extinction marks a complete and final end to the human story, which is why I label it ‘final’ human extinction.
So, this is one bundle of complexity hidden behind what appears to be a simple question: would human extinction be bad? Whenever someone asks this, the first thing you should do is reply: what do you mean by ‘human’? And which type of ‘extinction’ are you talking about? Once you’re clear on these issues, there’s a second complication to navigate... (MORE - missing details)