
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10....22.2076629
EXCERPT: Since there is insufficient consciousness of how crucial attractiveness is in life (contrasted with our consciousness of the factors of race and gender), the ugly person is hermeneutically disadvantaged in a way that they might not be aware of. If ugly people are told repeatedly that they are not ugly or that their woes are not due to them being ugly, even though they are, then this social taboo of being ugly and telling someone they might be ugly, are what puts those people at a hermeneutic disadvantage of interpreting the social world and their place in it.
The taboo upholds a disconnect between the way ugly people experience the social world and the way in which they are told the social world actually is. The taboo of ugly itself is an instance of hermeneutic injustice, insofar as it hampers people’s self-understanding with regards to how their looks partially pre-determine their place in the social world. And this, in turn, matters because this kind of stigmatization prevents subordinated people from ‘developing their full capacities’). (MORE - details)
PAPER'S ABSTRACT: Lookism refers to discrimination based on physical attractiveness or the lack thereof. A whole host of empirical research suggests that lookism is a pervasive and systematic form of social discrimination.
Yet, apart from some attention in ethics and political philosophy, lookism has been almost wholly overlooked in philosophy in general and epistemology in particular. This is particularly salient when compared to other forms of discrimination based on race or gender which have been at the forefront of epistemic injustice as a topic of research.
This paper argues that lookism is associated with various forms of epistemic injustice. In the specific case of lookism, hermeneutic injustice takes the shape of the taboo of acknowledging that unattractive people are unattractive.
This, on the one hand, results in a hampered understanding of one’s own situation insofar as one is deterred from seeing one’s looks as one major factor for one’s social position. On the other hand, this hermeneutic injustice serves as the backdrop of instances of a special kind testimonial injustice in which the ugly person’s burgeoning realization that their looks influence their social standing detrimentally is discounted due to the pejorative nature of ascribing someone the property of being unattractive or ugly.
EXCERPT: Since there is insufficient consciousness of how crucial attractiveness is in life (contrasted with our consciousness of the factors of race and gender), the ugly person is hermeneutically disadvantaged in a way that they might not be aware of. If ugly people are told repeatedly that they are not ugly or that their woes are not due to them being ugly, even though they are, then this social taboo of being ugly and telling someone they might be ugly, are what puts those people at a hermeneutic disadvantage of interpreting the social world and their place in it.
The taboo upholds a disconnect between the way ugly people experience the social world and the way in which they are told the social world actually is. The taboo of ugly itself is an instance of hermeneutic injustice, insofar as it hampers people’s self-understanding with regards to how their looks partially pre-determine their place in the social world. And this, in turn, matters because this kind of stigmatization prevents subordinated people from ‘developing their full capacities’). (MORE - details)
PAPER'S ABSTRACT: Lookism refers to discrimination based on physical attractiveness or the lack thereof. A whole host of empirical research suggests that lookism is a pervasive and systematic form of social discrimination.
Yet, apart from some attention in ethics and political philosophy, lookism has been almost wholly overlooked in philosophy in general and epistemology in particular. This is particularly salient when compared to other forms of discrimination based on race or gender which have been at the forefront of epistemic injustice as a topic of research.
This paper argues that lookism is associated with various forms of epistemic injustice. In the specific case of lookism, hermeneutic injustice takes the shape of the taboo of acknowledging that unattractive people are unattractive.
This, on the one hand, results in a hampered understanding of one’s own situation insofar as one is deterred from seeing one’s looks as one major factor for one’s social position. On the other hand, this hermeneutic injustice serves as the backdrop of instances of a special kind testimonial injustice in which the ugly person’s burgeoning realization that their looks influence their social standing detrimentally is discounted due to the pejorative nature of ascribing someone the property of being unattractive or ugly.