4 categories of pseudoscience — and how to talk to people who believe in them

[C C]

https://bigthink.com/thinking/kinds-of-pseudoscience/

EXCERPTS: Despite increasing levels of technology and scientific literacy, it seems as if pseudoscience is more insane and pervasive than ever. But if these ideas are so clearly mistaken, why is it that so many people get sucked into them?... In an essay on pseudoscience, historian of science Dr. Michael Gordin argues that we often think about the divide between real science and pseudoscience incorrectly.

[...] While many great minds have attempted to draw a clear line between the scientific and the unscientific [demarcation problem], the results of their efforts have been mixed... [Karl Popper's falsifiability]

[...] Another concept ... is that of the paradigm shift, as described by Thomas Kuhn. Kuhn puts the line between science and non-science in terms of paradigms — bundles of ideas that are widely accepted among scientists. [...] The idea of paradigms as the demarcation lines can explain some aspects of science, but it doesn’t entirely explain how shifts to new ideas occur. Importantly, while it can identify what pseudoscience is, it tends to the relativistic...

Dr. Gordin suggests [...] “Any attempt to build a taxonomy of the many doctrines that have been labeled as ‘pseudoscientific’ reveals the impossibility of an internally consistent single definition of fringe science.”

Instead, he suggests that “pseudoscience is science’s shadow. Specifically, it is the shadow of professional science, and just as a shadow cannot exist without the object casting it, so does every object necessarily cast shadows.” These shadows, and there is more than one, can be treated as overlapping, but with certain tendencies that allow us to categorize them.

The multiple shadows of science. [...] First, he identifies the vestigial sciences. He describes these as: “…systems of thought that used to be considered sciences but that professional scientists have, over time, either gradually moved away from or actively excluded. The most well‐known are astrology and alchemy...”

[...] Next, he identifies the ideological fringes. These are the ideas that are “distortions of rational thinking in the service of a political ideology.” Famous examples include Nazi Deutsche Physik, Stalinist Michurinism, and the increasingly tortured arguments against climate science we see today.

After that is the mentalist fringe. Defined as focusing on “allegedly unrecognized or under-appreciated powers of mind,” this group includes a wide range of pseudoscience, from ESP to spiritualism. Importantly, this group overlaps with the vestigial group, as many ideas here were once considered scientific before better ideas came along.

Lastly, Dr. Gordin defines the controversy fringe. Categorized by “cases in which potentially path‐breaking work is published within the bounds of a science and is greeted with intense skepticism and debate, typically aired across the pages of professional journals,” items in this group can either become accepted, as was the case for quantum mechanics a century ago, or rejected and sent back to the fringe, as is the case for anybody who claims cold fusion has been invented yet.

So, according to this conception, something like astrology fits neatly into one category, while something like dialectic materialism — the Marxist theory of history — could fit within two: vestigial and ideological. Something like the search for Atlantis, the existence of which is a falsifiable hypothesis, would likely rest in the controversy group.

[...] One of the biggest takeaways of this is that pseudoscience isn’t one thing; it will change over time. ... Dr. Gordin suggests that, in certain ways, each category is critiquing mainstream science ... including that real science tends toward “abstruse jargon, excessive mathematization, and an impression that science is cliquish and resists engagement with outsiders,” and taking a moment to address them may help some people on the fringes find their way back to the center.

Dr. Gordin points out that many people know about the work of science, but not how it is done. “Demystifying those aspects of science [...] would at the very least educate neutral parties..."

Few people think they are conducting or subscribing to pseudoscience, Dr. Gordin argues. “… it is a significant point for reflection that all individuals who have been called 'pseudoscientists' have considered themselves to be 'scientists', with no prefix.”

[...] Dr. Gordin specifically rejects “belittling” advocates of pseudosciences, which he accuses Richard Feynman of having done, in favor of finding ways that the mainstream might better address the issues that drove people to the fringes in the first place.

[...] Pseudoscience has been around since the rise of modern science and is likely to endure in some form... (MORE - missing details)

[Yazata]

EXCERPTS: Despite increasing levels of technology and scientific literacy, it seems as if pseudoscience is more insane and pervasive than ever.

Is there really any credible evidence that "pseudoscience" (whatever that is) is "more insane and pervasive than ever"? I think that particular proposition is just bullshit.

But if these ideas are so clearly mistaken, why is it that so many people get sucked into them? ... In an essay on pseudoscience, historian of science Dr. Michael Gordin argues that we often think about the divide between real science and pseudoscience incorrectly.

Dr. Gordin has just published a book on the subject and this Bigthink article is probably marketing as part of his book tour.

https://global.oup.com/academic/product/...g=en&cc=us

Word of mouth suggests that it's a good book and I kind of want to read it. I'm not sure that I want to purchase a copy, but I might. Hopefully I can find it in a library or something.

While many great minds have attempted to draw a clear line between the scientific and the unscientific demarcation problem, the results of their efforts have been mixed...

Very much so. It's an ongoing question in the philosophy of science. (And no, I don't think that Popper was successful in answering it.)

Another concept ... is that of the paradigm shift, as described by Thomas Kuhn.

In one of the most over-rated books of its era. But Kuhn may or may not have been right in making the demarcation problem a largely sociological matter. "Science" is whatever the mainstream of "scientists" think it is at the moment. Which leaves most of the issues raised by "pseudoscience" and the demarcation problem untouched.

Dr. Gordin suggests [...] “Any attempt to build a taxonomy of the many doctrines that have been labeled as ‘pseudoscientific’ reveals the impossibility of an internally consistent single definition of fringe science.”

I think that's true. Although Gordin's use of the phrase "fringe science" seems to orient him towards Kuhn's sociological vision in which science is a sociological institution with insiders and outsiders. Which would make "fringe science" whatever sort of "science" that exists on the "fringe", ideas that the majority or the mainstream elite of science is leery of.

But certainly they might have a variety of not-always-consistent reasons for rejecting things, some of those reasons good, and others perhaps not so much.

Instead, he suggests that “pseudoscience is science’s shadow. Specifically, it is the shadow of professional science

Well sure. Use of the word "science" in "pseudoscience" seems to imply that. But... what if one of these "pseudosciences" didn't purport to be a "science". What if it just described itself as an intellectual inquiry into something that conventional science doesn't recognize?

I'm sensing a bit of scientistic imperialism that Gordin may or may not have intended and that may or may not exist in his book (that I haven't read). The idea that something can't be a legitimate intellectual inquiry unless it is a "science". The idea that "science" is the only sort of legitimate intellectual inquiry that there is.

So why can't people investigate ufos of whatever it is, or practice a Chalmersian sort of philosophy of mind, or be a historian (Gordin is a historian of science at Princeton) without being condemned as a "pseudoscientist"? What if they aren't pretending to be a "scientist" or to be practicing "science"? In those cases, what would justify use of the "pseudo-"? And what remains of Gordin's idea that "pseudoscience" is "science's" shadow?

The multiple shadows of science. [...] First, he identifies the vestigial sciences. He describes these as: “…systems of thought that used to be considered sciences but that professional scientists have, over time, either gradually moved away from or actively excluded. The most well‐known are astrology and alchemy...”

Yes, there's that. Except that I don't think that most astrologers today pretend to be scientists. They do delve into the body of astrological lore from past centuries. But my question for Gordin would be, if they aren't pretending to be scientists, why call them "pseudoscientists"? What makes that perjorative term applicable to them?

Next, he identifies the ideological fringes. These are the ideas that are “distortions of rational thinking in the service of a political ideology.” Famous examples include Nazi Deutsche Physik, Stalinist Michurinism, and the increasingly tortured arguments against climate science we see today.

That last is where his real interest lies, I'd wager. It might be one of the big things that motivated him to write his book.

I'm very much a "climate science" skeptic. (I still remember when meteorology as it was called then wasn't a political activism department in universities.) And from my skeptical position it really looks to me like "climate science" is indeed one of Gordin's "distortions of rational thinking in the service of a political ideology".

I think that I'm reasonably intelligent and I'm willing to compare my "rational thinking" on these matters with anyone. I don't pretend to be a scientist. I'm not "pseudo-ing" anything, I'm not a mere "shadow" of the one true intellectual legitimacy. I'm just expressing some doubts and asking what seem to me to be reasonable questions.

1. If the total mean global temperature has only risen 1.6 degrees C since the industrial revolution (their figures), then what justifies all the "extinction level event" rhetoric? All the alarmist imagery of the Earth in flames? It's such a small increase that most people probably haven't even noticed it in their lives and only know about it from propaganda. Do we really know how large future effects will be and whether they will even be all that terrible? All the predictions seem to be based on untested models (hugely complex computational fluid dynamics subject to all kinds of chaos). They seemingly ignore that a longer growing season and milder winters in Russia and Canada might be a good thing for huge areas.

2. If 2/3'ds of the increase since 1850 has happened since 1990 (their figures) and is very likely associated with the massive industrial development of China, then why all the emphasis on wholesale transformation of the societies and economies of the West (and not China, which is barely mentioned in the political social-change rhetoric)? "Climate science" really seems to me to be similar to what dialectical materialism was in the old Soviet Union, a supposedly factually unquestionable "scientific" justification for revolutionary social change. "Climate science" is joined at the hip to a utopian social change program, just as Hitler's Aryan science was and Stalin's Marxist genetics. Which returns us to Gordin's idea of ideological science, but perhaps not in the way he intended.

After that is the mentalist fringe. Defined as focusing on “allegedly unrecognized or under-appreciated powers of mind,” this group includes a wide range of pseudoscience, from ESP to spiritualism. Importantly, this group overlaps with the vestigial group, as many ideas here were once considered scientific before better ideas came along.

Lots of contemporary philosophy of mind probably belongs here. (That's you, David Chalmers and Frank Jackson.) "Mentalism" as he puts it is kind of the last redoubt of those who challenge the physicalist scientism that's so prevalent these days. While I don't agree with them, I do have some sympathy for them. I think that once again, the philosophy of mind asks important questions and is exceedingly rational, even if it isn't "science". (So the irrationality and the "pseudo-" jibes bounce off.)

And if laypeople choose to adopt an idealist ontology, what is the problem? Why are individual choices of fundamental philosophical assumptions so concerning and so intolerable to the self-styled "skeptics" who make it their mission in life to battle "pseudoscience"? What has become of the (increasingly threatened) fundamental liberal ideal of freedom-of-thought? Why has it become so important that everyone conform and think alike?   

Lastly, Dr. Gordin defines the controversy fringe. Categorized by “cases in which potentially path‐breaking work is published within the bounds of a science and is greeted with intense skepticism and debate, typically aired across the pages of professional journals,” items in this group can either become accepted, as was the case for quantum mechanics a century ago, or rejected and sent back to the fringe, as is the case for anybody who claims cold fusion has been invented yet.

That's where the sociological aspect appears once again. Does anyone really believe that a student would be accepted into a "climate science" doctoral program if he/she expressed skeptical questions about global warming? Could he or she graduate with a doctorate? Could he or she ever be hired anywhere? Would he or she ever gain tenure? Like the rest of life, you have to go along to get along. Which kind of makes a travesty of "professional consensus" and makes "fringe" ideas 'fringe' for reasons that might have little to do with their intellectual plausibility or evidencial backing.

So, according to this conception, something like astrology fits neatly into one category, while something like dialectic materialism — the Marxist theory of history — could fit within two: vestigial and ideological. Something like the search for Atlantis, the existence of which is a falsifiable hypothesis, would likely rest in the controversy group.

I'm skeptical about Gordin's categories. As the examples above suggest, there might be a bit of a square peg/round hole aspect to classifying everything that way. But I praise Gordin for at least trying.

One of the biggest takeaways of this is that pseudoscience isn't one thing

I'm not convinced that pseudoscience even exists in such a broad sense that a single descriptive account applies to all of its instances. And to his credit, Gordin starts his book by saying exactly that: "Pseudoscience is not a real thing". It seems to me (perhaps Gordin would disagree) to be whatever people who identify with science (many of them more likely to be political ideologues or the self-styled "skeptics" than actual scientists) don't like, want to ridicule and hope to exclude from public discussion..

Dr. Gordin suggests that, in certain ways, each category is critiquing mainstream science ... including that real science tends toward “abstruse jargon, excessive mathematization, and an impression that science is cliquish and resists engagement with outsiders,” and taking a moment to address them may help some people on the fringes find their way back to the center.

Well, if non-scientists are in no position to understand the science, then isn't the insistence that those laypeople believe in science's truth anyway, absent any understanding of it, just an authoritarian demand for faith? Isn't that precisely what the medieval and early modern churches are condemned for doing?

It makes me very uncomfortable to see science, which ideally is supposed to be an open-minded search for truth, being turned into a rhetorical instrument for authoritarianism and for unquestioning conformity and obedience. It's the worst perversion of something (science) that I've loved all my life.