A computer made of water and pipes

[Magical Realist]

"The Water Integrator (Russian: Гидравлический интегратор Gidravlicheskiy integrator) was an early analog computer built in the Soviet Union in 1936 by Vladimir Sergeevich Lukyanov.[1][2][3] It functioned by careful manipulation of water through a room full of interconnected pipes and pumps. The water level in various chambers (with precision to fractions of a millimeter) represented stored numbers, and the rate of flow between them represented mathematical operations. This machine was capable of solving inhomogeneous differential equations.[4]

The first versions of Lukyanov's integrators were rather experimental, made of tin and glass tubes, and each integrator could be used to solve only one problem. In the 1930s it was the only computer in the Soviet Union for solving partial differential equations.

In 1941, Lukyanov created a hydraulic integrator of modular design, which made it possible to assemble a machine for solving various problems. Two-dimensional and three-dimensional hydraulic integrators were designed.

In 1949–1955, an integrator in the form of standard unified units was developed at the NIISCHETMASH Institute. In 1955, the Ryazan plant of calculating and analytical machines began the serial production of integrators with the factory brand name “IGL” (russian: Интегратор Гидравлический Лукьянова - integrator of the Lukyanov hydraulic system). Integrators were widely distributed, delivered to Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria and China.

A water integrator was used in the design of the Karakum Canal in the 1940s, and the construction of the Baikal–Amur Mainline in the 1970s. Water analog computers were used in the Soviet Union until the 1980s for large-scale modelling. They were used in geology, mine construction, metallurgy, rocket production and other fields.

Currently, two hydraulic integrators are kept in the Polytechnic Museum in Moscow."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Water_integrator

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fluidics

[C C]

The hydraulic computer, a good example of functionalism; another being the clockwork mechanism kind of steampunk fame, à la Charles Babbage.
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Chris Eliasmith, Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind

functionalism - The view that the physical realization of a functional component is not, in some sense, its essence. Rather, what makes a functional component the type it is, is characterized in terms of its role in relating inputs to outputs and its relations to other functional components.

A popular way to pump the intuition that all that needs to be kept constant about a subject to keep the subject's mental properties constant is the set of causal relational properties of the subject is what has come to be known as "the silicon chip replacement" thought experiment.

Ned Block (1980) identifies three senses of functionalism.

The first is simple decompositional functionalism. 'Functionalism' in this sense refers to a research strategy that relies on the decomposition of a system into its components; the whole system is then explained in terms of these functional parts.

Second, computation-representation functionalism is a special case of decompositional functionalism which relies heavily on the 'computer-as-mind' analogy. Psychological explanation under computation-representation functionalism is "akin to providing a computer program for the mind" (Block 1980, p.171). Thus, mental processes are seen as being decomposable to a point where they can be thought of as processes which are as simple as those of a digital computer or, similarly, a Turing machine.

Lastly, Block identifies metaphysical functionalism. This form of functionalism is a theory of mind that hypothesizes that mental states simply are functional states. The metaphysical functionalist claims that mental states are the types of mental state they are because of the causal relations between inputs, outputs and other mental (i.e. functional) states of the system, as in the Turing machine. The physical implementation of the set of functions which implement a mind are irrelevant to what makes something a mind – it's the functional relations that count.

In general, proponents of each of these forms of functionalism make the claim that the physical realization of a given function is not, in some sense, its essence.

Metaphysical functionalism identifies causal structures with mental states which are realizable by "a vast variety of physical systems" (Block 1980, p. 173). Metaphysical functionalism often identifies mental states with Turing machine "table states" (Block 1980, p. 172).

Similarly, computation-representation functionalism holds that the information processing mechanism necessary to run the 'mind' program could be hydraulic, electric, mechanical, or whatever.

Lastly, decompositional functionalism is, superficially at least, more interested in the function of a system than the physical makeup of the system.

However, decompositional functionalism is seldom, if ever, completely divorced from the physical system it is used to explore. While it is true that in decompositional functionalism the function of the system being explored is often abstracted from its physical realization, it is also the case that that realization is continuously re-examined in order to better understand and characterize its function. Decomposition is not a simple matter of observing a system, noting the various functions, and constructing a model. It is a complex process that involves examining and re-examining and re-re-examining ad infinitum (or at least until the model is just about right) the original physical system. In other words, decomposition is severely constrained by the system being decomposed (Bechtel and Richardson 1993).

As a theory of mind, functionalism is quite appealing . It is based in mathematical proof and provides a means of constructing analogies to guide our understanding of the mind.

[Yazata]

A hydraultic computer! I've never heard of that, though it isn't entirely surprising. Like CC mentions, there are mechanical computers, from simple adding machines to Charles Babbage's Analytical Engine which was never completed (with programming by Ada Lovelace).

I'm inclined to think that one can make a computer out of anything capable of storing and transmitting information. (Whatever 'information' is.)

They have actually built biochemical computers out of nucleic acids like dna.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNA_computing

You know, it makes me wonder if human societies might behave like computers of a sort. Information certainly flows through them, they have memory and process the information in a whole variety of ways. They don't seem to have stored programs though. More like neural networks perhaps, with people playing the role of neurons. That has implications for things like Searle's 'Chinese Room' and for social ontology more generally.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_room

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/social-ontology/

[Magical Realist]

You know, it makes me wonder if human societies might behave like computers of a sort. Information certainly flows through them, they have memory and process the information in a whole variety of ways. They don't seem to have stored programs though.

That's an intriguing proposal. Perhaps the stored program, stored in the language and books and art and institutions and media of a society, is the particular culture of that society. An odd and somewhat contradictory hodge podge of interpretations and narratives that frames how we experience the world and relate to each other. As members of society we don't seem embedded in this program just as computers don't seem embedded in theirs. But all the values and ideas and principles and mores of our culture determine how we process new experiences, outputting synthesis that make up how we interact with the world as a whole. Each society runs on its own cultural program which shapes how it comes to grow and evolve in its own particular way.

“We seldom realize, for example that our most private thoughts and emotions are not actually our own. For we think in terms of languages and images which we did not invent, but which were given to us by our society.”
― Alan Watts