Jul 28, 2021 06:03 PM
(This post was last modified: Jul 28, 2021 06:36 PM by C C.)
https://iai.tv/articles/why-science-isnt..._auid=2020
EXCERPT: . . . The example above neatly sums up a general problem in thinking about science, politics and policy. Scientific advisors play a central role in policy-making. In the Covid-19 pandemic, UK government leaders have stressed that they are "following the science".
Given their power, it seems important scientists don't let their own political, ethical or economic values influence their advice. It would be deeply undemocratic if, as the Daily Mail implies, Susan Michie sneaked communism into policy via the backdoor of science advice. And that seems a valid concern even if communism is a good idea. On the other hand, scientists are, of course, humans with needs, wants, passions and interests. Can they avoid letting values influence their claims?
A large number of philosophers of science now say that’s impossible: scientific justification cannot be value-free. Note just how strong these claims are. There are lots of cases where scientists' ethical or political values have influenced their science. [...] However, the philosophers' worry isn't just that lots of "science" is influenced by values. It's not even that it is difficult to avoid having science influenced by values, or difficult to tell whether science is influenced by values, or that choices about what to research might reflect economic values.
Rather, it is that the very core of scientific justification must be influenced by values. There is no way at all of doing science which doesn't somehow prejudge or assume some ethical or political or economic viewpoint. [...] And what are the implications for the relationship between science and policy?
How much evidence that some claim is true should we require before saying that the claim has been justified? Perhaps the simplest and most powerful argument for an inescapable role for values in scientific justification appeals to "inductive risk". All scientific knowledge is inductive; strictly, it goes beyond our evidence.
[...] We face a problem: the authority of scientific experts seems to turn on the idea that they are objective; objectivity seems to require value freedom; but the problem of inductive risk seems to imply that all scientific justification is value-laden. On this response, inductive risk concerns aren’t really about science itself, but about how science is communicated. The problem is that scientists sometimes engage in sloppy talk, saying claims are true when they should say they are “X%” certain.
[...] One option is to find some way for scientists to avoid taking inductive risks; for example, rather than say "Covid-19 is airborne", running a risk of false positives, they could say "we are very certain that Covid-19 is airborne". This would leave policy-makers with a question of whether "very certain" is "certain enough", but at least the scientists could keep their hands clean. Indeed, there are cases where scientists do something like this...
Unfortunately, this strategy doesn’t work, because inductive risk problems arise throughout the scientific process, and not just when reporting. Consider the models used to predict the likely effects of different lockdown policies...
[...] scientists could, somehow, have avoided making any value-laden choices, say, by running multiple models and reporting all of their results. ... Still, even this approach involves making value-judgments, about which approaches are worth investigating, what is most important to know about, and so on...
[...] We are left, then, with two options: to deny the authority of science, or to change our image of objectivity. The first option is exciting, but risks throwing the baby out with the bathwater: even if climate science or epidemiology involves some value judgments, it seems better for climate scientists or epidemiologists to play a role in policy than to leave everything to unqualified talking-heads.
The second option, then, is to give up on the idea that objectivity is about the absence of values, and to say that it is about the presence of the right values. This proposal may seem worrying. How could we know what the right values are? Is there even any such thing as the "right" values? Haven’t we saved objectivity in science by entering into the even trickier area of objectivity in ethics?
[...] Fortunately, in the context of policy-advice, we can largely sidestep them. In a democracy, the "right" values just are democratic values, the values which shape our political system and which are shared by most of the people. As long as the values which shape scientific practice are consistent with these democratic values, then science can be objective.
[...] Of course, it isn’t easy or straightforward to make certain that the values which shape science are democratically legitimate. There's a fine line between respecting democratic values and pandering to the interests of the governing party. [...] you might be nervous: haven’t we replaced the idea of science as a trustworthy guide to the world with a notion that our values are a good guide? Maybe. Still, if we are to follow the science, and science must rest on some value judgments, we must make certain that the science, ultimately, follows us... (MORE - missing examples & details)
RELATED (scivillage): Med schools now denying sex + Stanford caters to myths of organic agriculture ...... On menthol cigarettes, social justice theory shouldn’t trump science
EXCERPT: . . . The example above neatly sums up a general problem in thinking about science, politics and policy. Scientific advisors play a central role in policy-making. In the Covid-19 pandemic, UK government leaders have stressed that they are "following the science".
Given their power, it seems important scientists don't let their own political, ethical or economic values influence their advice. It would be deeply undemocratic if, as the Daily Mail implies, Susan Michie sneaked communism into policy via the backdoor of science advice. And that seems a valid concern even if communism is a good idea. On the other hand, scientists are, of course, humans with needs, wants, passions and interests. Can they avoid letting values influence their claims?
A large number of philosophers of science now say that’s impossible: scientific justification cannot be value-free. Note just how strong these claims are. There are lots of cases where scientists' ethical or political values have influenced their science. [...] However, the philosophers' worry isn't just that lots of "science" is influenced by values. It's not even that it is difficult to avoid having science influenced by values, or difficult to tell whether science is influenced by values, or that choices about what to research might reflect economic values.
Rather, it is that the very core of scientific justification must be influenced by values. There is no way at all of doing science which doesn't somehow prejudge or assume some ethical or political or economic viewpoint. [...] And what are the implications for the relationship between science and policy?
How much evidence that some claim is true should we require before saying that the claim has been justified? Perhaps the simplest and most powerful argument for an inescapable role for values in scientific justification appeals to "inductive risk". All scientific knowledge is inductive; strictly, it goes beyond our evidence.
[...] We face a problem: the authority of scientific experts seems to turn on the idea that they are objective; objectivity seems to require value freedom; but the problem of inductive risk seems to imply that all scientific justification is value-laden. On this response, inductive risk concerns aren’t really about science itself, but about how science is communicated. The problem is that scientists sometimes engage in sloppy talk, saying claims are true when they should say they are “X%” certain.
[...] One option is to find some way for scientists to avoid taking inductive risks; for example, rather than say "Covid-19 is airborne", running a risk of false positives, they could say "we are very certain that Covid-19 is airborne". This would leave policy-makers with a question of whether "very certain" is "certain enough", but at least the scientists could keep their hands clean. Indeed, there are cases where scientists do something like this...
Unfortunately, this strategy doesn’t work, because inductive risk problems arise throughout the scientific process, and not just when reporting. Consider the models used to predict the likely effects of different lockdown policies...
[...] scientists could, somehow, have avoided making any value-laden choices, say, by running multiple models and reporting all of their results. ... Still, even this approach involves making value-judgments, about which approaches are worth investigating, what is most important to know about, and so on...
[...] We are left, then, with two options: to deny the authority of science, or to change our image of objectivity. The first option is exciting, but risks throwing the baby out with the bathwater: even if climate science or epidemiology involves some value judgments, it seems better for climate scientists or epidemiologists to play a role in policy than to leave everything to unqualified talking-heads.
The second option, then, is to give up on the idea that objectivity is about the absence of values, and to say that it is about the presence of the right values. This proposal may seem worrying. How could we know what the right values are? Is there even any such thing as the "right" values? Haven’t we saved objectivity in science by entering into the even trickier area of objectivity in ethics?
[...] Fortunately, in the context of policy-advice, we can largely sidestep them. In a democracy, the "right" values just are democratic values, the values which shape our political system and which are shared by most of the people. As long as the values which shape scientific practice are consistent with these democratic values, then science can be objective.
[...] Of course, it isn’t easy or straightforward to make certain that the values which shape science are democratically legitimate. There's a fine line between respecting democratic values and pandering to the interests of the governing party. [...] you might be nervous: haven’t we replaced the idea of science as a trustworthy guide to the world with a notion that our values are a good guide? Maybe. Still, if we are to follow the science, and science must rest on some value judgments, we must make certain that the science, ultimately, follows us... (MORE - missing examples & details)
RELATED (scivillage): Med schools now denying sex + Stanford caters to myths of organic agriculture ...... On menthol cigarettes, social justice theory shouldn’t trump science
