All that can be known of Quantum particles is the probability of where they might be

[Ostronomos]

This mysterious nature of material objects (namely quantum particles) suggests that the material world is an illusion. A chimera. As all matter was shown to have wave-like properties (first by De Broglie) this becomes an undeniable fact.

Hence the people who "died" on 9/11 are still alive at some place elsewhere at some time in some other form, could be another universe I don't know. This is just wild speculation.

When Max Born re-interpreted Schroedinger's equation to reflect the fact that it is not the quantum particles that spread out in space over time but the probability of locating them in specific locations this had tremendous implications and ramifications. For one thing it clearly illustrated the fact that the microscopic world was unlike the world we see around us. In the 21st century there has been a paradigm shift in recent years that extend the concept of the wavefunction to imply that there exists a mind behind the material world. Can anyone elaborate on this fact?

[Zinjanthropos]

One thing I always wanted to ask....if our brain is already misinterpreting reality, then how does being under the influence of drugs, that further skew the aforementioned altered view, suddenly make things clear? I think to answer that would solve an even greater mystery.

[C C]

As artificial ontology becomes more technologically sophisticated and advanced over time in the course of working out its problems, some of those strategies will doubtless be reflected back on our own situation (perhaps even usefully, rather than just fueling speculation).

An advanced, simulated reality like The Matrix could not computationally maintain the countless affairs of the micro-level, which only certain researchers and their devices/experiments would ever be observing/detecting, anyway. The apparatus would rely on statistical probability, generative principles slash placeholder concepts/forms, and the coherence rescues of patchwork rules to output, on-the-fly, the likelihood of what an intruding perceptual agent should see. This would also include most of the distant macroscopic world being background props and facade, until encroached upon by terrestrial explorers, telescopes and probes. The novel Simulacron-3 tentatively dealt with these issues way back in 1964.

Sans its residents literally having correlate bodies resting in umbilical pods of a supercendent level, the whole simulation might even be temporarily shut-down on occasion until heavy processing in a "region of trouble" was completed, and thereby yield no missing gaps in the population's personal memories. An individual's life would still seem to be continuous (barring dreamless sleep), unaware of an interruption, a hiatus of the world in suspension.

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One thing I always wanted to ask....if our brain is already misinterpreting reality, then how does being under the influence of drugs that further skew the aforementioned altered view, suddenly make things clear? I think to answer that would solve an even greater mystery.

Neurotheology. If everything starts feeling equally meaningful due to drug experiences or certain kinds of seizures either disabling survival differentiators in the brain or excessively reinforcing them, then that could be interpreted as a revelation of some kind (especially in ancient times). A lucidity that all things are connected, subsumed by one identity (how William James once conceived "monism" and block-universe).[1]

V.S. RAMACHANDRAN: Everything seems suffused with meaning. The patient will say, "Finally I see what it's really about, Doctor. I really understand God. I understand my place in the universe, in the cosmic scheme."

[...A...] possibility is that this is something to do with the way in which the temporal lobes are wired up to deal with the world emotionally. As we walk around and interact with the world, you need some way of determining what's important, what's emotionally salient and what's relevant to you versus something trivial and unimportant.

[...] The strength of these connections is what determines how emotionally salient something is. And therefore, you could speak of a sort of emotional salience landscape, with hills and valleys corresponding to what's important and what's not important. And each of us has a slightly different emotional salience landscape.

Now, consider what happens in temporal lobe epilepsy when you have repeated seizures. What might be going on is an indiscriminate strengthening of all these pathways. It's a bit like water flowing down rivulets along the cliff surface. When it rains repeatedly there's an increasing tendency for the water to make furrows along one pathway and this progressive deepening of the furrows artificially raises the emotional significance of some categories of inputs.

So instead of just finding lions and tigers and mothers emotionally salient, he finds everything deeply salient. For example, a grain of sand, a piece of driftwood, seaweed, all of this becomes imbued with deep significance. Now, this tendency to ascribe cosmic significance to everything around you might be akin to what we call a mystical experience or a religious experience.

[...] A few years ago, the popular press inaccurately quoted me as having claimed that there is a God center or a "G-spot" in the temporal lobes. Now, this is complete nonsense. There is no specific area in the temporal lobe concerned with God [in contrast to multiple regions and processes contingently contributing].

[...] Just because some patients ... have intense religious experiences, this does not in any way invalidate that experience for that patient. In fact, it can very often enrich the patient's life enormously. --Secrets of the Mind (PBS), transcript-2001

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[1] Wayne Viney and Madisson Mullen: . . . William James was also an ontological pluralist. He coined the term multiverse in 1895; a term that 120 years later is increasingly employed by physicists and astronomers. He argued that, according to his pluralistic vision, there are real beginnings, real endings, real crises—many “reals”. His quarrel with monistic perspectives is that they close accounts with reality prematurely and that, compared with pluralism, they are more likely to result in absolutism. He repeatedly expressed his disdain for absolutism.

In a letter to Charles Renouvier in 1883 he asked “Why does the Absolute Unity make its votaries so much more conceited at having attained it, than any other supposed truth does?”. In The Principles of Psychology, James (1890/1981) referred to absolutism as “the great disease of philosophic thought” (p. 334).

James returns to the problem of intimacy in relation to monistic and pluralistic views. Superficially, monistic philosophies, compared with pluralism, appear to result in more intimate relations among things. If everything is part of one thing, then how can anything be really foreign, irrelevant, trivial, or secondary? In The Will to Believe, James speculated that idealism “gives to the nature of things such kinship with our own personal selves … There is no radically alien corner, but an all-pervading intimacy”.

But in his more mature philosophy he came to the conclusion that intimacy depends upon some degree of externality and otherness. He noted that “The whole question of how ‘one’ thing can know ‘another’ would cease to be a real one at all in a world where otherness itself was an illusion”. Intimacy, from a pluralistic perspective, has its birth in the experience of the self as an agent who initiates activity, genuinely participates in the ongoing stream of events, and enjoys reciprocity.

In a world that is foredone, monistic absolutism allows for integral but not intimate relations among things. James argues that monistic absolutism implies a block universe, a world without a history, with no possibilities, with a fixed future. It is also a world devoid of genuine subjects. Pluralism, with its recognition of otherness, allows for authentic and intimate subject-object and subject-subject relations and for a biophilic mutuality that embraces other subjects and objects but avoids absorption or self-destroying engrossment.

[Zinjanthropos]

I’m ok with my sober view somewhat of an illusion but I can’t accept that being wasted produces clarity.