Growing Neanderthal brains + Can Integrated Information Theory explain consciousnes?

[C C]

Scientists to grow 'mini-brains' using Neanderthal DNA
https://www.theguardian.com/science/2018...erthal-dna

EXCERPT: Scientists are preparing to create “miniature brains” that have been genetically engineered to contain Neanderthal DNA, in an unprecedented attempt to understand how humans differ from our closest relatives. In the next few months the small blobs of tissue, known as brain organoids, will be grown from human stem cells that have been edited to contain “Neanderthalised” versions of several genes. The lentil-sized organoids, which are incapable of thoughts or feelings, replicate some of the basic structures of an adult brain. They could demonstrate for the first time if there were meaningful differences between human and Neanderthal brain biology....

MORE: https://www.theguardian.com/science/2018...erthal-dna

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Can *Integrated Information Theory* Explain Consciousness?
https://theconversation.com/why-we-need-...ness-93146

EXCERPT: . . . Recently, “Integrated Information Theory” has been gaining attention – and the backing of some eminent neuroscientists. It says that absolutely every physical object has some (even if extremely low) level of consciousness. Some backers of the theory claim to have a mathematical formula that can measure the consciousness of anything – even your iPhone.

[...] to some extent, we have been able to test it. In one experiment, for example, researchers looked at brain responses to a short pulse of “transcranial magnetic stimulation”, in which a magnetic coil is placed on top of the scalp, and a very brief pulse of magnetic field emitted. The response was recorded from electrodes at locations all over the rest of the scalp. When fully awake, the response to the little burst of magnetic field would spread far and wide, in complex patterns of ripples. But when participants were in deep sleep, or under general anaesthesia, the response did not spread very far from the magnet, and the shapes of the ripples were much more simple. These results support the theory. They demonstrate that when we’re conscious, each region of the brain is doing something different, but are all managing to communicate.

So far so good. But it would be great to go further than this. Hence the attempt to find a formula that can give us a precise “level of consciousness” from detailed data. It is here that the serious controversy begins....

MORE: https://theconversation.com/why-we-need-...ness-93146

[Magical Realist]

"At the end of her piece, Goldhill quotes Chalmers quoting the philosopher John Perry who says: “If you think about consciousness long enough, you either become a panpsychist or you go into administration.”

https://neurobanter.com/2018/02/01/consc...npsychism/

[C C]

"At the end of her piece, Goldhill quotes Chalmers quoting the philosopher John Perry who says: “If you think about consciousness long enough, you either become a panpsychist or you go into administration.”

https://neurobanter.com/2018/02/01/consc...npsychism/

If it's descended partly from the Arthur Eddington school of thought, then this "intrinsic nature of matter" view that several philosophers sport is probably a form of panexperientialism. (Pan-phenomenalism might be better, just to shirk any notion of cognition or intellect accompanying it.) Usually it seems to depend upon physicalism being construed as an epistemological construct -- like a map of outer mechanistic relationships or "causal structure". Thereby being a descriptive placeholder for what can't be addressed internally (what non-represented existence is to itself). Rather than the extreme of physicalism being an appeal to a metaphysical substance or metempirical reality (beyond experience). The "panpsychism" aspect doesn't have to feature the "universe is fine-tuned for life" stuff that Philip Goff adds to it.

Despite the ring of yet another "metaphysical realism" dogma below [structural realism], the emphasis on knowledge suggests that it's just a practical orientation. (Foggy memory -- been a long time since I read that whole SEP entry.)

James Ladyman: Peter Unger also argues that our knowledge of the world is purely structural and that qualia are the non-structural components of reality. [Frank] Jackson argues that science only reveals the causal / relational properties of physical objects, and that “we know next to nothing about the intrinsic nature of the world. We know only its causal cum relational nature”. Langton argues that science only reveals the extrinsic properties of physical objects, and both then argue that their intrinsic natures, and hence the intrinsic nature of the world, are epistemically inaccessible. Jackson points out that this inference can be blocked if the natures of objects and their intrinsic properties are identified with their relational or extrinsic properties, but argues that this makes a mystery of what it is that stands in the causal relations. --Structural-Realism#KanESR . . . SEP

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[Ostronomos]

"At the end of her piece, Goldhill quotes Chalmers quoting the philosopher John Perry who says: “If you think about consciousness long enough, you either become a panpsychist or you go into administration.”

https://neurobanter.com/2018/02/01/consc...npsychism/

If it's descended partly from the Arthur Eddington school of thought, then this "intrinsic nature of matter" view that several philosophers sport is probably a form of panexperientialism. (Pan-phenomenalism might be better, just to shirk any notion of cognition or intellect accompanying it.) Usually it seems to depend upon physicalism being construed as an epistemological construct -- like a map of outer mechanistic relationships or "causal structure". Thereby being a descriptive placeholder for what can't be addressed internally (what non-represented existence is to itself). Rather than the extreme of physicalism being an appeal to a metaphysical substance or metempirical reality (beyond experience). The "panpsychism" aspect doesn't have to feature the "universe is fine-tuned for life" stuff that Philip Goff adds to it.

Despite the ring of yet another "metaphysical realism" dogma below [structural realism], the emphasis on knowledge suggests that it's just a practical orientation. (Foggy memory -- been a long time since I read that whole SEP entry.)

James Ladyman: Peter Unger also argues that our knowledge of the world is purely structural and that qualia are the non-structural components of reality. [Frank] Jackson argues that science only reveals the causal / relational properties of physical objects, and that “we know next to nothing about the intrinsic nature of the world. We know only its causal cum relational nature”. Langton argues that science only reveals the extrinsic properties of physical objects, and both then argue that their intrinsic natures, and hence the intrinsic nature of the world, are epistemically inaccessible. Jackson points out that this inference can be blocked if the natures of objects and their intrinsic properties are identified with their relational or extrinsic properties, but argues that this makes a mystery of what it is that stands in the causal relations. --Structural-Realism#KanESR . . . SEP

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YOU ARE THE PRIME CHARACTER AND NATURE OF THE UNIVERSE! The universe carries a description that is isomorphic to your identity and the syntactic structure of itself. The concept of syntax in the CTMU is used in relation to reality and syntactic operators are self-aware elements of reality that carry physical information. Both between and inclusive of the brain. Reality as a whole can be viewed as a self-aware syntactic system in which everything is conscious to some level, hence panpsychism.