Does superdeterminism save QM? Or does it kill free will and destroy science?

[C C]

I'm starting to lose the will to live with this thread.

I've been too busy to with holiday preparations to catch up with what's specifically transpiring here and on the forum at large, but your comment reminds me of this...

"That's the circus that incompatibilists create (hard determinists, libertarians, and hard incompatibilists). FW can't be reconciled with determinism, FW can't be reconciled with indeterminism, etc -- blah-blah back and forth."

Incompatibilists hilariously obstruct each other in various ways, ensuring as a side-benefit that they never become compatibilists. It's reminiscent of crab mentality. FW remains sweet and vulnerable to all Big Bad Wolves, and that battlefield of antics they generate with respect to FW keeps going on perpetually.

But they also have to agree on some things. For instance, a libertarian will agree with a hard determinist like Jerry Coyne below that compatibilism is semantics, or whatever the specific "get your ass back down here in the bucket" crab platitude of the day is.

Jerry Coyne: Indeed, [John Stewart] Bell himself believed in libertarian, you-could-have-chosen-otherwise free will, while Einstein, a hardnosed determinist, didn't.

As I've reported before, physicist, atheist, and Nobbel Laureate Steve Weinberg also believed in libertarian free will. He sat next to me at the Moving Naturalism Forward meeting in Stockbridge, MA several years ago, and after I gave my spiel on the nonexistence of libertarian free will, Weinberg told me that he didn't accept that his behaviors were determined by the laws of physics.

What I find fascinating is that physicists were conditioning their ideas and research directions on a philosophical belief that humans must have libertarian free will. Perhaps that impeded the ideas of superdeterminism.

[...] I'm with Hossenfelder in our rejection of libertarian free will, which is the most common view of free will. I don't give a hoot about compatibilism, which I see as a matter of semantics that is far less relevant than accepting the implications that pure naturalism including any quantum indeterminism has for society and for human behavior.

Happy hols. all.

Likewise. You and everybody else have a merry, whatever you want to call it tomorrow and arguably till after New Year's.

[Syne]

"That's the circus that incompatibilists create (hard determinists, libertarians, and hard incompatibilists). FW can't be reconciled with determinism, FW can't be reconciled with indeterminism, etc -- blah-blah back and forth."

Incompatibilists hilariously obstruct each other in various ways, ensuring as a side-benefit that they never become compatibilists. It's reminiscent of crab mentality. FW remains sweet and vulnerable to all Big Bad Wolves, and that battlefield of antics they generate with respect to FW keeps going on perpetually.

The problem is that everyone is essentially an incompatibilist. Compatibilists (soft determinists) just fool themselves into thinking semantic games (Kant described as "wretched subterfuge" and "word jugglery"), that make free will completely inert, somehow mean they are not giving determinism complete priority. In that sense, obstructing others is at least more intellectually honesty than obliviously obstructing oneself. And there are even brands of compatibilism and incompatibilism that are, themselves, compatible.

But they also have to agree on some things. For instance, a libertarian will agree with a hard determinist like Jerry Coyne below that compatibilism is semantics, or whatever the specific "get your ass back down here in the bucket" crab platitude of the day is.

Notice how you have no justification for the semantic games other than deriding incompatibilists.

Jerry Coyne: Indeed, [John Stewart] Bell himself believed in libertarian, you-could-have-chosen-otherwise free will, while Einstein, a hardnosed determinist, didn't.

As I've reported before, physicist, atheist, and Nobbel Laureate Steve Weinberg also believed in libertarian free will. He sat next to me at the Moving Naturalism Forward meeting in Stockbridge, MA several years ago, and after I gave my spiel on the nonexistence of libertarian free will, Weinberg told me that he didn't accept that his behaviors were determined by the laws of physics.

What I find fascinating is that physicists were conditioning their ideas and research directions on a philosophical belief that humans must have libertarian free will. Perhaps that impeded the ideas of superdeterminism.

[...] I'm with Hossenfelder in our rejection of libertarian free will, which is the most common view of free will. I don't give a hoot about compatibilism, which I see as a matter of semantics that is far less relevant than accepting the implications that pure naturalism including any quantum indeterminism has for society and for human behavior.

Superdeterminism is no less a philosophical belief than free will. There is no evidence that weighs decidedly in favor of superdeterminism. But maybe the same denial that refuses to see the semantic games equally rejects the intellectual honesty to admit as much.