Scivillage.com Casual Discussion Science Forum

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(Feb 15, 2021 06:51 PM)Yazata Wrote: [ -> ]When I say that I freely chose to do X, I mean that I did it because I wanted to, not as the result of any coercion external to myself. The idea of free will doesn't require totally uncaused events. Freely chosen actions aren't random convulsions. It's actions taken as the result of my own intentions and desires. So in order to save free will, one needn't deny causation, but require instead that the causation be of a suitable sort. (Internal-psychological, as opposed to external-coercive.)

I did X because it was my will and intention to do it. Why did I intend to do X? Because I had certain desires and goals. Because I understood my situation in such and such a way. Still consistent with local causality of the game of life sort. I think that if somebody freely acts, a suitably knowledgeable neuroscientist could probably predict very accurately (probably not with today's state-of-the-art, but in principle) what that action would be from observing the person's brain states milliseconds earlier. That does no harm to the idea of free will. The idea of free-will actually depends on it, since I did X because I wanted to, not for no reason at all.

[...] Free will means actions determined by the actor's will. Which in turn is determined by the actor's intentions, understanding, desires and all that. So free-will is not only consistent with local determinism, it requires it.

Yah, having regularities and being potentially predictable (in theory) goes hand-in-hand with being a systemic entity (organism) in the first place, as opposed to being a jumble of elements or someone who is deeply insane in an irrational and irregular behavior context.

The pattern-following, background universe and regional environment necessarily established who I am in terms of my identity and propensities or "personal programming". So both the past and continuing configurations of such can't arbitrarily and suddenly be jettisoned after birth or upon adulthood as no longer mattering for the choices I make or am confined to. Granting that such past world states could be captured as single, all-encompassing snapshots devoid of loose ends with respect to relative and perspectival conditions, for prediction/computational purposes, which I doubt...

Quote:Perhaps the key to the free-will problem is this proposition: The longer a causal chain, the less deterministic it is. There's still causation linking each step, but even if we know the state of the universe at time A with all the precision possible given uncertainty constraints, we still won't be able to predict the state of the universe at temporally distant time B with any precision at all.

An introduction of slight randomness (gradually building up from the subatomic level) would at least modestly derail the rule-following or calculable nature of an unfolding cosmic process. So as to make long-term, specific predictions about life-form activity unreliable or impossible. But OTOH, a heavy degree of events not conforming to any pattern would be just as much an "outsider" invasively disrupting a decision-making system as an extraneous force manipulating it that was governed by laws.

Quote:To get from there to free will, think about what you mean when you use the phrase.

Especially since it seems pretty much just a word game or semantics wrangling. For me, there seems to be little point in having a view of free will (FW) that is vulnerable to this or that ontological option, even if the latter can never be conclusively confirmed or denied (i.e., that barrier hasn't stopped people from endorsing and promoting _X_ metaphysical option for centuries). That's why I tend toward either compatibilism or practical definitions of FW (as opposed to metaphysically laden ones).

Due to favoring the consequences like either rejecting FW or rejecting determinism itself, an "active" incompatibilist is motivated beforehand to select or create meanings of free will that are a fail right out of the starting gate when conflated with determinism or a settled existence slash future. Whereas the "passive" incompatibilist simply accepts the existing reasoning of incompatibilism and its definitions of FW -- only acquiring the label afterwards, or arrives there on one's own (minus outer influences) working from the appearance of an impartial orientation (whether that's actually the case or not).

Similar with the compatibilist, but with inverted plug-ins; also either motivated beforehand or passively arriving.

In practical venue, I see two flavors of free will:

First is FW as becomes a concern in legal environments. Essentially a person being allowed to adhere to their usual programming, inclinations, and choice-making without interference or coercion from other autonomous, deliberating agencies. It is an intermittent status, not an absolute or constantly applicable one. (Despite being an internal condition, insanity might be contended to be a kind of non-agent interloper, since it is typically uninvited beforehand by the afflicted.)

Second is the concept of "free will" itself as acquired and utilized by an individual to break out of their usual habits, programming, or patterns of behaving and thinking. Such a thought orientation inspires changes in one's life that otherwise would not have occurred (in contrast to say, viewing one's self as a machine following predictable routines or an organism stuck in inherent ruts and aims).

Quote:What does do harm to the idea of free will is the assertion that a suitably knowledgeable scientist could predict the person's actions today from perfect knowledge of the person's brain-states years earlier along with suitably precise descriptions of the person's environment at that time. That kind of knowledge might give us some idea of the range of actions that will be likely at the later date, given the person's broad personality and what their likely environmental situation might be in the future, but the linkage between A and B will be far looser than the linkage between actions and brain states milliseconds earlier.

[...] What free-will is in conflict with is non-local determinism. The idea that the actor's actions weren't the result of the actor's intentions and will, but rather were already determined by the state of the rest of the universe long before the actor ever chose to act

I'm perhaps less worried about the grand scale, due again to wanting a view of FW that is unaffected by ontological possibilities, including a settled existence (block universe).

For instance, even if there was a major occurrence at macroscopic level in the present that authorities assert was genuinely "random", it's still going to be classifiable as that once it becomes part of the fixed past, because there is no pattern it belongs to and no principle or law that can slot it as falling out of calculations. Unpredictability is likewise not dependent upon an unsettled future or a future that doesn't exist yet.

Not that I deem "indeterminism" as deeply essential to FW, since as mentioned before too much randomness could actually disrupt one's normal decision-making, not unlike a thug holding a gun coercing a person to do something against their will. I'm referencing it in the context of "settled existence" (in contrast to the universe as an unfolding process of ephemeral moments or states) purely for the sake of those who feel that random events (those not conforming to a pattern or rule) are essential to FW.

(Feb 16, 2021 05:20 PM)Secular Sanity Wrote: [ -> ]He’s searching for physical evidence for indeterminism because physicalism is the monistic framework within which causality is understood by most scientists and philosophers.

He's referring to the information of a physical system. He goes on in his book "The Neural Basis of Free Will," about energy and phase relationships, neural decoding, receptor cells, the Jennifer Aniston neuron, the working memory and so on.

[...] Do you think that Clive Wearing, the man with no short-term memory, when offered two foods that he equally likes, would choose the same thing over and over again?

[...] https://youtu.be/T80wIGZSYoc

In his review of Tse's book [footnote excerpt & link at bottom], Stephen L. Macknik portrays lack of free will as doing the same thing over and over again. Unless something random intervenes during a hypothetical repeat of the universe's history with the same initial state -- in this case quantum effects on chemical neural receptors introducing alterations.

But I'm afraid I don't get it, since even if there were only changes at the atomic/subatomic level it still means a slightly different version of the universe is running in these speculative scenarios. As well as a different version of the person of interest if the microscopic differences occur in the latter's brain. Such depictions seem to really be about parallel universe issues wrapped up free-will clothing. Each instance demonstrates what [eventually] slightly tweaked individual _Y_ will do in [eventually] slightly tweaked universe _Z_ according to the identity configuration they start with. Which is the same circumstance applicable to the original world, sans the tweaks.

Macknick also refers to "the universe conspired from its very inception to bring" about a social interaction. This is projecting anthropic characteristics upon a mindless realm similar to the "personification equivocation" that Robert C. Bishop points out in his critique of Tse's work, or the ambiguity he accuses him of indulging in numerous times (if that's the case):

"Tse uses the language of persons while his intended referent is neurons and brains. This is explicit in his Mozart example, where we have language applicable to Mozart as a person, but an identification of Mozart with a brain. Let's call this the personification equivocation."

At any rate, it doesn't enlighten me on how indeterminism is the gospel factor for free will that so many feel it is. If "amplified" random occurrences occasionally contribute to selection in a brain process, then that could arguably be considered an erratic, native or internal characteristic -- like the other governed, non-random operations transpiring in the individual's body that imparts to the person's behavior and who they are, rather than an invader hijacking the executive organ.

When they decide to pick a rose, that becomes a fixed event in the past or the overall timeline of their life (and a choice their body's functioning is responsible for, not the mindless universe at large). If contended that it could have been a different choice due to a different option randomly triggered by a receptor, then that's imaginatively and counterfactually switching to a different person slash different universe and its own timeline (even if the differences are miniscule or lacking up to that key point of change).

- - - footnote - - -

{*} Stephen L. Macknik (SciAm): If our universe is deterministic in this way there can be no free will because you were destined to make that same decision—every single one of your decisions—from the very moment of the big bang. It’s not that you don’t make decisions: you do. But you’ll make them the same exact way in two different universes that have identical big bangs. It means that the universe conspired from its very inception to bring you and your significant other together. It’s quite romantic, actually, so long as you’ve been fortunate enough to have a nice life. But if not, you’re truly screwed, and the universe has been literally plotting your demise for the last 14 billion years.

For some physicists, these issues are not really issues at all because the universe, they claim, is not deterministic. That is to say, quantum level effects on particles are truly random. Therefore, the same big bang, if it occurred twice in two different universes made up of exactly the same particles having identical initial vectors would result nevertheless in different futures, because quantum level random effects change things up. Other physicists, including Stephen Hawking, poo-poo the quantum gambit...

So the universe is either deterministic or non-deterministic, and your free will to choose the red versus the green sauce for your burrito hangs in the balance. [...] Not so fast. Enter Dartmouth neuroscientist Peter Tse, who has found a middle ground in his new book “The Neural Correlates of Free Will: Critical Causation” (MIT Press). Tse has thought through this enormous problem and realized something important that brings free will back to the realm of the living. Remember that determinism is an unavoidable fact of the universe at the macroscopic but not the quantum level. Well what if the macroscopic universe is not deterministic because the brain is designed to amplify quantum level particle effects to the macroscopic level through the action of specialized neuronal channels that make decisions potentially truly stochastic?

[...] There are chemical receptors on most neurons that receive neurotransmitters (globs of chemicals secreted by other neurons), that then respond by opening ion channels, causing neurons to create neutral impulses (aka: macroscopic real world events normal people call “brain activity”, or “thought”). Well, in a deterministic universe… so what? You could have predicted every idea I’ve ever had, before my birth, if had enough data about the universe. Right?

Tse says no, because some chemical receptors, called NMDA receptors, are actually blocked by a single atom of magnesium, that must first be released before ions can flow to cause brain activity. Because macroscopic brain activity is therefore dependent on the position of a single atom, which is itself a quantum-level creature, it means that these neurons amplify the quantum level activity of the magnesium atom to the level of neural circuit behavior and real life. Thus our behavior is indeed subject to quantum effects and the universe cannot be deterministic.

Can’t help but think of all those millions upon millions of sperm that I’ve produced in my lifetime that didn’t make it to an egg. Somehow two did. For sperm it’s a crapshoot, no idea why I needed so many for two kids when all I needed was the determined pair that made it. Seems like a good waste of biological material and energy drained from my system. Poor little buggers that didn’t succeed might as well not have been there but it was determined two would be successful for reasons no one can explain. Just not sure if it was determined two would get through or that this particular pair were determined at the BB. Can I say both?

(Feb 17, 2021 03:45 AM)C C Wrote: [ -> ]Tse says no, because some chemical receptors, called NMDA receptors, are actually blocked by a single atom of magnesium, that must first be released before ions can flow to cause brain activity. Because macroscopic brain activity is therefore dependent on the position of a single atom, which is itself a quantum-level creature, it means that these neurons amplify the quantum level activity of the magnesium atom to the level of neural circuit behavior and real life. Thus our behavior is indeed subject to quantum effects and the universe cannot be deterministic.[/color]

Peter Tse – What is information

Yeah, but like Jerry Coyne and others points out, even if there were quantum effects affecting our actions that still doesn’t give us the kind of agency that we want for free will. We’re not longing for randomly generated choices. What we all want is contra-causal free will, which technically, if you think about, would make us like gods. If our decisions are realized by our brains and bodies, operating in a physical context then we’re subject to the laws of physics. Anything beyond this would be supernatural. We would be an uncaused causer.

It's such an odd human longing, isn’t it, C C? On one hand, we want to be part of something bigger than us and (meant to be), but on the other hand, we want to be free from it.
Well, you can’t have your cake and eat it, too.

BTW, maybe we should send Yazata some Kleenex, eh? 

https://quillette.com/2019/07/17/why-we-...m-edwards/

(Feb 17, 2021 04:25 PM)Secular Sanity Wrote: [ -> ]

(Feb 17, 2021 03:45 AM)C C Wrote: [ -> ]Tse says no, because some chemical receptors, called NMDA receptors, are actually blocked by a single atom of magnesium, that must first be released before ions can flow to cause brain activity. Because macroscopic brain activity is therefore dependent on the position of a single atom, which is itself a quantum-level creature, it means that these neurons amplify the quantum level activity of the magnesium atom to the level of neural circuit behavior and real life. Thus our behavior is indeed subject to quantum effects and the universe cannot be deterministic.[/color]

Peter Tse – What is information

Yeah, but like Jerry Coyne and others points out, even if there were quantum effects affecting our actions that still doesn’t give us the kind of agency that we want for free will. We’re not longing for randomly generated choices. What we all want is contra-causal free will, which technically, if you think about, would make us like gods. If our decisions are realized by our brains and bodies, operating in a physical context then we’re subject to the laws of physics. Anything beyond this would be supernatural. We would be an uncaused causer.

It's such an odd human longing, isn’t it, C C? On one hand, we want to be part of something bigger than us and (meant to be), but on the other hand, we want to be free from it.
Well, you can’t have your cake and eat it, too.

It's naive to think it is either a solely determined or a solely random situation. As our physical world demonstrates, both are equally necessary. The macro world of physically determined cause and effect does not exist without the micro world of quantum randomness, but nor is the former reducible to the latter. Even if we assume that memory is a large factor in motivation, the long-term potentiation of neural synapses is strengthened by activity. That activity is neither solely determined by external factors nor solely determined by internal factors or quantum randomness. External stimuli, like trauma, is also likely to reduce synaptic efficacy, and internal stimuli, like imagining playing piano, is neither random nor externally motivated, but strengthens synaptic activity to cause synaptic and, by extension, more general neural plasticity.

The external world provides both physical limitations and readily available choices, and the internal quantum randomness provides an even greater scope of potential choice. But behavior is not random, nor can it be predicted in a determinant fashion. Now, you may wish to presume that the balance between these two is, itself, random, but then the resulting behavior would tend toward randomness, where actual behavior largely remains consistent with an individual's history and personality. In order to reconcile that with both physical determinism and quantum randomness, you have to postulate a Maxwell's demon to mediate the input from the two to explicitly minimize the randomness/entropy in favor of more order.

And like Maxwell's demon, the only way to reconcile that with physical law is to include the demon in the calculation of the overall entropy. That would suggest that such a demon, or the will in this case, is necessary according to physics. Now, you may not like that something exists that cannot currently be addressed by science, but most scientists accept things like dark energy without batting an eye, even though we can only infer their existence without any ability to demonstrate how they operate. We do not presume that dark energy is supernatural, so it seems arbitrary to presume free will so.

If anyone claimed that the accelerating expansion of space, which violates all known laws of physics, could only be supernatural, you would call that person superstitious, at best. Well, the same thing goes for dismissing free will as supernatural because it seems to violate known physics. That makes you the superstitious one.

Considering the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum physics, which prioritizes the observer as a causal factor in physical wave function collapse, it really shouldn't be all that hard to imagine the observer, and the will of when to make a measurement, as being causative within it's own mind. In order to avoid that interpretation, we are forced to postulate increasingly less parsimonious and less demonstrable things like multiverses. It seems it takes a whole lot more faith to believe the unevidenced notion that every moment splits off into a new, independent universe than to believe that an observer who, by all appearance, collapses quantum possibilities into concrete reality by simple choice could also collapse the quantum potentials in the brain to effectuate choice.

(Feb 17, 2021 02:00 PM)Zinjanthropos Wrote: [ -> ]Can’t help but think of all those millions upon millions of sperm that I’ve produced in my lifetime that didn’t make it to an egg. Somehow two did. For sperm it’s a crapshoot, no idea why I needed so many for two kids when all I needed was the determined pair that made it. Seems like a good waste of biological material and energy drained from my system. Poor little buggers that didn’t succeed might as well not have been there but it was determined two would be successful for reasons no one can explain. Just not sure if it was determined two would get through or that this particular pair were determined at the BB. Can I say both?

Given how superfluous absolute determinists consider all the mediating agencies between their proposed "initial configuration" and the "complicated specifics" of later stages to be in terms of responsibility (including the human body), it could make one feel sarcastic about the need for numbers.

Quantity is enabling. A unique, life-bearing planet like Earth is made possible by countless dead worlds.

The most basic characteristic for intelligence (aside from information storage) seems to be preference, or the ability to select according to a bias, goal, a need for sorting, etc. Again, that's simply rudimentary proto-intelligence, not the complete, sophisticated package.

A spontaneous impulse or extended existential process that truly lacked all traits of guided "stuff production" -- that lacked preferences, that wasn't even proto-intelligent -- would thereby generate a plenum of all possibilities. No laws holding back the impossible or systemic biases preventing the realization of everything that can fall out of relationships and metrics. (Arguably rubbing shoulders with mathematical Platonism.)

So underlying the very claim that there's only a single cosmos (or whatever necessary, generic domain for being) with its ancestral configuration or original state back in time that sets everything to come and limits possibilities afterward, is actually the shunning of a totally non-intelligent origin.

Given the usual mindlessness projected upon nature, there's irony or inconsistency in that which supplements Yazata's view that absolute determinists are subconsciously dabbling in their own version of Creator.

(Feb 17, 2021 07:55 PM)C C Wrote: [ -> ]

(Feb 17, 2021 02:00 PM)Zinjanthropos Wrote: [ -> ]Can’t help but think of all those millions upon millions of sperm that I’ve produced in my lifetime that didn’t make it to an egg. Somehow two did. For sperm it’s a crapshoot, no idea why I needed so many for two kids when all I needed was the determined pair that made it. Seems like a good waste of biological material and energy drained from my system. Poor little buggers that didn’t succeed might as well not have been there but it was determined two would be successful for reasons no one can explain. Just not sure if it was determined two would get through or that this particular pair were determined at the BB. Can I say both?

Given how superfluous absolute determinists consider all the mediating agencies between their proposed "initial configuration" and the "complicated specifics" of later stages to be in terms of responsibility (including the human body), it could make one feel sarcastic about the need for numbers.

Quantity is enabling. A unique, life-bearing planet like Earth is made possible by countless dead worlds.

The most basic characteristic for intelligence (aside from information storage) seems to be preference, or the ability to select according to a bias, goal, a need for sorting, etc. Again, that's simply rudimentary proto-intelligence, not the complete, sophisticated package.

A spontaneous impulse or extended existential process that truly lacked all traits of guided "stuff production" -- that lacked preferences, that wasn't even proto-intelligent -- would thereby generate a plenum of all possibilities. No laws holding back the impossible or systemic biases preventing the realization of everything that can fall out of relationships and metrics. (Arguably rubbing shoulders with mathematical Platonism.)

So underlying the very claim that there's only a single cosmos (or whatever necessary, generic domain for being) with its ancestral configuration or original state back in time that sets everything to come and limits possibilities afterward, is actually the shunning of a totally non-intelligent origin.

Given the usual mindlessness projected upon nature, there's irony or inconsistency in that which supplements Yazata's view that absolute determinists are subconsciously dabbling in their own version of Creator.

Caution: Amateur philosopher at work

I like my sperm story. It's new. Before it I used to present the 'X saves lives' conundrum. When it works how would you know who X actually saved? Well , you can't know. All you know is a statistic indicating the decision to use X has worked up till now. But when it doesn't work we know who was not saved. I've always thought the latter could be argued as pre-determined but the former cannot. 

Don't know what that says about a pre-determined event vs non-determined. Greater possibility that if Sally was one of the saved that I wouldn't know but if she died then I would. Maybe an outcome has to have more facts to be classed as determined. Cause would be a fact but when I don't know if the cause actually saved Sally it's because I'm missing information that will never materialize. I'm left with no choice but to reject determinism because it should apply every time. IMHO of course

(Feb 17, 2021 06:19 PM)Syne Wrote: [ -> ]It's naive to think it is either a solely determined or a solely random situation. As our physical world demonstrates, both are equally necessary. The macro world of physically determined cause and effect does not exist without the micro world of quantum randomness, but nor is the former reducible to the latter. Even if we assume that memory is a large factor in motivation, the long-term potentiation of neural synapses is strengthened by activity. That activity is neither solely determined by external factors nor solely determined by internal factors or quantum randomness. External stimuli, like trauma, is also likely to reduce synaptic efficacy, and internal stimuli, like imagining playing piano, is neither random nor externally motivated, but strengthens synaptic activity to cause synaptic and, by extension, more general neural plasticity.

The external world provides both physical limitations and readily available choices, and the internal quantum randomness provides an even greater scope of potential choice. But behavior is not random, nor can it be predicted in a determinant fashion. Now, you may wish to presume that the balance between these two is, itself, random, but then the resulting behavior would tend toward randomness, where actual behavior largely remains consistent with an individual's history and personality. In order to reconcile that with both physical determinism and quantum randomness, you have to postulate a Maxwell's demon to mediate the input from the two to explicitly minimize the randomness/entropy in favor of more order.

And like Maxwell's demon, the only way to reconcile that with physical law is to include the demon in the calculation of the overall entropy. That would suggest that such a demon, or the will in this case, is necessary according to physics. Now, you may not like that something exists that cannot currently be addressed by science, but most scientists accept things like dark energy without batting an eye, even though we can only infer their existence without any ability to demonstrate how they operate. We do not presume that dark energy is supernatural, so it seems arbitrary to presume free will so.

If anyone claimed that the accelerating expansion of space, which violates all known laws of physics, could only be supernatural, you would call that person superstitious, at best. Well, the same thing goes for dismissing free will as supernatural because it seems to violate known physics. That makes you the superstitious one.

Considering the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum physics, which prioritizes the observer as a causal factor in physical wave function collapse, it really shouldn't be all that hard to imagine the observer, and the will of when to make a measurement, as being causative within it's own mind. In order to avoid that interpretation, we are forced to postulate increasingly less parsimonious and less demonstrable things like multiverses. It seems it takes a whole lot more faith to believe the unevidenced notion that every moment splits off into a new, independent universe than to believe that an observer who, by all appearance, collapses quantum possibilities into concrete reality by simple choice could also collapse the quantum potentials in the brain to effectuate choice.

Well said, but we'll never know. It might just be a hierarchy of drives.

---

(Feb 17, 2021 07:55 PM)C C Wrote: [ -> ]Given the usual mindlessness projected upon nature, there's irony or inconsistency in that which supplements Yazata's view that absolute determinists are subconsciously dabbling in their own version of Creator.

One thing that used to drive me nuts was when I heard someone say, "It was God's will," especially at a funeral, but can you imagine someone saying, "It was predetermined"? Just as bad, if not worse.

(Feb 18, 2021 02:03 AM)Secular Sanity Wrote: [ -> ]Well said, but we'll never know. It might just be a hierarchy of drives.

Man, that rivals Ostro's "pish posh".

The thing is that you fail to offer the least argument of how a hierarchy of drives could possibly mediate external stimuli and internal randomness and urges. But then, you are just regurgitating the thoughts of others. Why would I expect any better?

I like margaritas. I go to my usual restaurant. The waiter is excellent. I remember him. He goes out of his way to please you. I order the house margarita, but he recommends the cranberry one, and says that I won’t regret it. His likability and confidence influence my choice. I don’t want to disappoint him and I like new experiences. I get the cranberry margarita. Rewind the tape. Something in the chain of events leading up to my decision would have to change. If it played out in the exact same way, could I have chosen differently? I don’t think so.