(Jan 16, 2020 11:30 PM)Secular Sanity Wrote: [ -> ] (Jan 16, 2020 10:04 PM)C C Wrote: [ -> ]That's arguably it, although I don't restrict it to simple conceptions like block-universes or that such is even deterministic. If those become necessary features of it then I'd have to reject the classification.
Maybe I'm missing something because I don't understand how it wouldn't entail determinism.
My bad. Absolute determinism (always the case) is what I'm refraining from being dogmatic about.
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Quick reason (for me) not to be dogmatic: States of the universe in (naive or non-complex) eternalism just exist. There is no process determining them, popping the next one into being while eradicating the last.
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Another, that's lengthier... Since there are no past/future states in presentism (apart from everyday pragmatism of those labels), claims of determinism and indeterminism in presentism apparently have to be based on laws, principles, rules -- and lack of such applying when something is not predictable or determinable.
As a hybrid of presentism and eternalism, the growing block-universe (possibilism) can at least potentially serve a purpose in illustrating how the former two could be equivalent in some ways.
For instance, if a justifiable claim is made in the context of presentism that an event is random (not dictated by a law, not predictable), then that event still retains random status when mapped onto the preserved past of possibilism.
From there it can be mapped with the random value onto whatever framework eternalism uses, where there is no designation as past (or "now" and future).
The fact that Abraham Lincoln's complete life doesn't exist in presentism doesn't prevent people from asserting that he and his life did happen. And in possibilism his complete life would actually exist rather than being mere memory and environmental records vulnerably subsisting in a particular fleeting moment. Whatever justified an event being "random" in his life if in a presentism context would still be "random" in a possibilsm and eternalism context.
Note that this isn't about whether or not there are random events that cannot be subsumed under a law or method of prediction, but rather not denying their possibility (dogmatic).
It's also not about the issue of free will. Randomness does not equal free will, since an outside influence or controller is still an outside influence or controller even if it's random. In contrast to decisions and actions falling out of one's own identity traits and typical output of one's physiological system.
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Now, if one wants to define "determine" in a way that doesn't concern or even hint at a selective action and predictability via maxims... it's just a reference to, say, other existing differences that are usefully labeled "future" from the perspective of this state... Then it can pertain to the block-universe.
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A reason for not making eternalism synonymous with a simple block-universe (the only option or member for it) is that the latter doesn't take into account the complexities of a multiverse. As well as something like Julian Barbour's stratified manifold that he calls "Platonia". And any other candidates for new models lurking around the corner which might allow some semblance of unpredictability as to which world one is experiencing. Which is not to say that any of that stuff is the case, but they shouldn't dogmatically be ruled out.