Apr 4, 2019 03:39 PM
When attempting to reach a conclusion on the existence of God, logic is far more reliable than empiricism since it enables a kind of absolute and permanent epistemological foundation.
(Apr 4, 2019 03:39 PM)Ostronomos Wrote: [ -> ]When attempting to reach a conclusion on the existence of God, logic is far more reliable than empiricism since it enables a kind of absolute and permanent epistemological foundation.
(Apr 4, 2019 03:39 PM)Ostronomos Wrote: [ -> ]When attempting to reach a conclusion on the existence of God, logic is far more reliable than empiricism since it enables a kind of absolute and permanent epistemological foundation.
(Apr 4, 2019 06:31 PM)C C Wrote: [ -> ](Apr 4, 2019 03:39 PM)Ostronomos Wrote: [ -> ]When attempting to reach a conclusion on the existence of God, logic is far more reliable than empiricism since it enables a kind of absolute and permanent epistemological foundation.
Reason is all there is to begin with when it comes to exploring anything prior in rank to the sensible world (or our sequences of experiential events). But as Kant pointed out, the multiple possibilities that rational processes output are resistant to culling since they are just that: Do not involve phenomenal or immediate appearances subject to observing slash measuring at a time/location (manifested spatiotemporal attributes go out the window). Whether it's a nomological next-level of generative principles or the noumena of an intellectual world, there is nothing but language and abstract symbolic description for even handing those affairs.
In contrast: Single photons can be manipulated and either indirectly or directly "seen". Ultra-microscopic entities have actually long since become part of the empirical world. Just the ability alone to test and perform experiments on such reels them in from the attempts of old-school positivists and antirealists to keep them condemned to metaphysical turf. It's when entering an area like QM interpretations and quantum-gravity models/theories that a lack of culling rears its head and physics is flirting with trans-phenomenal speculation -- appeals to mathematics and aesthetics isn't going to negate the brute fact of those pursuits being descriptively realized in variable, multiple ways (there's no competition going on when a winner can't be declared or resists a finale).
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(Apr 9, 2019 03:49 PM)Ostronomos Wrote: [ -> ]CC,
In keeping with the topic of generative principles as you call them, could not God connectively and coherently self-configure as reality thereby negating his own non-existence at will? There seems to be some misunderstanding in the mind of many materialists, where those who have never experienced mortal triumph take their own life for granted. But I don't think it is premature to state that when facing the greatest of uncertainties, we tend to see reality on a deeper level, as one that includes a God.
[*] KANT: But as will be shown, reason has, in respect of its practical employment, the right to postulate what in the field of mere speculation it can have no kind of right to assume without sufficient proof. For while all such assumptions do violence to [the principle of] completeness of speculation, that is a principle with which the practical interest is not at all concerned. In the practical sphere reason has rights of possession, of which it does not require to offer proof, and of which, in fact, it could not supply proof. The burden of proof accordingly rests upon the opponent. But since the latter knows just as little of the object under question, in trying to prove its non-existence, as does the former in maintaining its reality, it is evident that the former, who is asserting something as a practically necessary supposition, is at an advantage (melior est conditio possidentis). For he is at liberty to employ, as it were in self-defence, on behalf of his own good cause, the very same weapons that his opponent employs against that cause, that is, hypotheses. These are not intended to strengthen the proof of his position, but only to show that the opposing party has much too little understanding of the matter in dispute to allow of his flattering himself that he has the advantage in respect of speculative insight. Hypotheses are therefore, in the domain of pure reason, permissible only as weapons of war, and only for the purpose of defending a right, not in order to establish it. But the opposing party we must always look for in ourselves. For speculative reason in its transcendental employment is in itself dialectical; the objections which we have to fear lie in ourselves. We must seek them out, just as we would do in the case of claims that, while old, have never become superannuated, in order that by annulling them we may establish a permanent peace.
Quote:Question: Could the mind e actual and prior to the supposed external concept of reality?
(Apr 9, 2019 06:28 PM)C C Wrote: [ -> ][*]Quote:Question: Could the mind be actual and prior to the supposed external concept of reality?[*]
As random-selected example... If realism about fields being fundamental were the case (i.e., particles are just vortices, nodes, knots, etc occurring in them), then obviously that manner of existence qualifies more as a kind of non-technological processor than a "world of corporeal entities". So such is both not phenomenally represented as the latter and not generalized and linguistically/abstractly conceived as a "reality" until certain patterns -- which in turn self-conceive themselves as "minds" -- do arise in the roiling complexities of the fields.
(Apr 11, 2019 06:49 PM)Ostronomos Wrote: [ -> ]Can you tell me if such a case would help establish a proof that mind contained reality as described by the CTMU's incoversion versus a reality that contained the mind (as in the generalized sense of the word) or coinversion? If these patterns can become intelligent by processing themselves (in the non-technological sense), assuming such is possible, then would what we typically view as a mind become self-distributed?