May 17, 2018 05:46 PM
(May 16, 2018 04:08 PM)C C Wrote: [ -> ]https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/obs...ng-normal/
EXCERPT: We use the term “normal” so casually and so often that it seems utterly…normal.
Familiar, certainly.
Quote:But [...] Yale University neuroscientists Avram Holmes and Lauren Patrick argue we must move beyond the traditional concept of “normal”
We "must"? Where does that implied necessity come from? It doesn't seem to be logical necessity. Once again, morality and moral exhortation seem to be sneaking into what is ostensibly "science".
Perhaps what intelligent people should be doing is displaying a little skepticism by not giving other people's personal opinions special credence just because magic words like "Yale university" and "neuroscientists" have been invoked.
Quote:because it doesn’t exist—at least, not as a single, fixed entity.
Their idea of the "traditional concept of 'normal'" looks like a straw man to me. Has anyone ever suggested that 'normality' is 'a single, fixed entity'?
Quote:Instead, they contend, it represents a wide spectrum of healthy variability. They shed light on why this variability exists, and what it contributes to the process of evolution.
Of course. That doesn't mean that the idea of normality is something that should be rejected. Beyond that, defining the scope and range of 'normality' becomes a philosophical problem (not a neuroscience problem).
I personally think that an Aristotelian approach to that question might be fruitful. 'Normality' would be defined in terms of our human functions and by the purposes that our various behaviors fulfill. Those in turn are probably defined in large part by evolution, I guess.
So normality in the biological sense would be behavior that's functional, that succeeds in achieving ends. Normal liver function would be a liver doing its biochemical job. Normal brain function would be function that allows people to solve the problems that they are faced with in life and to function effectively with other people.
Quote:It’s a position that is increasingly embraced by cognitive neuroscientists
There's the appeal to "scientific" authority again.
Quote:and it has clinical implications. The current assumption is mental pathology reflects a deviation from or disruption of “normal” behavior, which is in turn defined as the average behavior across the larger population; if you don’t behave like most people, then something’s gone wrong.
That's probably true, if we assume that most individuals are reasonably healthy and behave effectively within the limits imposed by their biology and their circumstances. Just biologically, it would be reasonable to assume that. Evolution selects for it.
Quote:Consider depression. In the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, depression is defined by a constellation of symptoms [...] The systematic lumping of non-normal behaviors into a discrete diagnosis gives the impression mental illness is a cognitive stepping out of bounds—that the mind has broken and requires fixing.
Absent an understanding of the underlying neurological etiology, I think that's probably a good way of conceptualizing depression. We obviously recognize it in terms of symptoms.
Quote:This concept of a fixed “normal,” Holmes and Patrick argue, is an erroneous and unrealistic (could one say “unhealthy”?) misconception that doesn’t reflect the healthy variation produced by evolution.
People who aren't depressed obviously do display an almost infinite variety of psychological states. I'm not aware that anyone has ever disputed that. But all of those states share the characteristic that they are reasonably functional in their circumstances. If somebody's psychology deviates too far from functionality in a particular direction (defined symptomatically in the DSM) then mental health professionals call it "depression".
I'm still unclear why that's supposedly "erroneous and unrealistic" and something that "must" be rejected.
Quote:Evolution, they maintain, doesn’t converge on a stable “healthy”
The straw-man again.
Quote:—or even a narrow range of healthy values within a given trait. Instead, there is a large range of healthy variability that depends greatly on the environment.
Ok, let's say that 'normal' means the ability to respond effectively to the surrounding environment. Let's say that can happen in many different ways. That doesn't mean that the idea of 'normality' is something to be rejected. (In favor of... what? Anything goes?) Even if these "scientific" clowns succeed in banishing the idea of "normality", they will still have to replace it with another idea that does the same work.
What appears to be happening here is another in the seemingly never-ending attempts to package political/moral social-change rhetoric in the guise of "science", usually by way of bad philosophy.
It's one of several reasons why whenever I hear the phrase "scientists say..." I suspect that I'm about to be bullshitted.