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Here's is an educational post on an issue I think few understand. Which solution do you favor? Or do you have your own solution?

"The basic problem of mental causation is an intuitive one: on the face of it, it seems that mental events cause physical events (and vice versa), but how can mental events have any causal effect on physical events? Suppose, for example, some person, John, orders dessert after dinner. It seems that at least one cause for such a physical, behavioral event is that John desired to have dessert and believed that by ordering dessert he would be able to soon have dessert. But, how can such mental events as beliefs and desires cause John's mouth to move in such a way that he orders dessert?

Sub-problems of mental causation

Exclusion problem

What follows is a summary of the causal exclusion problem in its simplest form, and it is merely one of several possible formulations.

To the extent that we do not have to go outside human physiology in order to trace the causal antecedents of any bodily movement, intentional action can be fully causally explained by the existence of these physiological antecedents alone. No mention of mental states need enter into the explanation. This troubles philosophers because intuitively it seems that mental states are crucial in causing a person to act (for example, their beliefs and desires). But, given that physiological facts are sufficient to account for action, mental states appear to be superfluous; they are at risk of being causally and explanatorily irrelevant with respect to human action (Yoo 2006, p. §3b.iii).

Many philosophers consider this apparent irrelevance to be a highly counter-intuitive and undesirable position to take. It ultimately leads to epiphenomenalism—the view that mental events or states are causally irrelevant, they are merely after effects that play no role in any causal chains whatsoever. Thomas Huxley famously noted that epiphenomenalism treats mental states like the steam coming off a train: it plays no causal role in the train's moving forward, it is merely an "emergent property" of the actual causation occurring in the engine (Walter 2003, p. §2).

Problem of anomalism

Another problem with mental causation is that mental events seem anomalous in the sense that there are no scientific laws that mental states can figure into without having exceptions. There are no "strict" laws, and mental events must factor into strict laws in order to fit respectably into the causal order described by current science [see (Davidson 1970)].

In short, one response has been to deny that psychological laws involving mental states require strict, exceptionless laws. Jerry Fodor argues that non-basic (or "special") sciences do not in fact require strict laws (Fodor 1980). In current practice, special sciences (for example, biology and chemistry) have ceteris paribus laws (or laws with "all else being equal" clauses), according to which there are exceptions. However, only in the basic sciences (physics) are there strict, exceptionless laws. Thus, although mental states are anomalous, they can still figure into scientifically respectable laws of psychology.

Problem of externalism

In the latter half of the twentieth century externalism about meaning became espoused by many philosophers. Externalism is roughly the view that certain parts of an individual's environment play a crucial role in the meaning of at least some of an individual's words [see (Putnam 1975) and (Burge 1979)]. A thesis about meaning affects the mind insofar as our thoughts are about things in the world. A common view in the philosophy of mind is that at least certain mental states have intentional content in this sense. For example, one's belief that water is wet has the semantic content of water is wet. The thought is about water and the fact that it is wet. But, if externalism is true—if some of the contents of one's thoughts are constituted at least in part by factors external to one's mind—then there is yet another difficulty in explaining how mental states can cause physical states (Yoo 2006, p. §3b.ii)].

Solutions to the problem

There are several options for answers to the kinds of questions raised by the basic problem of mental causation.

Dualist solutions

Some have claimed that while the mental and the physical are quite different things, they can nonetheless causally interact with one another, a view going back to Descartes [(Descartes & 1642/1986), especially meditations II & VI]. This view is known as interactionist dualism. The major problem that interactionist dualism faces is that of explicating a satisfactory notion of causation according to which non-spatial events, such as mental events, can causally interact with physical events. According to the current mainstream scientific world-view, the physical realm is causally closed, in that causal relationships only hold among physical events in the physical realm. Given these types of considerations, some argue that it is appropriate to say that the main assumptions in interactionist dualism generate the problem of mental causation rather than solve it (see (Yoo 2006, p. §1a).

Physicalist solutions

The other major option is to assert that mental events are either (at least contingently) identical to physical events, or supervene on physical events. Views that fall under this general heading are called physicalism or materialism. But, such views require a particular theory to explain how mental events are physical in nature. One such theory is behaviorism. Behaviorists, in general, argue that mental events are merely dispositions to behave in certain ways. Another theory is the identity theory, according to which mental events are (either type- or token-) identical to physical events. A more recent view, known as functionalism, claims that mental events are individuated (or constituted by) the causal role they play. As such, mental events would fit directly into the causal realm, as they are simply certain causal (or functional) roles. Finally, there is eliminative materialism, which simply denies that there are any such mental events; thus, there is really no problem of mental causation at all...."---https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of..._causation

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I must confess that I'm stumped by this problem. The answers given do not seem satisfactory and create more problems than they solve. While I lean towards dualism, I am left explaining how mind and matter indeed interact. How can a mere intention of the non-physical mind raise my arm instantaneously? Where does the mind touch the physical? In some third neutral substrate like energy? Energy seems a promising candidate in that it is both mental--as pure activity--and physical--as a substance. IMO energy just overlaps enough with mind and matter to provide the bridge between those two otherwise disparate realms.

Pragmatic dualism but philosophical monism.

Pragmatically, there does seem to be a division between mind and body. Some people solve the causation by saying there is no mind, just illusion.
Physicalism assumes everything is composed of one (monist) physical substance. I assume that substance has more of a mental nature, and that the physical is just a shared mental construct.
No issue of causation between a mind and a mental construct.

I'm inclined to think that the brain (and wider nervous system) is a hugely complex neural network. That's the level at which physical causality is applicable.

But part of what that nervous system is doing is trying to understand its own behavior and the behavior of other people and animals. It's way too complex to try to understand that in terms of the causal interactions of billions of neurons and synapses. So what we see is a seemingly innate (or largely innate) simplified model of ourselves and others consisting of features like 'ideas', 'beliefs', 'decisions', 'values' and so on. That's what I'm inclined to think that the mental vocabulary refers to, to elements of a mental model that's generated at the underlying neurological level.

That vision isn't unlike a computer where physics and physical causality are applicable down on the level of computer chips. Then there are levels of programming languages running abstractly atop the physical substrate level. You rise through machine language to assembly language and eventually to Windows 10. But the commands in Windows 10 aren't really entering into causal relationships themselves, they just simplify a more complicated set of things happening under the surface where the causality actually resides.

OK, so how would I address the issues in the OP?

First, I don't adhere to epiphenomenalism in any strong metaphysical sense, since I don't see the mental model as an ontologically existing kind of mind- stuff, even if mind-stuff is just causally ineffective smoke coming from a smokestack. (I'm not sure what to metaphysically make of information.)

Concerning the exclusion problem, I agree that one could give a complete causal description of what the brain is doing without employing any mental categories. But that doesn't leave the mental categories without a role, since practically speaking we can't understand ourselves or others in terms of the totality of individual neuron firings. We don't seem to have access to ourselves or others at that machine-language level and the processing task it would represent would just be too massive. We have to employ simplifying assumptions and a simplified model that basically summarizes a host of more complicated doings down at the neural level in a form where it can be efficiently processed.

The anomalism problem loses its force in this picture, since one wouldn't expect Windows 10 commands to conform to physical laws. They conform to different kinds of rules invented by Microsoft's software writers. The causal stuff is down there on the chip, of more concern to Intel than to Microsoft.

The externalism problem (I'm something of an adherent of externalism I guess) would probably respond to a similar reply.

If you can't explain it, explain it away.

(Feb 3, 2018 05:39 PM)Magical Realist Wrote: [ -> ]Here's is an educational post on an issue I think few understand. Which solution do you favor? Or do you have your own solution? [...] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of..._causation

Quote:. . . That problem, in short, is how to account for the common-sense idea that intentional thoughts or intentional mental states are causes of intentional actions....

If it's limited to intentional mental states, which the article itself has a link to just propositional attitudes, then those shouldn't need to be anything more than mechanistic structure and its operations. Unless stipulated beforehand that those procedural interactions are experienced slash manifested as something. It's vaguely akin to claiming that the word Moon or a linguistic account of Luna causes the meta-phenomenal version of the Moon -- or even causes the corporeal phenomenon of it in our exteroception. (One tentative step for machines: Making AI ‘Intentional’: a Case Study and New Programming Framework)

One meaning of "Intentionality" is aboutness or directedness. A mental state is an intentional mental state (has intentionality) when it is about about, or directed at some object. Beliefs are necessarily intentional mental states. It is impossible to have a belief without the belief being about something. If you believe that the earth is round, your belief is about the earth. If you are looking at a bird, your perceptual experience is directed at the bird. So these are examples of intentional mental states. Similarly, desire is also an intentional mental state - it is impossible to have a desire without the desire being a desire about something. Notice that an intentional mental state can be about something that does not actually exist. A little girl might believe that Santa Claus lives in Finland. Her belief is about Santa Claus even though Santa Claus does not exist. http://philosophy.hku.hk/courses/cogsci/...nality.php

Thought, desire, and sensory processing about _X_ doesn't necessarily entail "being shown". Since there's a p-zombie or "happening invisibly" type of those which is at least endorsed by the anti-panpsychism majority. (Physical in an ontological rather than a merely explanatory context seems equivalent to "existing or transpiring without evidence of such", when minus the exhibitions of mind). So again, if the wikipedia entry doesn't even directly want to emphasize the manifestations of consciousness as part of the problem or THE problem, then the mental states it addresses are potentially nominal to begin with (exist in name only, amount to an alternative identifying label for some mechanistic activities).

Ask someone for evidence of "physical events" and a "physical realm" without appealing to the concrete phenomena of experience and the utile descriptions and products of reason. You either get a blank response or a careless lack of recognizing that one is still appealing to / using the furniture and attributes of mind. That's why the latter are prior in rank to the former. But once mind (experiences, memory/habits, regulating intellect and understanding) have generated "shown / felt" evidence and warranted conclusions, then the game of "abstract casual structure" (physicalism) can be played. Which is all that's really going on with these struggles: Trying to make a jumble of invented / traditional concepts commensurable with each other. Our original sources for evidence (manifestation and reasoning) are relentlessly given whether we like it or not -- like water pouring on a prisoner chained under a waterfall. (Sally may never personally visit and witness Antarctica directly, but her intellect finds it doubtful that such a massive global conspiracy covering up that the continent is fictional could succeed for decades and decades. The complexity, the complexity!)

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Kant: No doubt I, as represented by the internal sense in time [introspective half of experience], and objects in space outside me [external half of experience], are two specifically different [categories of] phenomena, but they are not therefore conceived as different things [substances]. The transcendental object, which forms the foundation of external phenomena, and the other, which forms the foundation of our internal intuition, is therefore neither matter [physical], nor a thinking being by itself [mental], but simply an unknown cause of phenomena which supply to us the empirical concept of both. --CPR ... Müller translation [Note: That's "unknown cause" in a hierarchal sense, not causation in terms of our familiar, spatiotemporal sequence of relationships.]

The brow wrestling below should be more about the seeming incommensurability of two different descriptive approaches than the historical mistake of two parties reifying their rival conceptual orientations -- each treating their preference (material or mental) as THE actual manner of be-ing itself.

“An Argument Against the Mind Being a Physical Mechanism” (MS Word Document): In his important paper, “The Conceivability of Mechanism,” Norman Malcolm argues against a mechanistic account of the mind. Malcolm contends that a completely mechanistic account of the mind allows no place for “purposive explanations” to bring about events. Consequently, if the mind is merely a neurophysiological mechanism, no person ever performs an action for reasons the person holds. In other words, a wholly mechanistic account of the mind leaves no room for rational explanations of events. Just as it is incorrect to claim that the mechanistic actions of mousetraps, thermostats, and fax machines are rational, so it would be false to say that the mind operates rationally, if it is another physical mechanism of the same sort. Malcolm finds a mechanistic account of the mind inconceivable because it is impossible for someone to assert that the mind does not act on the basis of reasons, which is itself asserted on the grounds that one has good reasons to believe it.

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“In a physicalistic world, principles of sound reasoning have no relevance determining what actually happens.” Consequently, “On the assumption of the causal closure of the physical, no one ever accepts a belief because it is supported by good reasons. To say that this constitutes a serious problem for physicalism seems an understatement.” On pain of unassertability, then, physicalists must reject one of its core principles and allow for non-physical causes to bring about rational actions and beliefs. Since physicalism undermines the grounds for its own assertability, physicalism contains a problem of self-reference. Although physicalism could still be true, its truth comes with the steep price of undermining the rationality of believing physicalism itself.

The physicalist is presented with a dilemma. If physicalism is true, then the belief that physicalism is true is unassertable on rational grounds. On the other hand, if people hold some beliefs (including the belief that physicalism is true) on the basis of rational reasons, then physicalism is unassertable. The physicalist’s options are not attractive: either accept irrationality or reject physicalism. I should note that strictly speaking this is not a proof that physicalism is false. However, this provides grounds for dismissing physicalism since this shows if physicalism is true, then it is irrational to believe that physicalism is true.

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