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Full Version: Panpsychism is crazy, but it’s also most probably true
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IMO: "Panprotopsychism" should be used rather than panpsychism. The latter implies a fully functional mind as opposed to just precursors (elemental properties, powers, and components) which need to be organized into a functional arrangement of intellect, multi-modal experiences (qualitative showings) and cognition of them.

https://aeon.co/ideas/panpsychism-is-cra...bably-true

EXCERPT: [...] I maintain that there is a powerful simplicity argument in favour of panpsychism. The argument relies on a claim that has been defended by Bertrand Russell, Arthur Eddington and many others, namely that physical science doesn’t tell us what matter is, only what it does. The job of physics is to provide us with mathematical models that allow us to predict with great accuracy how matter will behave. This is incredibly useful information; it allows us to manipulate the world in extraordinary ways, leading to the technological advancements that have transformed our society beyond recognition. But it is one thing to know the behaviour of an electron and quite another to know its intrinsic nature: how the electron is, in and of itself. Physical science gives us rich information about the behaviour of matter but leaves us completely in the dark about its intrinsic nature.

In fact, the only thing we know about the intrinsic nature of matter is that some of it – the stuff in brains – involves experience. We now face a theoretical choice. We either suppose that the intrinsic nature of fundamental particles involves experience or we suppose that they have some entirely unknown intrinsic nature. On the former supposition, the nature of macroscopic things is continuous with the nature of microscopic things. The latter supposition leads us to complexity, discontinuity and mystery. The theoretical imperative to form as simple and unified a view as is consistent with the data leads us quite straightforwardly in the direction of panpsychism....
(Mar 4, 2017 07:55 PM)C C Wrote: [ -> ]Panpsychism is crazy, but it’s also most probably true

I agree pretty strongly with the first clause but disagree even more strongly with the second.

Quote:EXCERPT: [...] I maintain that there is a powerful simplicity argument in favour of panpsychism. The argument relies on a claim that has been defended by Bertrand Russell, Arthur Eddington and many others, namely that physical science doesn’t tell us what matter is, only what it does. The job of physics is to provide us with mathematical models that allow us to predict with great accuracy how matter will behave.

I think that there's some truth to that.

Quote:But it is one thing to know the behaviour of an electron and quite another to know its intrinsic nature: how the electron is, in and of itself. Physical science gives us rich information about the behaviour of matter but leaves us completely in the dark about its intrinsic nature.

I'm not sure what kind of answer this guy hopes to receive. What is an "intrinsic nature" and how could it be described or communicated? Why isn't he satisfied with something along the lines of 'An electron is whatever it is that behaves in such and such a way'?

Quote:In fact, the only thing we know about the intrinsic nature of matter is that some of it – the stuff in brains – involves experience.

I'd be inclined to say that "experience" (whatever that word means, it's rarely defined) arises in the functioning of information processing systems. Not necessarily all of them, but ones of a particular sort. Clarifying what that sort is, is the big outstanding task of the philosophy of mind.

It needn't have much to do with the "intrinsic nature" of the matter out of which the system is constructed. We could have a soft squishy system made out of biological neurons or a hard crystalline system made out of silicon chips or something, and as long as they are functionally equivalent, as long as they are performing the same information processing tasks, they would have equal claim to be undergoing 'experience' (whatever that is).

I don't think that "experience" needs to be a fundamental property of subatomic particles, any more than the files on your computer's hard drive need to be.  

Quote:We now face a theoretical choice. We either suppose that the intrinsic nature of fundamental particles involves experience or we suppose that they have some entirely unknown intrinsic nature.

How would it bring us any closer to understanding the "intrinsic nature" of whatever those particles are to hypothesize that they possess "experience" among their properties? This guy seems unmoved when we ascribe properties like mass or electric charge to them, arguing that we still don't really know what it is that possesses those properties. So why would ascribing psychological properties to them help us understand their natures?

Quote:On the former supposition, the nature of macroscopic things is continuous with the nature of microscopic things. The latter supposition leads us to complexity, discontinuity and mystery. The theoretical imperative to form as simple and unified a view as is consistent with the data leads us quite straightforwardly in the direction of panpsychism....

Is he trying to suggest that 'panpsychism' somehow explains the quantum-(microscopic)/classical-(macroscopic) interface? If so, it needs more explanation.
I think physicalism leads to some form of limited panpsychism. I mean it's pretty accepted as a given that matter CAN be conscious, as demonstrated by our own brains. The problem as I see it is whether consciousness is binary or graduated in lesser and greater degrees. We seem to assume babies are conscious, and animals, and even Alzheimer's patients. This seems to suggest that consciousness is not an all or nothing phenomena but varies in its intensity and extent. At it's most primitive levels, is it a property of neurons or a property of electrons? We''l have to wait and see I guess.
We can't even determine how the leap from matter to life occurred, much less that matter has any rudimentary, inherent experience. Assuming such things immediately leaves the realm of science for the ontological realm of philosophy, at best, and that not even remotely supported by anything empirical. As such, there are some things that science must remain agnostic on, which is what Russell and Eddington are expressing. How the author uses that as a jumping off point to conscious matter is beyond me. Seems the leap from conscious brain matter to conscious ore is indeed simple. A simple category error.