(Oct 6, 2016 04:15 PM)Secular Sanity Wrote: [ -> ]I don’t think that consciousness wholly originates from the brain. I think you need a body in order to process information. I’m a big fan of embodied cognition.
There are several, arguably distinct enterprises transpiring under the umbrella of "embodied cognition". I'm only focusing on what Lakoff is affiliated with below.
Due to "the human conceptual system being metaphorical in nature", George Lakoff's particular version has the odd offshoot of limiting us in ways reminiscent of Kant's categories (of the Faculty of Understanding). This is ironic from the standpoint that he spends much time railing against the abstract, language, or functional schemes of mind in the disembodied cognitive tradition. But then his team's work concludes with the human body itself becoming yet another epistemological filter. This sets aside who is wrong or right, and whether such limitations even matter. I'm merely noting the unexpected return to one familiar road-stop or destination along the way, despite the radical shift in approaches.
John Brockman, George Lakoff:
"We are neural beings," states Berkeley cognitive scientist George Lakoff. "Our brains take their input from the rest of our bodies. What our bodies are like and how they function in the world thus structures the very concepts we can use to think. We cannot think just anything - only what our embodied brains permit."
His new book Philosophy In The Flesh, coauthored by Mark Johnson, makes the following points: "The mind is inherently embodied. Thought is mostly unconscious. Abstract concepts are largely metaphorical."
Lakoff believes that new empirical evidence concerning these finding of cognitive science have taken us over the epistemological divide: we are in a new place and our philosophical assumptions are all up for grabs.
He and Johnson write: "When taken together and considered in detail, these three findings from the science of the mind are inconsistent with central parts of Western philosophy, and require a thorough rethinking of the most popular current approaches, namely, Anglo-American analytic philosophy and postmodernist philosophy."
According to Lakoff, metaphor appears to be a neural mechanism that allows us to adapt the neural systems used in sensory-motor activity to create forms of abstract reason. "If this is correct, as it seems to be," he says, "our sensory-motor systems thus limit the abstract reasoning that we can perform. Anything we can think or understand is shaped by, made possible by, and limited by our bodies, brains, and our embodied interactions in the world. This is what we have to theorize with."
He then raises the interesting question: "Is it adequate to understand the world scientifically?"
[...] The moral is that you cannot take conceptual systems for granted. They are neither transparent nor simple nor fully literal. From the perspective of the science of mind, science itself looks very different from what we are commonly taught it is. Scientific understanding, like all human understanding, must make use of a conceptual system shaped by our brains and bodies.
--PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH - A Talk with George Lakoff; EDGE 51— March 9, 1999
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Lakoff on functionalism, from the same EDGE interview above: Early cognitive science, what we call "first-generation" cognitive science (or "disembodied cognitive science"), was designed to fit a formalist version of Anglo-American philosophy. That is, it had philosophical assumptions that the determined important parts of the content of the scientific "results." Back in the late 1950's, Hilary Putnam (a noted and very gifted philosopher) formulated a philosophical position called "functionalism." (Incidentally, he has since renounced that position.) It was an apriori philosophical position, not based on any evidence whatever. The proposal was this:
The mind can be studied in terms of its cognitive functions - that is, in terms of the operations it performs - independently of the brain and body.
The operations performed by the mind can be adequately modeled by the manipulation of meaningless formal symbols, as in a computer program.
This philosophical program fit paradigms that existed at the time in a number of disciplines.
In formal philosophy:
The idea that reason could be adequately characterized using symbolic logic, which utilizes the manipulation of meaningless formal symbols.
In generative linguistics:
The idea that the grammar of a language can be adequately characterized in terms of rules that manipulate meaningless formal symbols.
In artificial intelligence:
The idea that intelligence in general consists in computer programs that manipulate meaningless formal symbols.
In information processing psychology:
The idea that the mind is an information-processing device, where information-processing is taken as the manipulation of meaningless formal symbols, as in a computer program.
All of these fields had developed out of formal philosophy. These four fields converged in the 1970's to form first-generation cognitive science. It had a view of mind as the disembodied manipulation of meaningless formal symbols.
[...] This view was not empirically based, having arisen from an apriori philosophy. Nonetheless it got the field started. What was good about it was that it was precise. What was disastrous about it was that it had a hidden philosophical worldview that mascaraded as a scientific result.
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Synopsis of George Lakoff views, by Piero Scaruffi:
Language is grounded in our bodily experience
Language is embodied, which means that its structure reflects our bodily experience
Our bodily experience creates concepts that are then abstracted into syntactic categories.
Syntax is a direct consequence of our bodily experience, not an innate property
Grammar is shared (to some degree) by all humans for the simple reason that we all share roughly the same bodily experience
All metaphors are ultimately based on our bodily experience
Metaphor = the process of experiencing something in terms of something else
The human conceptual system is metaphorical in nature, as most concepts are understood in terms of other concepts
Language comprehension always consists in comprehending something in terms of another
All our concepts are of metaphorical nature and are based on our physical experience
We understand the world through metaphors, and we do so without any effort, automatically and unconsciously
Language was created to deal with physical objects, and later extended to non-physical objects by means of metaphors
Conceptual metaphors transport properties from structures of the physical world to non-physical structures
Metaphor is central to our understanding of the world and the self
Metaphor is pervasive is that it is biological: our brains are built for metaphorical thought
Metaphorical language is but one aspect of our metaphorical brain